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Abstract 
This thesis contains four essays that examine the relationships among risk disclosures, 
multi-level governance, credit ratings, and bank value in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) banks. These essays concentrate on four closely linked risk disclosures, and 
governance topics that quantitatively investigate the antecedents and informativeness of risk 
disclosures by banks from 14 countries in MENA region over the 2006–2013 inclusive 
period.  
The first essay aims at investigating the impact of multi-layer governance mechanisms 
on the level of risk disclosures by banks. The essay result suggests a variation between 
MENA banks in the level of risk disclosures with a significant improvement from 2006 to 
2013. Specifically, the findings are three-fold. First, the results suggest that Sharia 
Supervisory Board (SSB) is positively associated with the level of risk disclosures by banks. 
Second and at the bank-level, the essay finds that ownership (governmental ownership and 
family ownership) and board (board size and non-executive directors) structures have a 
positive effect on the level of risk disclosures by banks, whilst CEO duality is negative, but 
insignificantly related to bank risk disclosures. At the country-level, the evidence suggests 
that control of corruption has a positive effect on the level of bank risk disclosures, whilst 
political stability and absence of violence have a negative, but insignificant association with 
the level of bank risk disclosures. 
In the second essay, the thesis investigates the relationships among national governance 
quality (NGQM), Islamic governance quality (ISGQ), including other bank-level governance 
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mechanisms, and risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs); and consequently 
ascertains whether NGQM has a moderating influence on the ISGQ -RMDPs nexus. The 
findings are four-fold. Firstly, this study finds that RMDPs are higher in banks from countries 
with higher NGQM. Secondly, this essay shows that RMDPs are higher in banks with better 
Islamic governance. Thirdly, the study finds that board size and non-executive directors have 
a positive effect on the level of RMDPs. Finally, this study finds evidence that suggests that 
NGQM has a moderating effect on the Islamic governance quality-RMDPs nexus.  
The third essay explores whether RMDPs have a predictive effect (informativeness) on 
banks’ credit ratings (BCRs); and consequently ascertains whether governance structures can 
moderate such an association. The findings suggest that RMDPs have a predictive effect on 
BCRs. The study finds that the quality of the BCR is higher in banks that have higher risk 
disclosures, board size, government ownership, board independence, women directors and 
established SSB. On the other hand, the results indicate that the BCR quality is lower in 
banks that have higher foreign ownership, and CEO role duality. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that governance structures moderate the relation between RMDPs and BCRs. 
The final essay examines the extent to which RMDPs and multi-level governance can 
explain observable changes in bank value in a number of ways. First, this essay seeks to 
examine whether RMDPs can influence the value of banks. The second objective is to 
examine how NGQM may affect the bank value. Finally, this essay explores the relationship 
between operating in better- or poorly-governed countries and the market value of banks. 
The results confirm the substantial role of risk disclosures and multi-level governance in 
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improving bank valuation in MENA. More specifically, the results indicate that market 
valuation is higher in banks with bigger foreign ownership, board size, board independence, 
Islamic governance, and NGQM. The results also show a significant negative relationship 
between CEO power and bank value. 
The research’s empirical findings are largely in line with the predictions of the multi-
theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, signalling, legitimacy, 
institutional, and resource dependence theories. The study findings are robust to alternative 
firm- and country-level controls, alternative multi-level governance mechanisms, risk 
disclosure proxies, alternative estimation techniques, and endogeneity problems.  
In doing so, this study extends, as well as contributes to the banking and governance 
literature in a number of ways. First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this thesis 
provides a first-time cross-country evidence on the level of risk disclosures in MENA 
countries, especially following the 2007/08 financial crisis in the banking industry. Second, 
this thesis offers first-time evidence on the informativeness of Islamic governance quality 
and risk disclosures from equity and debt markets. Third, this thesis offers evidence and 
extends prior research on the influence of multi-level governance on bank value, and credit 
ratings, using a multi-theoretical framework. Fourth, the study offers first-time evidence on 
the effect of national governance quality on banks’ risk disclosures, credit ratings, and bank 
value.  
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1. Background 
This thesis examines risk management and disclosure practices in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) setting in the light of recent risk disclosures and governance reforms. 
Risk management and disclosure practices are a significant part of bank’s long-term financial 
sustainability and annual reporting. They often include managerial clarifications, and 
commentary about a bank’s up-to-date state regarding uncertainty and future predictions 
(Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). However, regulators and stakeholders have been 
concerned with risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs) in recent years, 
especially following the 2007/2008 global banking crisis (Abedifar et al., 2013; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015; Laeven, 2013). 
The past decade has witnessed, in addition to the 2007/2008 global banking crisis, credit 
crunch, European debt crisis, and Chinese stock market crash in 2015. In addition, there were 
several high profile bank failures that happened around the world (e.g., Lehman Brothers in 
USA, Northern Rock in the UK, Islas Finance House in Turkey, the Dubai Islamic Bank, the 
Islamic Investment Companies of Egypt, Bank Islam Malaysia Berthed, and Islamic Bank of 
South Africa). These crises have affected the banking sector worldwide, as well as reignited 
concerns relating to the effectiveness of RMDPs (Aebi et al., 2012; BCBS, 2015a, 2015b; 
Beisland., 2014; Dardac & Grigore, 2011; Hasan, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Mollaha & 
Zamanb, 2015). 
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RMDPs as a corporate governance practice are principally critical for banks due to their 
opaqueness, complexities, multiple agency conflicts, and severely critical information 
asymmetries (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Bischof et al., 2016; Leventis et al., 2013). Regulators 
and central bankers prefer banks to practice risk management and disclosures by imposing 
stricter accounting standards (e.g., IAS 32, 39; IFRS 7, 9; Basel accords) and corporate 
governance (CG) reforms to achieve and maintain the well-functioning of the banking 
industry and the entire economy (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015; Laeven, 2013; 
Walker, 2009).  
Ineffective governance practices, including RMDPs, alternatively, may contribute to 
bank crashes, which can pose a substantial impact on investors, especially in the wake of 
crises. This, in turn, has grown current concerns over how banks are governed and what the 
governance structures that can effectively influence bank credit ratings and value are. 
Moreover, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) indicates that 
comprehensive and effective risk disclosures and governance structures are critical toward 
achieving and maintaining public trust and confidence (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 
2015a, 2015b; Deumes, 2008; Liang et al., 2013).  
Basel Accords (i.e. I, II, and III), international and domestic equivalent accounting (e.g., 
IFRS 7, 9; IAS 32, 39), and governance standards (e.g., World Bank and Saudi CG codes) 
are often aimed at strengthening the necessity for comprehensive RMDPs. Similarly, 
identifying, measuring, managing, controlling, and more importantly, disclosing risks are 
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becoming more critical as the global banking sector becomes increasingly complex and 
opaque. Nonetheless, Basel Accords and IFRS lack sufficient granularity in some key risk 
areas (e.g., operational risks and strategic risks), which in general are omitted from risk 
disclosures regulations (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Bischof & Daske, 2012).  
Hence, a number of changes have been made to Pillar 3 of the Basel Accords in order to 
improve risk disclosures by demonstrating that banks must provide clear, comprehensive, 
informative, consistent, and comparable risk disclosures on main risks in highly comparable 
formats (BCBS, 2015b). Revised Pillar 3 considers another step forward in the development 
of RMDPs; however, risk disclosure requirements should be developed frequently to ensure 
the quality and relevance of the risk disclosures.  
Thus, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 and credit crunch, Basel III raised 
both the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base and enhanced the risk coverage 
of the capital framework by strengthening the regulation, supervision, governance, and risk 
management of the banking sector (BCBS, 2011; Rattanataipop, 2013; Walker, 2011). 
Walker (2011) has argued for the continuous improvement in RMDPs, which is underpinned 
by good governance in order to reduce the likelihood of future financial crisis.  
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2. Motivation 
Despite the complexity of concerns around bank-level governance mechanisms and 
RMDPs (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Garas 
& Pierce, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Laeven, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, no attention has been given to how the national governance quality 
can affect these practices. As proposed by Aguilera et al. (2008), Baldini et al. (2016), 
García-Castro et al. (2013), Schiehll et al. (2014), and Schiehll and Martins (2016), effective 
CG structures may be contingent on the national governance quality factors. Such national 
governance quality may affect managers’, shareholders’, and other stakeholders’ insights of 
agency, legitimacy, and resource dependence problems (Essen et al., 2013; Hooghiemstra et 
al., 2015) and thus, eventually affects RMDPs choices in different governance contexts and 
its consequences. Consequently, many emerging markets, including those in the MENA 
region, have embarked upon reforms that are aimed at enhancing their CG structures and 
practices. 
This study focuses on MENA countries for a number of reasons. First, they provide a 
unique context, where risk disclosure can be examined. Similar to many developing market 
economies, MENA countries have witnessed varied challenges in relation to their CG 
practices compared to their developed counterparts. These challenges include prevalence of 
power concentration in the form of widespread CEO role duality, limited board 
independence, concentrated ownership structures, and poor levels of transparency and 
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disclosure practices (Hassan et al., 2009; Samaha et al., 2012). Second, many MENA 
governments and regulatory authorities have pursued a considerable amount of reforms on 
CG, including implementing IFRS and Basel accords (e.g., I, II, and III), which require banks 
to report more information about their RMDPs.  
Third, MENA banking sector has also experienced a phenomenal growth of Islamic 
banks (IBs), and dual banks (DBs) in recent times (Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015). Fourth, many 
countries in MENA region and other emerging markets, which suffered during GFC, have 
weaknesses in political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality environments 
and poor governance systems (Kaufmann et al., 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
To bridge the gap, regulators and standard-setters in MENA region established several 
CG codes depending on best CG practices since the mid-2000s to enforce minority 
shareholder rights and accountability, as well as to improve market transparency. Notably, 
these codes are mandatory in some countries, such as Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
and UAE or exist on “comply or explain” basis in countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, and 
Qatar. In other countries, such as Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, CG codes are voluntary 
(Amico, 2014). Furthermore, and because weak CG in banks can destabilise the financial 
system and given the significant socio-economic effect in circumstance of bank turmoil, 
specific attention has been given to banks’ CG (World Bank, 2009). Thus, in recent years, 
several MENA countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, and UAE, have issued mandatory CG code 
for banks, while the remaining countries have issued CG guidelines to ensure financial 
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strength in the MENA banking sector and in capital markets (Amico, 2014; Koldertsova, 
2011; World Bank, 2009).  
Moreover, BCBS issued revised CG principles for the banking sector in the wake of 
GFC to the well-functioning of the banking sector and the safeguarding of stakeholders’ 
interest to achieve a sustainable growth (BCBS, 2015b). Soundly governed banks could 
acutely affect the bank’s risk profile. For instance, soundly governed banks improve 
supervisory process through maintaining a competent and cost-effective management as well 
as prudential board oversight, sound and effective risk management, resilient internal 
controls, and compliance (BCBS, 2015b). Hence, the revised CG principles emphasise the 
importance/ implementation of rigorous risk governance, and hence, improve risk 
governance and disclosure practices (BCBS, 2015b). However, the low country-level 
governance in the majority of MENA countries may affect banks’ trustworthiness. Hence, 
MENA context allows us to examine clearly, if national governance quality moderates the 
relationship between bank-level governance mechanisms and RMDPs, or the relationship 
between bank-level governance mechanisms, RMDPs, and bank value. 
In addition to CG and IFRS reforms in MENA region, many commercial banks have 
transformed completely or opened a window for Islamic banking, especially after the 
remarkable large-scale growth in Islamic banking and finance worldwide, particularly in the 
MENA region (Beck et al., 2013; Ernst & Young, 2012; Ozturk, 2014; Rahman & Bukair, 
2013; Safieddine, 2009).  
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However, and whilst this is generally a positive development, it can also create 
additional agency, governance, and management challenges as Islamic (IBs) and dual (DBs) 
banks tend to have two distinct internal CG structures. It consists of the traditional board of 
directors, which is expected to focus on taking conventional decisions, and Islamic 
governance committee/SSB, which tends to focus on ensuring that the products and services 
of their banks comply with Sharia law (Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Safieddine, 2009). These 
include, but are not limited to prohibition of charging interest (Reba) and prohibition from 
engaging in speculation. Moreover, Islamic banks rely on a risk-sharing model, and are 
required to be more transparent and accountable compared to conventional counterparts, 
because they mainly face and monitor more risks.  
Despite its importance, studies examining the impact of firm-level governance structures 
on risk disclosure are generally rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013), but particularly acute with respect to the 
banking sector of developing countries, such as those in the MENA region. Furthermore, and 
to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous research has examined the effect of 
multi-level governance mechanisms (e.g., board and ownership mechanisms, Sharia 
supervisory board – SSB, and country-level governance mechanisms) either on the level of 
bank risk disclosures or on bank credit ratings and value.  
This conveys us also to an additional important theoretical gap in the banking research—
the propensity to focus on a single country, principally the USA. Extant research has 
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increasingly documented that the institutional context has substantial implications for 
disclosure and governance findings (Aguilera et al., 2008; Elshandidy, 2016; Filatotchev et 
al., 2016). 
Also and although there are growing suggestions that the distinctive and peculiar 
features of national governance quality (NGQM) are an important driver of bank strategies, 
behaviour, and valuations (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 
2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), extant research relating to the impact of NGQM on disclosure 
quality (e.g., RMDPs) or bank credit ratings and value has received little attention (Alon & 
Dwyer, 2014; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Cahan et al., 2015; Essen et al., 2013; García-
Castro et al., 2013; Schiehll et al., 2014). Thus, I conjecture that because of these variances, 
reliance on bank CG, and risk disclosures may lead to variances in bank credit ratings and 
value in different contexts. Hence, understanding the effect of country- and bank-level 
governance extends the knowledge of the antecedents and the economic role of risk 
disclosures. 
Given this background, this thesis hence contains four essays that measure the level of 
risk disclosures in MENA banks and ascertain the extent to which multi-level governance 
mechanisms, including bank- and country-level governance can explain observable 
differences in such risk disclosures. In addition, it examines the informativeness of risk 
disclosures from equity and debt markets.  
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3. Essay 1 
The first essay investigates the impact of multi-layer governance (MLG) mechanisms, 
consisting of board and ownership structures, Sharia supervisory board (SSB), and country-
level governance characteristics on the level of risk disclosure by banks in emerging context 
(MENA). Despite its importance, studies examining the impact of firm-level governance 
structures on risk disclosures have major limitations. First, most prior studies explore the 
nature and determinants of risk disclosure in developed countries (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Deumes, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2014; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; 
Miihkinen, 2012; Linsley et al., 2006; Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 2009).  
By contrast, little attention has been given to developing countries in general, but the 
MENA region in particular (Al-Shammari, 2014; Ismail & Rahman, 2013; Muzahem, 2011; 
Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013). In addition, little attention has been given to the banking sector 
despite its importance to global and national economies, as well as governments, other 
corporations, and households (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Rattanataipop, 2013; Savvides & 
Savvidou, 2012). Second, there is a limited number of large-scale cross-country studies that 
examine governance and risk disclosure practices (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Dobler et al., 
2011; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015), especially in developing countries in general, and MENA 
banks in particular (Abdallah et al., 2015). Third, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
there is no evidence on whether Islamic governance and country-level governance 
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mechanisms are associated with risk disclosure in different regulatory environments, 
especially in developing countries. Thus, this essay seeks to answer four questions. 
The first question is whether the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) can have an effect on 
the level of bank risk disclosures. The second question is -at the bank-level- whether 
differences in risk disclosure level could be explained by board structures. The third question 
is whether the ownership structures (government ownership and family ownership) can have 
an effect on the level of bank risk disclosures. The fourth question examines, at the country-
level, the extent to which country-level governance mechanisms (i.e., control of corruption 
(COCQ) and political stability and absence of violence (PSQ)) can have an effect on the level 
of bank risk disclosures. This essay employs a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates 
predictions from agency, resource dependence, and signalling perspectives in order to fully 
explain differences in aggregate levels of risk disclosure. 
This essay examined four hypotheses to determine the relationship between multi-layer 
governance mechanisms and the level of risk disclosures. Using one of the most extensive 
datasets on MLG and risk disclosure to date from 14 countries in the MENA region over the 
period from 2006 to 2013, in addition to employing fixed effect, 3SLS, and G2SLS 
regression models, the findings are three-fold. First, the results suggest that SSB is positively 
associated with the level of risk disclosures by banks.  
Second, and at the bank-level, the essay finds that ownership (governmental ownership 
and family ownership) and board (board size and non-executive directors) structures have a 
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positive effect on the level of risk disclosures by banks, whilst CEO duality is negative, but 
insignificantly related to bank risk disclosures. At the country-level, the evidence suggests 
that control of corruption has a positive effect on the level of bank risk disclosure, whilst 
political stability and absence of violence have a negative, but insignificant association with 
the level of bank risk disclosures. 
4. Essay 2 
The second essay examines the relationships among national governance quality 
(NGQM), Islamic governance quality, including other bank-level governance mechanisms 
and risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs); and consequently ascertains 
whether NGQM has a moderating influence on the Islamic governance quality-RMDPs 
nexus. Notwithstanding, prior studies investigating the relationships among national 
governance quality, Islamic governance quality, including other bank-level governance 
mechanisms (ISGQ) and RMDPs are rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 
2013; Elshandidy et al., 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, and 
to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no extant study examining how NGQM 
might probably affect the ISGQ-RMDPs nexus.  
The second essay, therefore, seeks to answer two main questions. The first question is 
whether the NGQM and ISGQ have an effect on the level of RMDPs. In addition, this essay 
explores why and how national governance quality may have a moderating influence on the 
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ISGQ-RMDPs nexus in the MENA Islamic banks. This essay employs a multi-theoretical 
framework that incorporates predictions from agency, signalling, legitimacy, institutional, 
and resource dependence perspectives in order to fully explain the differences in RMDPs. 
This essay examined three hypotheses to determine the relationship between national 
governance quality (NGQM), Islamic governance quality, including other bank-level 
governance mechanisms and risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs). 
 Using Islamic banks dataset from 10 MENA countries from 2006 to 2013, in addition 
to employing fixed effect and G2SLS regression models, the findings are four-fold. Firstly, 
this study finds that RMDPs are higher in banks from countries with higher NGQM. 
Secondly, this essay shows that RMDPs are higher in banks with better Islamic governance. 
Thirdly, the study finds that board size and non-executive directors have a positive effect on 
the level of RMDPs. Finally, this study finds evidence suggesting that NGQM has a 
moderating effect on the Islamic governance quality-RMDPs nexus. 
5. Essay 3 
Unlike literature on the impact of risk disclosures and governance structures, which 
tends to focus largely on equity markets in one national financial market, the third essay 
explores the predictive effect (informativeness) of risk disclosures on banks’ credit ratings 
(BCRs). Consequently, it ascertains whether governance structures have a moderating effect 
on the risk disclosures-BCRs nexus. 
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Literature appears to suffer from a number of limitations. Firstly, limited prior studies 
have generally examined the informativeness of risk disclosures in developed countries 
(Abraham & Shrives., 2014; Maffei et al., 2014; Elshandidy & Neri., 2015; Rajgopal, 1999) 
and observably, large-scale, cross-country studies are limited (Elshandidy & Neri., 2015; 
Lau et al., 2015). Secondly, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no evidence 
on whether Islamic governance and governance structures, in general, moderate the 
relationship between risk disclosures and BCRs in different regulatory environments such as 
MENA countries.  
The third essay, hence, seeks to answer five main questions. The first question is whether 
risk disclosures have a predictive effect (informativeness) on bank credit ratings (BCRs) in 
MENA region. The second question is whether the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) can have 
a predictive effect (informativeness) on BCRs in MENA region. The third question is -at the 
bank-level- whether differences in BCRs could be explained by board structures. The fourth 
question is whether the ownership structures can have an effect on the BCRs. The fifth 
question examines whether governance structures have a moderating effect on the risk 
disclosures-BCRs nexus. This essay employs a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates 
predictions from agency, signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence perspectives in 
order to fully explain the informativeness of risk disclosures and governance structures.  
This essay examined five hypotheses to determine the informativeness of risk 
disclosures and governance structures on BCRs using firm-level data from 12 MENA 
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countries for the period from 2006-2013, in addition to employing ordered logistic regression 
and 2SLS regression models and The Probabilistic Neural Networks (PNNs). The findings 
suggest that risk disclosures have a predictive effect (informativeness) on BCRs. The study 
finds that the quality of the BCR is higher in banks that have higher risk disclosures, board 
size, government ownership, non-executive directors, women directors and established 
Sharia supervisory board. On the other hand, the results indicate that the BCR quality is 
lower in banks that have higher foreign ownership, and CEO role duality. Furthermore, the 
findings suggest that governance structures moderate the relation between risk disclosures 
and BCRs. The Probabilistic Neural Networks (PNNs) results partially support the ordered 
logistic regression results and provide new insights in relation to the importance of risk 
disclosure pre/during/post the financial crisis by rating agencies.  
6. Essay 4 
In the fourth essay, we undertake a cross-country study to investigate three issues related 
to market valuation, which are highly relevant to banks and investors in developing countries. 
The first issue is whether the risk disclosures can influence the value of banks. The second 
issue is how bank-level governance may affect the bank value. Finally, this essay explores 
the relationship between operating in highly governed countries and the market value of 
banks. 
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A growing research focuses on the market valuation of the risk disclosures and other 
multi-level governance ties in banks; however, the results so far are inconsistent. It remains 
ambiguous, though, whether risk disclosures and governance mechanisms affect investors’ 
perceptions of banks’ value. Extant research conveys us to an additional important theoretical 
gap in the banking research—the propensity to focus on a single country, principally the 
USA. However, extant research in developing countries is extremely rare (Moumen et al., 
2015), which may influence the effectiveness of governance structures results (Filatotchev 
et al., 2013; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015).  
The fourth essay, hence, seeks to answer three main questions. The first question is 
whether risk disclosures influence banks’ market value in the MENA region. The second 
question is whether the bank-level governance, including Islamic governance, board 
structures, and ownership structures affect market valuation. The third question is whether 
country-level governance could explain differences in market valuation. This essay employs 
a multi-theoretical framework that incorporates predictions from agency, signal, and 
institutional perspectives in order to explain fully the impact of risk disclosures and multi-
level governance on market valuation.  
This essay examined five hypotheses to determine the impact of risk disclosures and 
multi-level governance on market valuation using a dataset from 14 MENA countries for a 
period of eight years from 2006 to 2013. The results confirm the substantial role of risk 
disclosures and multi-level governance in improving bank valuation in MENA. More 
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specifically, the results indicate that market valuation is higher in banks with bigger foreign 
ownership, board size, board independence, Islamic governance, and national governance 
quality. The results also show a significant negative relationship between CEO power and 
bank value. Additionally, I found evidence of informative risk disclosures and multi-level 
governance in countries considered as a strongly governed environment. More importantly, 
the bank-level governance impact is higher in poorly governed environments compare to 
strongly governed environments. 
 The next sections will present the content of each of the four essays with the final 
section offering an overview, as well as conclusions to the thesis.  
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Empirical Essays on Risk Disclosures, Multi-Level 
Governance, Credit Ratings, and Bank Value: 
Evidence from MENA Banks 
 
 
 
Essay 1 
 
The Impact of Multi-Layer Governance on 
Risk Disclosure: Evidence from MENA 
Banks 
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Abstract  
This essay examines the impact of multi-layer governance (MLG) mechanisms, 
consisting of board and ownership structures, Sharia supervisory board (SSB), and country-
level governance characteristics; on the level of risk disclosure by banks. Using one of the 
most extensive datasets on MLG and risk disclosure to-date from 14 countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region over the period 2006 to 2013, the findings are three-
fold. First, the results suggest that SSB is positively associated with the level of risk 
disclosures by banks. Second and at the bank-level, the essay finds that ownership 
(governmental ownership and family ownership) and board (board size and non-executive 
directors) structures have a positive effect on the level of risk disclosures by banks, whilst 
CEO duality is negative but insignificantly related to bank risk disclosures. At the country-
level, the evidence suggests that control of corruption has a positive effect on the level of 
bank risk disclosure, whilst political stability and absence of violence have a negative, but 
insignificant association with the level of bank risk disclosures. The empirical findings are 
largely in line with the predictions of the multi-theoretical framework that incorporates 
insights from agency, signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence theories. The findings 
are robust to alternative firm- and country-level controls, alternative MLG mechanisms and 
risk disclosure proxies, alternative estimation techniques, and endogeneity problems. 
Keywords: Risk Disclosure; Corporate Governance; Sharia Supervisory Board; Country 
Governance; MENA Banks; Multi-Theoretical Perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis has raised the importance of risk management and 
disclosure, as well as governance structures in the banking sector worldwide (Abdallah et 
al., 2015; Aebi et al., 2012; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; Ntim, 
2016; Walker Review, 2009). Despite its importance, studies examining the impact of firm-
level governance structures on risk disclosure are generally rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013), but particularly acute 
with respect to the banking sector of developing countries, such as those in the MENA 
region. Further, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous research has 
examined the effect of multi-layer governance mechanisms (e.g., board and ownership 
mechanisms, Sharia supervisory board – SSB, and country-level governance mechanisms) 
on the level of bank risk disclosures. Therefore, this study seeks to contribute to the literature 
by examining the impact of MLG mechanisms on the level of risk disclosure by banks. Using 
a dataset from 14 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and its 
unique characteristics over the period of 2006 to 2013, where current IFRS, Basel II, III, and 
corporate governance (CG) reforms require banks to provide more transparent information 
on their risk management and disclosure practices.  
The risk disclosure literature generally suggests that governance structures are a key 
determinant of risk disclosure for a number of reasons. First, agency theory suggests that 
good governance structures can help reduce the level of information asymmetry and 
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uncertainty between shareholders and managers, as well as between shareholders and 
stakeholders by facilitating greater corporate transparency, and accountability through 
increased risk disclosures (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 
2013; Safieddine, 2009).  
Second, signalling theory predicts that banks with good governance structures may 
choose to disclose additional information voluntarily about risk as differentiating 
characteristic to send significant signals to the market that additional requirements are not 
needed. Also, the board of directors (BODs) and shareholders may elect to signal the quality 
of their banks by engaging in increased risk disclosures (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973). 
With specific reference to Islamic banks, their SSBs can arguably communicate their 
monitoring power and effectiveness with respect to imposing Sharia1 compliance to other 
stakeholders; through increased risk disclosures. 
Third, from the standpoint of resource dependence theory, bank boards and shareholders 
might increase the quality of risk disclosure in order to obtain access to critical resources, 
such as finance and business contracts (Jia et al., 2009; Jizi et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). With a particular focus on Islamic banks, their SSBs can be a 
                                               
1 Sharia or Islamic law is Islamic principles derived mainly from contemporary Islamic theology 
interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (Syed & Van Buren, 2014). It 
should be noted that Sharia or Islamic law regarding to human daily interaction (e.g., financial 
transactions) is not a strictly well-defined set of specific rules and principles because it may differ 
based on Islamic scholars’ interpretation to contemporary activities (Abedifar et al., 2013; Lewis, 
2007; Syed & Van Buren, 2014). 
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mechanism for securing such resources and legitimising their banks’ operations and 
performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Oliveira et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995).  
In general, a few empirical studies have either investigated the impact of governance 
structures on risk disclosure or examined it within the banking context (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Oliveira et al., 2011; Rattanataipop, 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012). 
Despite the importance of risk disclosure, the general prior empirical research on risk 
disclosure and CG has major limitations. First, most prior studies explore the nature and 
determinants of risk disclosure in developed countries (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Deumes, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011; Elshandidy 
et al., 2013, 2014; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Kajüter, 2006; 
Konishi & Ali, 2007; Miihkinen, 2012; Linsley et al., 2006; Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 
2009).  
By contrast, little attention has been given to developing countries in general, but the 
MENA region in particular (Al-Shammari, 2014; Amran et al., 2008; Ismail & Rahman, 
2013; Moumen et al., 2015; Muzahem, 2011; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013). In addition, little 
attention has been given to banking sector despite its importance to global and national 
economies, as well as governments, other corporations and households (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Rattanataipop, 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012).  
Second, there is a limited number of large-scale cross-country studies that examine 
governance and risk disclosure practices (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Dobler et al., 2011; 
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Elshandidy & Neri, 2015), especially in developing countries in general, and MENA banks 
in particular (Abdallah et al., 2015). Third, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there 
is no evidence on whether Islamic governance and country-level governance mechanisms 
are associated with risk disclosure in different regulatory environments, especially in 
developing countries. 
This study focuses on MENA countries because they provide a unique context, where 
risk disclosure can be examined. Similar to many developing market economies, MENA 
countries have witnessed varied challenges in relation to their CG practices compared to their 
developed counterparts. These challenges include prevalence of power concentration in the 
form of widespread CEO role duality, limited board independence, concentrated ownership 
structures and poor levels of transparency and disclosure practices (Hassan et al., 2009; 
Samaha et al., 2012). Thus, many MENA governments and regulatory authorities have 
pursued considerable amount of reforms on CG, including implementing IFRS and Basel 
accords (e.g., I, II, and III), which require banks to report more information about their risk 
management practices.  
MENA banking sector has also experienced a phenomenal growth of Islamic banks 
(IBs), and dual banks (DBs) in recent times (Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015). However, whilst 
this is generally a positive development, it can also create additional agency, governance, 
and management challenges as IBs and DBs tend to have two distinct internal CG structures. 
It consisting of the traditional board of directors; which is expected to focus on taking 
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conventional decisions, and Islamic governance committee/SSB, which tends to focus on 
ensuring that the products and services of their banks are in compliance with Sharia law 
(Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Safieddine, 2009).  
Against this background, the central objective of this study is to examine the impact of 
MLG on the level of risk disclosure by MENA banks. Specifically, this essay investigates 
the impact of board, ownership, SSB and country-level governance characteristics on the 
level of risk disclosure in MENA banks, consisting of IBs, commercial banks (CBs), and 
DBs. In doing so, this study extends, as well as makes a number of new contributions to the 
extant literature. First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study provides a first-
time cross-country evidence on the level of risk disclosures in MENA countries, especially 
following the 2007/08 financial crisis. Second, this essay provides evidence for the first time 
on the impact of SSB on the level of risk disclosure by banks. Third, this essay provides 
evidence on the extent to which differences in bank risk disclosures can be explained by 
other MLG structures, including board and ownership mechanisms and country-level factors. 
Finally, the study evidence offers insights into risk disclosure and governance practices over 
the pre- and post-2007/08 period in MENA countries.  
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses risk disclosure 
practices, CG reforms, Sharia supervisory board (SSB), and Islamic governance in a MENA 
context. Section 3 provides a proposed multi-theoretical framework for risk disclosure. 
Section 4 reviews the literature on MLG and risk disclosure. Section 5 outlines the research 
  
 
44 
 
 
 
design and measurements of variables. Section 6 reports and discusses the empirical findings. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Risk Management, CG Disclosure Reforms, and 
Sharia Supervisory Board in MENA  
The 2007/2008 financial crisis has raised the importance of risk disclosure and 
management in the banking sector worldwide. Indeed, the past decade has witnessed the 
global financial crisis, credit crunch, European debt crisis, and several high-profile corporate 
failures including large global banks (e.g., AIG, Enron, Islas Finance House in Turkey, 
Lloyds TSB, Lehman Brothers, Northern Rock, WorldCom, the Dubai Islamic Bank and the 
Islamic Investment Companies of Egypt) (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Greuning & 
Bratanovic, 2003; Horcher, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Ozturk, 2014). These failures happened 
in the banking sector as banks were exposed to various types of risk.  
Although risk is a key issue in banking operations, there are two approaches to defining 
it (Ale, 2009; GASB, 2000). The first approach concentrates on the negative effects of risk, 
including potential losses, negative impact, hazards, damages or threats (Ale, 2009; Bessis, 
2002; GASB, 2000). By contrast, a second approach concentrates on a combination of the 
upside (favourable) and downside (unfavourable) of risks (IRM, 2002, COSO, 2004, ISO, 
2009, IAS 32 and 39, IFRS 7). This study will follow the second approach that defines risk 
as uncertainty, volatility, and exposure affecting the deviation from an expected outcome, 
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which results in potential gains or losses because it is more comprehensive and reflects more 
accurately banking operations and the broader business environment. In spite of the 
importance of risk disclosure and management practices especially during periods of 
economic and financial crises, there are no comprehensive financial reporting standard that 
currently covers all types of risks. 
Banks are exposed to various types of risk when providing their financial services. These 
risks have been grouped by prior research in different ways in order to suit largely their 
analytical framework. However, the common types of risk (Ahmed, 2010; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Greuning & Bratanovic, 2003; Horcher, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013), which 
are considered in this study include financial risks (e.g., credit risk, liquidity risk, market 
risks, capital management and adequacy risks), and non-financial risks (e.g., operational 
risks and strategic risks). Also, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a 
subgroup of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), highlights enhancing market 
discipline in the Basel II Capital Accord (Pillar 3) by improving risk disclosure in the global 
banking sector (BCBS, 2006; Ismail & Rahman, 2013; Van Oorschot, 2010).  
Basel II capital accord categorises three main types of risks, which are: (i) credit, (ii) 
market, and (iii) operational risks; to which banks have an obligation to reserve adequate 
capital resources (i.e., regulatory capital) in order to absorb any unexpected losses. In 
addition, Pillar III market discipline includes quantitative and qualitative disclosure for each 
separate risk type and the risk management objectives and policies have to be described. It 
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should be noted that apart from the Basel Accords, some international accounting standards 
have been issued that specially deal with the management of risks by companies. These 
include IAS 32, IFRS 7, and IFRS 9. A major limitation of these accounting standards is that 
they concentrate only on financial risks, which include credit, liquidity, market, and 
derivative/financial instruments trading risks. In fact, neither Basel I, II, and III nor IAS 32, 
IFRS 7 and IFRS 9 deal with operational (e.g., technology and integrity risks) and strategic 
risks (e.g., inflation and interest rates risks) (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2006). 
Furthermore, risk disclosures in banks have also become more complex due to the 
growing financial and technological complexity, large-scale acquisitions and mergers, new 
business activities, globalisation, and regulations, such as the Basel Accords (Akkizidis & 
Bouchereau, 2005; BCBS, 2003). With specific reference to the Basel Accords and unlike 
Basel I, Basel II requires banks to measure, allocate, and disclose specific risks such as credit, 
liquidity, market and operational risks (BCBS, 2006). More importantly, the third pillar 
(market discipline) of Basel II sets disclosure requirements to evaluate key risk information 
regarding the scope of application, risk exposures, risk appetite framework, risk assessment 
processes, and risk capital adequacy (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Iren et al., 2014).  
It is worthy to note that Basel II Accord proposed qualitative and quantitative risks 
disclosures regarding strategies, processes, structure, and nature of the credit, liquidity, 
market, and operational risks used by banks, in addition to risks methods that can be used to 
calculate the minimum capital adequacy requirements. Principally, Basel II Accord required 
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a qualitative risks disclosure that contains (i) risk measurement approach, (ii) risk 
management strategies and processes, (iii) risk management functional structure and 
organisation, and (iv) scope and nature of the risk reporting system (BCBS, 2006, 2014c). 
Basel II Accord also expected a quantitative risk disclosure that contains risk exposure, and 
the amount of regulatory capital for risk (pillar 1 capital) (Akkizidis & Bouchereau, 2005; 
BCBS, 2006). Along with the Basel II requirement, similar risk disclosure issues have been 
addressed by IFRS 7 and 9, in addition to IAS 32 and 39 (Bischof, 2009). For instance, IFRS 
7 requires a qualitative and quantitative disclosures relating to risks arising from financial 
instruments (Bischof, 2009; Dobler et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011). However, there is no 
formal granularity risks reporting requirements currently in existence (BCBS, 2016). It 
should be noted also that Basel II Accord is not compulsory for all banks in the MENA 
region. However, banks in many countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are required to fully comply 
with Basel II and III (BCBS, 2015a).  
Currently, many MENA banks are reconsidering their risks and their governance 
practices (BCBS, 2014b; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Young, 2015). Thus, we analyse risk 
disclosure drivers because MENA banks had a substantial degree of freedom regarding some 
risks such as operational and strategic risks, as has been discussed above. 
Furthermore, banks in MENA face a unique challenge in managing their risk, due to the 
continual political turbulence, distinctive asset and liability structures, and Islamic 
compliance, compared to conventional banks (Abedifar et al., 2013; Abu Hussain & Al-
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Ajmi, 2012; Mokni et al., 2014; Mollaha & Zaman, 2015). Additionally, the need to comply 
with Islamic governance rules and regulations poses stronger risk management challenges 
compared to their counterparts (Abedifar et al., 2013; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Mokni et al., 
2014; Pappas et al., 2012; Rosman & Abdul Rahman, 2015).  
Thus and due to the apparent special nature of MENA banks, the religious features of 
those banks create additional risks in terms of Sharia non-compliance risk (Abedifar et al., 
2013; Izhar & Asutay, 2010; Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2007). Thus, we conjecture that the 
antecedents of risks in MENA banks can be expected to differ from those of counterparts. 
As such, studying the RMDPs in MENA banks, where empirical findings are rare, can 
contribute to current knowledge and understanding of the motives and determinants of 
RMDPs. 
Many experts and scholars still see the requirements of the Basel capital accords (Basel 
I, II, and III)  and IFRS (IAS 32, IFRS 7, and IFRS 9) as being very general and qualitative 
in nature, although considered as an important step towards enhancing risk disclosure in 
banks (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 2009). Thus, in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2007 and credit crunch, it was shown that the capital regulation of Basel II might be 
insufficient to strengthen the banking sector transparency and need to develop a new or 
revised framework (Mittoo & Varotto, 2011) for more resilience within the banking sector.  
Therefore, in 2009, the Basel committee started to refine its Basel II accord, leading to 
the publication of the Basel III accord in 2010 with the aim of enhancing the resilience of 
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banks in order to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial 
and economic stress. In addition, Basel III raised both the quality and quantity of the 
regulatory capital base and enhanced the risk coverage of the capital framework by 
strengthening the regulation, supervision, governance and risk management of the banking 
sector (BCBS, 2011; Rattanataipop, 2013; Walker, 2011). Walker (2011) has argued for the 
continuous improvement in risk management and disclosure practices, which is underpinned 
by good governance in order to reduce the likelihood of future financial crisis. Consequently, 
many emerging markets, including those in the MENA region, have embarked on reforms 
that are aimed at enhancing their CG structures and practices. 
In this case, Arab countries in the MENA region have significant differences in the 
income per capita levels, legal systems and are at different stages of economic development 
and reforms (McLellan, 2011). This is a fundamental fact regarding the aims of their 
implementation of CG codes in such contexts. Moreover, MENA countries, similar to many 
emerging market economies, face a number of challenges with respect to their CG practices 
compared to their developed counterparts. For instance, MENA banks are characterised by 
either majority family-owned banks (FOBs) or governmentl-owned banks (GOBs), often 
with significant governance challenges. These include weak CG structures like role duality, 
limited board independence, concentrated ownership structures, and poor transparency and 
disclosure practices (Samaha et al., 2012; Baydoun et al., 2012).  
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Moreover, banks have legal, ethical, and moral obligation to mitigate their risks in order 
to protect their shareholders, as well as stakeholders, and improve their performance because 
of the complexity and opaqueness of the banks’ operations and their related exposures and 
risks (Falikhatun et al., 2010). Therefore, banks need to comply with sound CG practices in 
order to increase their levels of transparency and disclosure in order to reduce risks and 
agency costs, as well as to legitimise their activities (Carcello & Neal, 2003; Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006; World Bank, 2010).  
CG structures in the MENA countries have witnessed substantial changes over the past 
decades that have been motivated by the need to improve the integrity of local markets, and 
align governance practices with the relevant international standards in order to be attractive 
to foreign investors. Indeed, the awareness of the need to improve CG practices of financial 
institutions in the MENA region has been growing. Consequently, Oman was the first 
country in the MENA region to issue a code of CG in 2002, relating to companies listed on 
the Muscat securities market (Baydoun et al., 2012). Also, CG guidelines for UAE bank 
directors was issued in June 2006, and a code of CG was issued in 2007 for joint-stock 
companies (Hassan, 2009; Muzahem, 2011).  Similarly, a code of CG was introduced in 
Saudi Arabia in 2006 (Al-Janadi et al., 2012; Baydoun et al., 2012). In Jordan, further to 
issuing the bank director’s handbook of CG in 2004, the Central Bank of Jordan issued a CG 
code in 2007 (Central Bank of Jordan, 2007). Egypt published its first code for state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private sector organisations in 2006. 
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Furthermore, the MENA context is characterised by increased interest in Islamic 
banking often with added risks and CG challenges. In particular, international financial 
institutions are increasingly becoming interested in Islamic finance and investment because 
of the large global growth in Islamic finance and banking worldwide, which has occurred 
during the last twenty-five years. For instance, the amount of Islamic finance in 2011 totalled 
approximately $1.3 trillion in assets and an annual expected growth rate between 10% and 
20% per year (Ernst & Young, 2012). Also, a 2012 report by Ernst and Young (2012) 
suggests that the growth of Islamic finance continues steadily, suggesting an average annual 
growth of 19% over the 2009 to 2011 period.  
Moreover, several major international banks (e.g., BNP Paribas, Citibank, Deutsche 
Bank, and HSBC) established Islamic windows to meet the increasing demand for Islamic 
products (Ozturk, 2014; Pomeranz, 1997). In the last decade, Islamic banking has 
transformed itself from a trivial financial experiment to a major player in the global banking 
sector. Prior research (Beck et al., 2013; Farooq & Zaheer, 2015; Hasan & Dridi, 2010) 
suggests that the rapid development of Islamic financial sector is accompanied by assertions 
about relative resilience of Islamic banking to financial crises in comparison with 
conventional banking. For instance, Islamic finance experienced less deposit withdrawals, 
better capitalisation, asset growth, and relatively better stock market performance than 
conventional banks. Thus, this study seeks to examine the impact of CG in IBs in comparison 
with CBs that may offer some benefits to regulatory authorities. 
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Compliance with Sharia principles can also create unique CG challenges. The need to 
ensure compliance with Sharia principles differentiates Islamic financial institution in its 
products, instruments, operations, practices, and management from traditional financial 
institution. As Islamic banks must comply with Sharia, Islamic governance is considered the 
backbone of Islamic banking and finance. It legitimises the practices of banking and finance, 
and increases the confidence of the shareholders, as well as the public through ensuring that 
all practices and products are in compliance with Sharia principles and rules. 
On the other hand, the existence of Sharia risk (Non-Sharia compliant manner) would 
not just affect the confidence of the shareholders and the public in Islamic banking and 
finance institutions, but might also expose Islamic banking to similar financial crises often 
faced by conventional banks (e.g., fiduciary and reputational risks). Most interestingly, 
surveys such as those conducted by Chapra and Ahmed (2002) in Bahraini and Sudanese 
Islamic banks show that most depositors (86% and 95% of depositors in Bahraini and 
Sudanese Islamic banks) of Islamic banks are prepared to withdraw their funds, if those 
banks fail to operate in a Sharia compliant manner (Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Darmadi, 2013; 
Kettell, 2011; Matoussi & Grassa, 2012; Safieddine, 2009).  
Given this background, the main aim of this study is to measure the level of risk 
disclosures in MENA banks and ascertain the extent to which MLG mechanisms, including 
SSB, can explain observable differences in such risk disclosures. 
  
  
 
53 
 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
A number of theories, including agency, legitimacy, institutional, stakeholder, 
signalling, proprietary costs, and resource dependence can generally explain the motivations 
and variations in risk disclosure, as well as MLG impact on risk disclosure. Also, a 
comprehensive theory of risk disclosure does not currently exist (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; 
Amran et al., 2008; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Greco, 2012; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2011; 
Taylor et al., 2010). These theories in some literature tend to place emphasis on different 
aspects of risk disclosure and governance phenomena, as explained below, and to this extent, 
they are not mutually exclusive. Each particular theoretical perspective is being limited in its 
ability to explain fully the impact of MLG on the level of risk disclosures (Abdel-Fattah, 
2008; Morris, 1987; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). 
Therefore, in this study, I rely on a number of theories in order to assess the extent to 
which MLG mechanisms may be able to explain observable differences in the level of risk 
disclosures by banks. For example, Helbok and Wagner (2006) examined voluntary 
operational risk disclosure determinants, by relying on agency, signalling and political costs 
theories, whilst Oliveira et al. (2011) employed legitimacy, resource dependence, and 
stakeholders theories in doing same. Hence, in this study, I rely on a multi-theoretical 
framework that incorporates predictions from agency, resource dependence, and signalling 
theories in order to explain completely the differences in aggregate levels of risk disclosure. 
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Thus, it could be argued that these theories are relevant in explaining the relationship 
between risk disclosures and MLG mechanisms (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2000; Ntim et al., 
2013; Woods & Reber, 2003). 
First, agency theory is a relevant and powerful theory, which can be used to explain risk 
disclosures, especially when it comes to explaining information asymmetry and uncertainty 
between shareholders and management (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Better 
governance structures could enable investors to deal more effectively with risk 
diversification, portfolio investment decision-making and reducing investors' uncertainty by 
alleviating information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders via enhancing risk 
disclosure (Greco, 2012; Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 2009; Solomon et al., 2000). Also, in 
Islamic banking, there is a unique agency problem between management and all stakeholders 
regarding Sharia compliance, which can be mitigated via enhancing risk disclosure 
(Safieddine, 2009).  
Principally, there are several theoretical reasons why banks could be involved in wide-
ranging RMDPs. Agency theory predicts that effective mechanisms of the multi-layer 
governance may lead to transparent RMDPs. Thus, it mitigates agency conflicts and reduces 
the information asymmetry between management and shareholders (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Safieddine, 2009). 
Agency theory (AT) seeks to explain the principal(s) - agent relationship from an 
economic utilitarianism view (Ross, 1973). Specifically, AT suggests that a conflict of 
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interest in the bilateral principal-agent relationship is due to self-interested individuals 
(opportunistic behaviour) (Aguilera, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, AT emphases 
on determining the optimal implicit or explicit nexus of contracts for aligning the interests 
of contracting parties (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). More importantly, the conflict of interest between the contracting parties 
creates information asymmetry and agency cost which may affect firm valuations 
(Armstrong et al., 2011; 2010).  
Armstrong et al. (2010, 2011) underline the influences of information asymmetry 
between the agents of the firm and the principal(s) on the market valuations for the firm’s 
shares. We can argue that multi-layer governance may reduce asymmetric information in 
terms of risk disclosures; consequently, it can similarly improve the market valuations of 
bank’s shares. A recent empirical instance of this is Ntim et al. (2013) who suggest that risk-
related disclosure as a channel of reducing information asymmetry are tied to governance 
structures. Another example is Elshandidy et al. (2013) who reveal that corporate governance 
significantly improves risk related information. 
Additionally, AT seeks to attenuate agency costs through the design of governance 
system to align the interests of principal(s) and their agents (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; 
García-Castro et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013). Accordingly, most 
of the theoretical foundation of the extant research on corporate governance built upon AT, 
and is involved in linking different corporate governance (CG) mechanisms with risk 
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disclosure (Aguilera, 2005; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Zona et al., 2015). AT argues that 
principal(s) may use multi-layer governance, including board of directors monitoring (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983;  Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015c), Islamic governance (Safieddine, 2009), and 
ownership structure (Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983) to 
align the interests of principal(s) and agents to constrain managerial opportunistic behaviour 
and improves risk disclosure.  
In other words, by managing the principal(s)-agents’ conflicts through better governance 
system, banks will work more efficiently, which will be reflected on enhanced risk 
disclosures. Moreover, Tunyi and Ntim (2016), and Wiseman et al. (2012) argue that the 
institutional setting, such as the national governance quality and/ or country risk, is necessary 
for improving the understanding of the particular agency conflicts that may affect the bank 
transparency in different settings. However, AT was criticised because of its simplistic 
expectations about different risk preferences; it ignores stewardship interests; and does not 
indicate the social context importance (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; Wiseman et al., 2012). 
Second, from signalling theory perspective, in the current complex business 
environment, banks may choose to ameliorate risk disclosure as differentiating characteristic; 
to send significant signals to the market that additional requirements may not be needed. 
Also, board of directors and shareholders signal their performance quality through an 
increase in the level of risk disclosures, and thus, a decrease in the level of information 
asymmetry (Connelly et al., 2011; Morris, 1987; Spence, 1973). Moreover, in Islamic 
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banking, SSBs can communicate their performance by disclosing their level of Sharia 
compliance to other stakeholders. Specifically, signalling theory (ST) seeks to reduce 
asymmetric information between two parties by conveying significant information about 
intentions and abilities of firms (Ntim et al., 2013; Spence, 2002). For instance, management 
signals the underlying unobservable excellence of their companies to prospective investors 
by the recognizable financial statements transparency that may influence decision-making in 
the stock market (Connelly et al., 2011; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). However, some of the 
extant research argues that institutional environment may influence signals to be more (or 
less) observable (Bergh et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2011).  
The central ST assumption in the context of bank valuation is that asymmetric 
information affects external investors, which depend on a number of signals in establishing 
judgments about bank quality (Bergh et al., 2014; Morris, 1987; Spence, 2002). Per se, bank 
quality can be considered as a result of a signalling process, where signals such as risk 
disclosures are used by prospective investors to make valuation judgments related to banks 
(Musteen et al., 2010). However, signals must be recognizable and be perceived as relevant 
proxies of firms’ true position to have a significant impact. Specifically, since information 
on risk disclosures and multi-layer governance are presented to the stock markets, it can be 
debated that they convey effective signals that send significant information related to the 
bank valuation assessment.  
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Such signals affect a bank’s sustainability and managerial accountability (Miller et al., 
2013). Hence, ST focuses on distinguishing a bank with higher capabilities from their 
counterparts, unlike the institutional theory that concentrates on achieving imperative 
legitimacy (Miller et al., 2013). Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 
574). 
Signalling theory literature suggests that banks communicate RMDPs information to the 
external environment to drive a message to prospective investors about the bank and the 
effectiveness of national governance through prudential RMDPs (Connelly et al., 2011; 
Ntim, 2012c; Ntim et al., 2013). However, the explanatory power of agency and signalling 
theories is limited, as they tend to focus exclusively on managers and shareholders/investors 
to the detriment of other stakeholders, such as the local community. 
Third, from the standpoint of resource dependence theory, bank boards and shareholders 
might increase the quality of risk disclosure in order to help in secure critical resources such 
as finance and business contracts (Jia et al., 2009; Jizi et al., 2014; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). 
Similarly, SSB can be a mechanism for securing such resources and legitimise bank 
operations and performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Suchman, 1995). In addition, resource 
dependence theory offers a number of benefits resulting from the bank and national 
governance’s effectiveness through wider interdependencies of MENA banks. Specifically, 
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bank and national governance effectiveness work as an instrument for banks to decrease 
uncertainty and dependence through improved RMDPs. Particularly, in increased 
competitive environment, improved RMDPs may work as an indication of bank quality 
(Christopher, 2010; Zona et al., 2015). However, the ability of resource dependence theory 
to explain discernible differences in RMDPs is also limited by its excessive focus on 
directing RMDPs at securing resources, especially financial resources and stakeholders, who 
may not necessarily be the main users of RMDPs. 
However, some researchers argue that banks can evaluate risk disclosure from 
proprietary costs theory perspective by considering both the benefits and the costs related to 
risk disclosure (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Dye, 1986; Verrecchia, 1983). Therefore, there 
are many theories that can be employed to explain accounting choices and risk disclosure 
variation, as well as governance impact on risk disclosure in banks. However, there is no 
exclusive theory that fully explains why banks engage in risk disclosure.  
The earlier argument has debated that, although agency theory may be applicable for 
examining organizational behaviours and consequences in many contexts, there are settings 
under which a combination of signalling and institutional theories arguments would either 
enhance or substitute agency theory explanations. Hence, the rationale behind risk 
disclosures and governance structures are either guided by efficiency concerns, or 
legitimization and signal underlying quality to others. Therefore, by adopting a combined 
agency–signal–institutional–resource dependence perspective, I can investigate more 
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nuanced, agency cost, information asymmetry, and institutionally embedded structures that 
affect the bank’s reaction to internal and external governance pressures to engage in risk 
disclosures. 
Hence, this study considers the variety of individual perspectives to be complementary 
rather than competing theories following prior recommendations (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; 
Amran et al., 2008; Deegan, 2002; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Gray et al., 1995; Ntim et al., 
2013; Oliveira et al., 2011). Therefore, and given the inherent interdependencies or overlaps 
amongst the theories, this study argues that applying a framework that combines these 
theories will provide a richer basis for understanding and explaining the various motivations 
and variation of risk disclosures within the MENA context. 
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4. Empirical Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Risk disclosure is a requirement for all banks and its significance has increased in the 
aftermath of 2007/2008 financial crisis, when many CG organisations, including the Basel 
committee and central banks, responded with regulations and initiatives so as to enhance 
governance structures and encourage risk disclosure (Aureli & Salvatori, 2012; Grant & 
Visconti, 2006). Therefore, there has been a gradual increase in the number of studies on 
corporate risk disclosure. However, a few of these studies address the impact of governance 
on risk disclosure in general, and the banking sector in particular (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). 
Thus, this study focuses on risk related information disclosure of banks in emerging context 
(MENA).  
The risk disclosure literature as the general corporate disclosure literature has followed 
a similar pattern. Whilst a considerable number of studies have examined the impact of firm 
characteristics on the level of risk disclosure (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Rajab & Handley-
Schachler, 2009; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013), few studies have examined the impact of 
governance variables on risk disclosure (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Muzahem, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Taylor, 2011). In addition, a 
limited number of studies have examined the impact of SSB monitoring power on banks’ 
CG/CSR disclosure and performance (Al-Bassam et al., 2012; Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; 
Farook et al., 2011; Grassa, 2015; Rahman & Bukair, 2013), but to the best of the 
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researcher’s knowledge, there are no prior studies examining the impact of SSB on bank risk 
disclosure.  
Following previous studies, this study explores how bank- and country-level governance 
mechanisms in the form of Islamic governance/SSB characteristics, ownership mechanisms 
(i.e., governmental and family ownership), board characteristics (i.e., board size, duality, and 
non-executive directors) and country governance (i.e., political strength and lack of violence/ 
terrorism and control of corruption) drive the level of bank risk disclosures. 
4.1 Islamic governance/SSB and risk disclosure 
Islamic governance/(SSB) ensures that all practices and activities of banks (e.g., 
products, instruments, operations, practices, and management) are in compliance with Sharia 
principles and rules at all times, especially with respect to RIBA (interest) and speculative 
behaviour (Farook et al., 2011; Safieddine, 2009). Theoretically, the unique agency problems 
faced by Islamic financial institutions like “Mudarabah” (profit-sharing) can increase 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This can exacerbate agency problems by 
increasing opportunities for managerial expropriation of corporate resources (Safieddine, 
2009; Vinnicombe, 2010). Therefore, agency theory suggests that increased managerial 
monitoring, that may be exerted by the SSB, might have a positive influence on banks’ 
control and monitoring activities. This may help in enhancing the level of risk disclosure 
(Farook et al., 2011; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Rahman & Bukair, 2013). 
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 Similarly, resource dependence theory indicates that the SSB may be able to offer better 
access to a banks’ external environment in order to enhance opportunities for securing vital 
resources, such as finance and business contracts (Jia et al., 2009; Jizi et al., 2014; Salancik 
& Pfeffer, 1978). Also, Al-Bassam et al. (2012), Al-Bassam and Ntim (2016), Farook et al. 
(2011), and Rahman and Bukair (2013) argue that SSB with extensive and more varied 
expertise and knowledge, including financial expertise, may be more motivated to push for 
true, fair and transparent disclosures. This including those relating to inherent risks; in order 
to relay this information not only to shareholders, but also to other stakeholders, and thereby 
legitimising the banks’ practices. 
Empirically, limited, but a growing number of studies have suggested that SSB can be a 
key governance mechanism that may be able to enhance disclosure quality and performance 
(Al-Bassam et al., 2012; Farook et al., 2011; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Rahman & Bukair, 
2013). For instance, Farook et al. (2011), and Rahman and Bukair (2013) find a significant 
positive association between SSB characteristics and the level of CSR disclosure. Al-Bassam 
et al. (2012) and Al-Bassam and Ntim (2016) also find a positive relation between Islamic 
values in terms of SSB characteristics and the level of voluntary CG disclosure in Saudi 
Arabian publicly listed corporations. In addition, Mollaha and Zamanb (2015) find a positive 
relationship between the intensity of Sharia board supervision and bank performance.  
By contrast, Safieddine (2009) finds deficiencies in Sharia governance practices. For 
instance, the study found that the establishment of a governance committee or an audit 
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committee is not common among the banks surveyed. Therefore, the financial reporting 
process has a deficit that could increase agency problems. Whilst some research has been 
carried out on Islamic governance/ SSB characteristics and voluntary disclosure, to the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior study has examined the relation between SSB 
characteristics and the level of risk disclosure. Therefore, the study’s first hypothesis is that: 
H1: There is a positive association between Islamic governance and MENA banks’ 
risk disclosures. 
4.2 Corporate governance: bank ownership mechanisms 
Ownership structure can have an impact on attitudes to governance and risk disclosure 
(Beattie et al., 2001; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015c; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b). The 
directors (insiders) prepare the annual report for shareholders (outsiders) and thus, ownership 
might play a vital role in the extent of risk disclosure (Abraham & Cox, 2007). Disclosure 
literature applies different aspects of ownership structure as an explanatory variable of 
disclosure practices. Ownership structure has been divided into several categories, such as 
block, foreign, institutional, management, government and family ownerships (Eng & Mak, 
2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013). However, this study will use government 
and family ownership as MENA banks are often characterised by extremely concentrated 
ownership structures, primarily by government bodies and royal families.  
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Agency theory predicts that the main shareholders (government and family ownership) 
have both the power and the incentives to monitor insiders’ behaviour, and thus their 
presence may enhance the extent of bank risk disclosure. Similarly, signalling and legitimacy 
theories predict that banks with concentrated ownership may choose to disclose more 
information about risk in order to send a signal to the external environment about the banks’ 
performance and thereby legitimising their operations and enhancing the banks’ reputation. 
Also, resource dependence theory suggests that a main shareholder of the banks (government 
and family ownership) may put pressure on managers to disclose more transparent 
information relating to risk in order to secure access to critical resources, such as funds and 
customers (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). 
Empirically, Alhazaimeh et al. (2014), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali (2007), Ntim et al. 
(2013), Ntim and Osei (2011) find that there is a positive association between government 
ownership and risk disclosure. In contrast, Al-Akra et al. (2010), Barakat and Hussainey 
(2013), and Naser et al. (2002) find no such association, whilst Dam and Scholtens (2012) 
find a negative association between government ownership and voluntary disclosure.  
Similarly, Chau and Gray (2010), Chen and Jaggi (2001), Chen et al. (2008), and Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) find negative relation between family shareholding and disclosure, whilst 
Ali et al. (2007), Cascino et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2008), Wan-Hussin (2009), and Wang 
(2006) find a positive relation between family shareholding and disclosure quality.  
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In addition, Al-Akra and Hutchinson (2013) find that family firms are more (or less) 
expected to disclose mandatory (voluntary) information. Notably, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, no prior research has examined the relation between family 
ownership and risk disclosure. Therefore, the study’s second hypothesis is that: 
H2: There is a relationship between ownership concentration and MENA banks’ risk 
disclosures.  
H2a: There is a positive relationship between government ownership and MENA 
banks’ risk disclosures.  
H2b: There is a positive relationship between family ownership and MENA banks’ 
risk disclosures.  
4.3 Corporate governance: bank board characteristics 
variables 
Most CG codes recommend that board of directors should include a reasonable number 
of independent directors with explicit power to monitor bank executives (Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; 
Ntim et al., 2011; 2013; 2015). Theoretically, agency theory indicates that increased 
managerial monitoring associated with board structures (board size, CEO duality, and board 
independence-BBID) may have a positive influence on risk disclosure. Similarly, resource 
dependence theory suggests that enhanced board structures (board size, CEO duality, and 
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BBID) offer greater access to their bank’s external environment, safeguarding the interests 
of all stakeholders by reducing any conflict of interest among stakeholders.  
Thus enhanced risk disclosure may facilitate securing critical resources, such as finance 
and business contracts (Jia et al., 2009; Jizi et al., 2014). Also, Elshandidy et al. (2013), 
Elshandidy and Neri (2015), Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), and Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) 
argue that larger board of directors (BODs) with increased independent directors with wide 
and more diversified expertise and knowledge, including accounting expertise, may be more 
motivated to engage in increased risk disclosure. In contrast, it could be argued that larger 
board size may influence its control and monitoring activities negatively (Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006) because of poor co-ordination, communication, monitoring, and increased 
decision-making time (Jensen, 1993).  
Prior empirical research largely suggests a positive association between board size and 
risk disclosure. For instance, Al-Shammari (2014), Alhazaimeh et al. (2014), Elmagrhi et al., 
2016, Elshandidy et al. (2013), Elshandidy and Neri (2015), Gao and Kling (2012), 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011), Jizi et al. (2014), Ntim et al. (2013), and Mokhtar and 
Mellett (2013) find a significant positive relation between board size and the level of 
voluntary risk disclosure. In comparison, Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) find a non-significant association between the two variables, whilst, 
Domínguez and Gámez (2014) on the contrary, find a negative relationship between board 
size and risk disclosure.  
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Similarly, previous studies have reported mixed results regarding CEO duality. For 
instance, Al-Shammari (2014), Bassett et al. (2007), Chau and Gray (2010), Forker (1992), 
Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) find a negative relationship between the existence of 
CEO/chairman duality and the disclosure quality. In comparison, Abraham and Cox (2007), 
Deumes (2008), Elshandidy et al. (2013), Elshandidy and Neri (2015), and Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) find a non-significant association between CEO duality and risk 
disclosure, whereas Jizi et al. (2014) find a positive relationship between the two variables. 
Also, prior studies largely suggest a positive relation between board independence 
(BBID) and risk disclosure. For instance, Abraham and Cox (2007), Chen and Jaggi (2001), 
Elshandidy et al. (2013), Elshandidy and Neri (2015), Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), Ntim 
et al. (2013), O’Sullivan et al. (2008), and Oliveira et al. (2011) find a significant positive 
relation between BBID and risk disclosure, whereas Al-Shammari (2014), and Barakat and 
Hussainey (2013) find a non-significant association between the two variables. This 
difference in findings leads to the third hypothesis, which is as follows: 
H3: There is an association between board structure and MENA banks’ risk 
disclosures. 
H3a: There is a positive association between board size and MENA banks’ risk 
disclosures. 
H3b: There is a negative association between CEO duality and MENA banks’ risk 
disclosures. 
H3c: There is a positive association between board independence and MENA banks’ 
risk disclosures. 
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4.4 Country-level governance  
Country-level governance can have an impact on attitudes to governance and risk 
disclosure (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Essen et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2010). Agency theory 
points out that increased managerial monitoring related to country-level governance 
(political strength and lack of violence/ terrorism, and control of corruption) can have a 
positive influence on bank’ control and monitoring activities. It could protect the rights of 
minority shareholders, and hence minimise agency cost and information asymmetry (Essen 
et al., 2013). In addition, in countries with powerful governance institutions, banks may 
choose to engage in increased risk disclosure; in order to signal their superior performance 
to outside stakeholders.  
La Porta et al. (1997, 2000, and 2002) theorise that better country-level governance in 
terms of legal rules, and their enforcement quality may enhance investors protection and 
effectiveness of governance structures (e.g., corporate governance, external finance type, and 
disclosure quality). La Porta et al. (1997, 2000, and 2002) argue that country-level 
governance reduces agency costs; hence, banks might be driven by institutional pressures, 
especially in strongly governed countries to engage in increased risk disclosure.  
Empirically, extant research finds a positive relation between country-level governance 
and performance or/and disclosure (e.g., Claessens & Laeven, 2003; Cumming et al., 2014; 
Essen et al., 2013; Shen et al., 2012). For instance, Cumming et al. (2014) explore the impact 
of country-level governance on foreign cross-listed firms’ valuation.  
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Using a sample of 1,334 non-US companies from 48 countries over the period 1996-
2008 with 7,780 firm-year observations, Cumming et al. (2014) find foreign cross-listed 
companies’ valuation is contingent on home country governance. Specifically, this study 
finds valuations of cross-listed companies are higher if those companies are cross-listed and/ 
or from strongly governed environments compare to those companies that are non-cross-
listed and/ or from weakly governed environments.  
Similarly, using a sample of 1,005 foreign cross-listed companies in the US from forty 
countries between 1996 and 2005, Shi et al. (2012) find home country governance and 
ownership structures have a positive relationship with foreign cross-listed firms’ disclosure 
level. In addition, Beltratti and Stulz (2012), and Barakat and Hussainey (2013) find a 
positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between country governance indicators 
and performance or/ and risk disclosure. 
These findings offer support for the view that the role of country-level governance may 
have complementary or substitutive influence on corporate disclosure. For instance, 
Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) use a sample of 1,044 companies from sixteen European 
countries to examine how country governance mechanisms affect firm-level disclosure. They 
theorise that country-level governance in terms of legal environments may play a 
complementary governance role to reinforce CG-transparency nexus in strongly governed 
environments.  
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By contrast, in weakly governed environments, firm-level governance plays a stronger 
bonding governance role to mitigate increased agency costs in such environments in order to 
gain legitimacy. The study results suggest that country-level governance and CG 
arrangements become substitutes in terms of their influences on corporate disclosure. This 
leads to the study’s final hypothesis, which is as follows: 
H4: There is an association between country governance indicators and MENA 
banks’ risk disclosures.  
H4a: There is a positive association between political strength and lack of violence/ 
terrorism and MENA banks’ risk disclosures.  
H4b: There is a positive association between control of corruption and MENA banks’ 
risk disclosures. 
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5. Research Design 
5.1 Describing the Characteristics of the Sample and Data 
Considerations 
The sample was selected from listed commercial and Islamic banks in the MENA region 
with full data over eight fiscal years: 2006 to 2013. The total sample covers 100 banks listed 
in 14 MENA stock exchanges. This represents over 95% of the total market capitalisation of 
all the listed banks. Board characteristics, ownership structure, risk disclosure and financial 
data was collected from the sampled banks’ annual reports (downloaded from the Perfect 
Information Database and bank websites), and the Bankscope database. Country-level 
macro-economic and governance variables were collected from the IMF world outlook and 
the World Bank’s worldwide governance indicators databases, respectively. The final sample 
consists of 752 bank-year observations. The sample construction is presented in Table 1. 
This study uses a self-constructed risk disclosure index (RMDPI) to measure risk 
disclosure level presented in Appendix 1. Prior studies follow two approaches when risk 
disclosure is measured. On one hand, some prior studies (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015) mainly rely on predefined words or 
sentences that reflect risk in annual reports. However, there has been little agreement to date 
on what set of predefined words can be employed to consistently identify, and fairly reflect 
information on all risk categories in banks. Also, there will be disclosure score bias if a bank 
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concentrates on a certain category of risk and provides detailed information on it while failing 
to disclose other risk categories (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). 
Table 1 Sample construction 
 
Country Total 
banks 
Banks 
selected 
IBs 
obs 
CBs 
obs 
DBs 
obs 
Full 
sample 
percentage 
Bahrain 11 11 44 16 24 84  11.17%   
Egypt 11 11 13 40 20 73 9.71% 
Jordan 12 12 13 75 3 91 12.10% 
Iraq 9 2 0 16 0 16 2.13% 
Kuwait 12 10 36 35 5 76 10.11% 
Lebanon 6 6 0 28 16 44 5.85% 
Morocco 4 1 0 0 8 8 1.06% 
Oman 6 5 0 34 5 39 5.19% 
Palestine 3 1 0 8 0 8 1.06% 
Qatar 8 8 24 11 28 63 8.38% 
Saudi Arabia 12 11 21 0 63 84 11.17% 
Syria 9 2 6 8 0 14 1.86% 
Tunisia 10 2 0 9 0 9 1.20% 
UAE 19 18 32 39 72 143 19.02% 
Total 132 100 189 319 244 752 100.00% 
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On the other hand, other prior studies (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2010) rely on a 
constructed index to measure the level of risk disclosure; which fairly captures the 
comparative weights of different risk categories. Therefore, this study uses constructed 
RMDPI. The items contained in the RMDPI were drawn from the IAS 32, IFRS7, IFRS 9, 
Basel II, Basel III; and key risk disclosure items that have previously been used in related 
studies (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 2009; Greco, 2012; Helbok & Wagner, 
2006; Ntim et al., 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012). Hence, RMDPI is composed of 6 main 
sections, comprising of 96 sub-items, which fairly capture the comparative weights of 
different risk categories. Appendices 1 and 2 present the scoring criteria and composition of 
the RMDPI, respectively. 
5.2 Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
This essay classifies the variables into six main categories as presented in Table 2 with 
their full definitions. First, the dependent variable is risk disclosure level (RMDPI), which 
measures quality/level of risk disclosure in six key areas as set out by IAS 32, IFRS 7, IFRS 
9, Basel II, Basel III and prior literature (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Greco, 2012; Ntim et 
al., 2013). It consists of: (1) credit risk disclosure index (CRDI); (2) liquidity risk disclosure 
index (LRDI); (3) market risk disclosure index (MRDI); (4) capital adequacy risk disclosure 
index (ARDI); (5) operational risk disclosure quality index (ODQI); and (6) strategic risk 
disclosure quality index (SRDI). 
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Second, to examine H1 to H4, I gathered data on multi-layer governance. For instance, 
SSB is used as a proxy for Islamic governance. Board structure variables include board size 
(LNBS), CEO duality (CEOP), and board independence (BBID). Ownership structure 
variables include government ownership (GSHR) and family ownership (FOWN). Country-
level governance variables include political strength and lack of violence/ terrorism (PSQ), 
and control of corruption (COCQ). Finally, to address issues relating to potential omitted 
correlated variables, I include a number of firm- and country-level control variables. The 
firm-level controls include, bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), 
operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), and the length of the annual report 
(LENG), whilst the country-level controls include inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita 
(CGDP).  
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Table 2 Summary of definitions and operationalisation of variables 
  
Variables Definitions and coding 
Panel A: Dependent variables (risk disclosure).  
RMDPI Is the overall risk disclosure score determined depending on the un-weighted risk 
disclosure index and scoring criteria clarified in Appendices 1 and 2.  
Panel B: Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
SSB  Is the total SSB characteristics score determined according to the un-weighted SSB 
index consisting of 7 provisions and scoring criteria are; SSB Existence=1, if a bank 
has SSB board, 0 otherwise.; SSB Report=1, if a bank has disclosed SSB report, 0 
otherwise; Number of Member=1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSB’s member, 
0 otherwise; SSB Meetings=1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSB meetings, 0 
otherwise; Independent=1, if SSB’s members are independent from management, 0 
otherwise; Experience=1, if if a bank discloses SSB experience, 0 otherwise; Total 
fees disclosed=1, if a bank discloses SSB fees/ compensation, 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Corporate governance (CG) ownership characteristics 
GSHR Percentage of governmental ownership with at least 5% to total bank ordinary 
shareholdings. 
FOWN Percentage of family ownership with at least 5% to the total bank ordinary 
shareholdings. 
Panel D: Corporate governance (CG) board characteristics 
BBSZ Number of directors in BODs. 
CEOP  1, if the bank CEO and chairperson positions are held by same person, 0 otherwise. 
BBID Board indepencece is calculated as percentage of non-executive directors to the total 
number of the bank BODs. 
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Variables Definitions and coding 
Panel E: Country level governance variables 
PSQ Country- level political strength and absence of violence/ terrorism score based on 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) which calculates the probability of the government to 
threatened by violent or illegal means, containing politically‐inspired terrorism and 
violence in years 2006 until 2013. A higher score means better political strength and 
absence of violence/ terrorism. 
COCQ Country- level corruption governor score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010) which 
calculates the level to which abuse of bestowed public power to acquire a private 
benefit. A higher score means better control of corruption. 
Panel F: Control variables 
LNBS Bank size is measured by natural log of total assets. 
ROAA Performance is measured by return on assets, which are percentage of net income to 
total asset. 
LIQR Liquidity is measured by net loans to total assets. 
OPEF Operations efficiency is measured percentage of cost to income. 
BCAD The capital adequacy ratio. 
LENG Number of bank annual report pages.  
INFL Inflation, which is consumer prices (annual %). 
CGDP GDP per capita (current US$). 
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Due to well established research and space limitations, I did not develop direct 
theoretical and empirical links between these control variables and risk disclosure, but there 
are extensive prior empirical studies that suggest that they can impact on the level of bank 
risk disclosures (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004; Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012). 
Following Elshandidy and Neri (2015) and Ntim et al. (2013), this study uses the panel 
data regression model to examine the impact of MLG (SSB, board structure, ownership 
structure, and country-level governance) on the level of risk disclosure. Therefore, regression 
model is identified as follows:    
                ∑∑
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itiit CONTROLSMLGRMDPI εδββα             (1) 
where: 
RMDPI is risk disclosure index, MLG refers to multi-layer governance, consisting of the 
SSB, board structures (BBSZ, CEOP, and BBID), ownership structures (FOWN and GSHR), 
and country-level governance, including absence of violence (PSQ) and control of corruption 
(COCQ). CONTROLS refer to firm-level control variables, including LNBS, ROAA, LIQR, 
OPEF, BCAD, and LENG, and country-level control variables include INFL and CGDP. itδ  
is the bank-years specific fixed-effects, itε  is the error term, 0α is the intercept, and iβ are the 
vectors of coefficient estimates.  
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The main model defined in equation (1) is a standard panel data regression model that 
may possibly be estimated by pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects models. Pooled 
OLS assumes continuous variance and uncorrelated observations. To choose pooled OLS or 
the random effects and fixed effects, I used Breusch and Pagan test to decide the presence of 
the heterogeneity.  
The empirical results find that there are unobserved variables. Thus, pooled OLS 
estimator, arguably, is inconsistent and biased. At that point, to decide whether random 
effects or fixed effects will be employed, the Hausman specification test was used to choose 
the best model that yield more consistency and efficiency of the estimators. I chose fixed-
effects regression model rather than random-effects regression model because the Hausman 
favoured fixed-effects over random effects. 
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6. Findings and Discussion 
6.1 Descriptive, Univariate, and Bivariate Analyses 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the un-weighted and weighted risk 
disclosure indices (RMDPI and W-RMDPI, respectively) and SSB, and each of the eight firm 
years investigated. Table 3 reveals a number of interesting findings.  
First, it shows that there is a high degree of variation in the risk disclosure between 
banks. For instance, RMDPI ranges from a minimum of 1 (1.04%) to a maximum of 84 
(87.5%) with a standard deviation of 16.36 indicating a significant level of discretion 
regarding risk disclosure quality in the annual reports. 
Second, and consistent with prior risk disclosure studies (Greco, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 2009), there has been a continuous increase in risk disclosure 
over time. For instance, the average bank disclosed 35.95 (16%), 47.77 (24.65%), 54.55 
(25.97%), 57.44 (26.51), 61.24 (29.75%), 61.55 (29.90%), 62.51 (30.77%), and 63.60 
(31.88%), disclosure index score (percentage) in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013, respectively. Also, similar consistent trends are observable with respect to the 
weighted disclosure index score and the SSB, demonstrating that the 07/08 global financial 
crisis has changed the focus of risk disclosure and SSB in MENA banks. 
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Table 3 Summary descriptive statistics for RMDPI and SSB indices for all 752 bank 
years 
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
The un-weighted risk disclosure index (RMDPI)  
Mean   54.78   35.95   49.77   54.55   57.44   61.24   61.55   62.51   63.60 
Median   60.00   36.00   53.00   58.00   61.00   63.00   63.00   64.00   65.00 
STD   16.36   13.58   15.73   15.52   15.39   10.44   10.58   10.69     9.65 
Min     1.00     6.00     6.00     1.00     7.00   25.00   24.00   19.00   19.00 
Max   84.00   77.00   80.00   80.00   80.00   80.00   78.00   84.00   84.00 
The weighted risk disclosure index (W-RMDPI)  
Mean   79.95   44.99   69.99   78.22   82.06   88.10   88.60   90.49   91.66 
Median   86.00   42.00   76.00   84.00   87.50   89.50   92.00   93.00   93.00 
STD   24.16   20.22   24.97   24.12   24.65   15.19   15.00   15.49   14.48 
Min     2.00     7.00     7.00     2.00     7.00   28.00   27.00   19.00   19.00 
Max 135.00 106.00 128.00 128.00 130.00 126.00 118.00 135.00 135.00 
SSB index (Full sample)  
Mean    1.43     1.00     1.17     1.25     1.51 1.51     1.45 1.51     1.67 
Median    0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00     0.00 
STD    1.87     1.60     1.77     1.81     1.94 1.96     1.94 2.01     2.12 
Min    0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00     0.00 
Max    7.00     6.00     7.00     7.00     7.00 7.00     7.00 7.00     7.00 
SSB index (Conventional banks with Islamic window) 
Mean 3.43 2.63 3.50 3.50 4.20 3.50 3.50 4.20 3.00 
Median 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
STD 1.68 2.20 1.76 1.76 0.45 1.76 1.76 0.45 2.08 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 
Max 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
SSB index (Islamic banks) 
Mean 2.19 1.71 2.00 2.07 2.30 2.30 2.22 2.20 2.52 
Median 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
STD 1.96 1.66 1.87 1.88 1.96 1.99 1.99 2.03 2.16 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 7.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
Notes: This Table reports descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with un-weighted risk 
disclosure index (RMDPI), weighted risk disclosure index (W-RMDPI), and Sharia supervisory 
board index (SSB) from 2006 to 2013.  
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Finally, the banks made a significant increase in disclosing risks during the 07/08 
financial crisis compared to the pre-07/08 period and there was a general increasing trend in 
risk disclosure behaviour over time after 07/08 financial crisis. This increase was more 
observable after 2009. For example, the average bank scored 35.95 (16%) in 2006 compared 
with 47.77 (24.65%), 54.55 (25.97%), 57.44 (26.51), 61.24 (29.75%), 61.55 (29.90%), 62.51 
(30.77%), and 63.60 (31.88%) in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
These results shed light on the importance of risk disclosure for management and 
stakeholders, especially after Basel II made such risk disclosure compulsory in most of the 
sample’ countries after the 07/08 financial crisis. 
Table 4 shows the summary descriptive statistics of all the other independent and control 
variables included in the analysis. In general Table 4 shows wide spread in the distribution 
of all the variables. For example, Table 4 shows that GSHR ranges from a minimum of 0.00% 
to a maximum of 89.06% with government holding a 15.51% ownership in the average 
MENA bank. FOWN ranges from 0.00% to 87.00%, suggesting that despite the 
recommendations by the World Bank and OCED regarding the need for greater dispersion 
in ownership structure, the ownership structure of MENA banks are still fairly concentrated. 
 
 
  
  
 
83 
 
 
 
Table 4 Summary descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables for 
all 752 observations 
Variables         N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Independent (Corporate governance (CG)/ ownership characteristics variables). 
GSHR (%) 752.00 15.51 6.25 20.85 0.00 89.06 
FOWN (%) 752.00 7.74 0.00 14.23 0.00 87.00 
Panel B: Independent (Corporate governance (CG)/ board characteristics variables). 
BBSZ 752.00 9.44 9.00 1.90 5.00 15.00 
CEOP 750.00 0.80 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
BBID  752.00 0.89 0.91 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Panel C: Independent (Country Level-governance variables) 
PSQ 744.00 -0.13 -0.31 0.93 -2.83 1.22 
COCQ 744.00 0.23 0.24 0.70 -1.58 1.72 
Panel D: Control variables 
LNBS 752.00 15.63 15.65 1.60 0.30 21.09 
ROAA 752.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.52 0.24 
LIQR (%) 751.00 51.60 54.76 16.57 0.00 85.37 
OPEF (%) 745.00 42.36 39.39 30.51 -365.63 284.00 
BCAD (%) 707.00 20.25 17.24 14.39 9.26 204.41 
LENG 750.00 99.22 91.50 48.62 8.00 324.00 
INFL 736.00 5.39 4.00 4.93 -10.10 53.20 
CGDP 732.00 23426.34 19250.90 23200.92 5.00 93714.10 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: government ownership (GSHR), family ownership 
(FOWN), board size (BBSZ), CEO duality (CEOP), board independence(BBID),  political strength 
and absence of violence/ terrorism (PSQ), corruption control (COCQ), bank size (LNBS), 
performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), 
annual reports length (LENG), inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 2 fully defines 
all the variables used. 
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The majority of banks in the sample are profitable with a mean profitability ratio of 2%. 
Table 4 also shows that 80% of the banks in the sample separate the roles of CEO and 
chairman, and 89% of bank boards are non-executive, which is consistent with the 
recommendations of CG codes in MENA countries. The BBSZ ranges from five to fifteen 
directors with a mean of nine directors. Finally, the values of MLG, as well as the control 
variables, as shown in Table 4, suggest wide variability in the sample, and thereby 
minimising any possibilities of sample selection bias.  
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression analysis 
to test for multicollinearity. This study reports both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s 
non-parametric coefficients for robust results, and, noticeably, the magnitude and direction 
of both coefficients are similar. This is generally indicating that no serious non-normality 
problems exist. As expected, RMDPI scores are positively and significantly correlated with 
the variables LNBS, LIQR, LENG, GSHR, FOWN, BBID, SSB, PSQ, COCQ, and CGDP are 
correlated negatively and significantly with the variables OPEF, CEOP, and INFL, and 
thereby offering support for the validity of the disclosure index. 
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Table 5 Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices of the variables for all 752 observations 
Variables RMDPI LNBS ROAA LIQR OPEF BCAD LENG GSHR FOWN BBSZ CEOP BBID SSB PSQ COCQ INFL CGDP 
RMDPI   0.50** -0.07  0.37** -0.12** -0.13**  0.47**  0.27**  0.06  0.06  -0.16**  0.25**  0.30**  0.24**  0.30** -0.36**  0.16** 
LNBS  0.55**   0.00  0.25** -0.18** -0.11**  0.31**  0.33** -0.01  0.10**  -0.01  0.13**  0.18**  0.24**  0.20** -0.21**  0.22** 
ROAA -0.03  0.05   0.08* -0.23**  0.09* -0.10**  0.04  0.03  0.03  -0.02 -0.04 -0.12**  0.11**  0.08*  0.03  0.11** 
LIQR  0.33**  0.28**  0.20**  -0.17** -0.19** -0.07  0.31** -0.01 -0.13**  -0.27**  0.24**  0.04  0.64**  0.60** -0.14**  0.32** 
OPEF -0.23** -0.41** -0.45** -0.34**   0.16**  0.04 -0.13** -0.02 -0.02   0.08* -0.08*  0.03 -0.20** -0.14**  0.04 -0.23** 
BCAD -0.06 -0.06  0.13**  0.01 -0.12**  -0.17**  0.02 -0.09* -0.17**   0.02 -0.12**  0.10**  0.01  0.02 -0.08*  0.00 
LENG  0.53**  0.33** -0.19** -0.03  0.10** -0.21**   0.02  0.04  0.28**   0.13**  0.14**  0.12** -0.21** -0.13** -0.21** -0.19** 
GSHR  0.30**  0.35**  0.14**  0.39** -0.24**  0.13**  0.03  -0.19**  0.01  -0.17**  0.11**  0.09*  0.28**  0.32** -0.14**  0.13** 
FOWN  0.12**  0.02  0.05  0.01  0.05 -0.08*  0.14** -0.13**  -0.01  -0.12**  0.00 -0.08* -0.08* -0.08*  0.01 -0.14** 
BBSZ  0.07  0.09* -0.02 -0.14**  0.05 -0.19**  0.29**  0.04  0.09*    0.13**  0.02 -0.06 -0.22** -0.18**  0.00 -0.21** 
CEOP -0.16** -0.04 -0.09* -0.28**  0.09* -0.04  0.08* -0.18** -0.11**  0.14**  -0.45** -0.19** -0.20** -0.21**  0.12**  0.02 
BBID  0.14**  0.04  0.02  0.32** -0.07 -0.03  0.09*  0.15** -0.03 -0.05  -0.47**   0.12**  0.20**  0.18** -0.16**  0.04 
SSB  0.33**  0.35**  0.00  0.10** -0.09*  0.07  0.15**  0.12** -0.12** -0.05  -0.21**  0.07*   0.04  0.12** -0.21**  0.15** 
PSQ  0.18**  0.25**  0.24**  0.62** -0.41**  0.12** -0.15**  0.31** -0.12** -0.25**  -0.19**  0.31**  0.11**   0.77** -0.17**  0.57** 
COCQ  0.20**  0.15**  0.22**  0.54** -0.36**  0.17** -0.08*  0.31** -0.13** -0.21**  -0.19**  0.26**  0.15**  0.74**  -0.23**  0.52** 
INFL -0.34** -0.20**  0.01 -0.20**  0.07 -0.25** -0.23** -0.19** -0.04  0.04   0.18** -0.19** -0.25** -0.22** -0.27**   0.02 
CGDP  0.23**  0.33**  0.22**  0.37** -0.34**  0.02 -0.08*  0.18** -0.18** -0.20**  -0.08*  0.18**  0.30**  0.52**  0.45** -0.03  
Notes: the upper right half of the Table shows Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the bottom left half of the Table contains Spearman’s 
non-parametric correlation coefficients.  **, and * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, and 5% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are 
defined as follows: risk disclosure quality score (RMDPI), bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital 
adequacy (BCAD),annual reports length (LENG), government ownership (GSHR), family ownership (FOWN), board size (BBSZ), CEO duality (CEOP), 
board independence (BBID), Sharia supervisory board (SSB),  political strength and absence of violence/ terrorism (PSQ), corruption control (COCQ), 
inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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6.2 Regression Analyses 
Table 6 reports the results of the fixed-effects regression analysis of the impact of MLG, 
namely: Islamic governance (SSB), bank-level governance (i.e., ownership and board 
structures), and country-level governance (e.g., absence of violence and control of 
corruption), on the level of bank risk disclosures. The table (Table 6) further summarises the 
results of the regression analysis for nine different models. First, the models are statistically 
significant and explain 37, 47, 21, 53, 62, 24, 21, 48, and 37 percent of the variations in the 
level of bank risk disclosures. 
Second and in general, the results reported in Table 6 suggest that MLG is significant in 
explaining differences in risk disclosure quality. Third and specifically, this study starts by 
investigating whether the Sharia Supervisory Board index (SSB) can have an effect on the 
level of bank risk disclosures (RMDPI). The coefficient of the SSB on the RMDPI in Model 
1 of Table 6 is statistically significant and positive, indicating that H1 is accepted empirically. 
The policy suggestion is that banks with better SSB may put pressure on bank management 
to engage in increased levels of risk disclosures, as a signal of their monitoring power and 
effectiveness in achieving Sharia compliance.  
Theoretically, the results are consistent with the expectations of the multi-theoretical 
framework. This result implies that engaging in good SSB practices can help mitigate agency 
costs and enhance bank legitimacy (e.g., reputation and image) by improving the risk 
information transparency (e.g., market, operational, and strategic risks). The result also 
indicates that complying with good SSB practices through greater risk disclosure 
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activities not only can increase the bank legitimacy (Al-Bassam et al., 2012; Mollaha & 
Zamanb, 2015; and Suchman, 1995), but also present opportunities to obtain important 
resources (Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In addition, the results also offer 
empirical support for the findings of the few prior studies; that suggest that SSB can have a 
positive effect on disclosure and performance (Al-Bassam et al., 2012; Farook et al., 2011; 
Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Rahman & Bukair, 2013).  
Fourth, at the bank-level, this study investigates whether board and ownership structures 
can have an impact on the RMDPI. Board and ownership structures include two ownership 
(governmental ownership — GSHR, and family ownership — FOWN) and three board (bank 
board size — BBSZ, CEO duality — CEOP, and board independence— BBID) variables, 
respectively, in Table 6, Model 1. The results show that bank board size (BBSZ), board 
independence (BBID), governmental ownership (GSHR), and family ownership (FOWN) are 
positively associated with the RMDPI, but CEO duality (CEOP) is negatively related to the 
RMDPI.  
Similarly, the results also offer support for the multi- theoretical framework. For 
instance, the positive relationship among governmental ownership (GSHR), family 
ownership (FOWN), and the RMDPI is in line with those of prior studies (Alhazaimeh et al., 
2014; Ali et al., 2007; Cascino et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ghazali, 
2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Oseit, 2011; Wan-Hussin, 2009; Wang, 2006).  
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Table 6 The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (RMDPI) 
Variables 
 
 Dependent variable: Bank’s un-weighted risk disclosure (RMDPI)  
(1)  
Full sample 
(2)  
IBs 
(3)  
CBs 
(4)  
DBs 
(5)  
Pre 07/08 
(6)  
07/08 
(7)  
Post 07/08 
(8)  
3SLS 
(9)  
G2SLS 
Panel A: Independent : multi-layers governance variables   
SSB  3.58***  5.01***    -  5.76***  1.36  1.82*  1.66*  3.02***  3.58*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)    - (0.000) (0.180) (0.074) (0.059) (0.003) (0.000) 
GSHR  2.33** -0.49  1.87*  2.45** -0.27  2.75***  1.00  2.81***  2.33** 
 (0.020) (0.625) (0.063) (0.015) (0.790) (0.008) (0.316) (0.005) (0.020) 
FOWN  2.53**  2.78***  1.89*  0.10 -0.94  1.48  1.56*  2.93***  2.53** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.060) (0.924) (0.351) (0.143) (0.078) (0.003) (0.011) 
BBSZ  2.98***  1.58  1.78*  2.99*** -0.78 -0.34  2.65**  2.43**  2.98*** 
 (0.003) (0.116) (0.077) (0.003) (0.437) (0.735) (0.013) (0.015) (0.003) 
CEOP  -0.14 -0.82  -1.13  -0.36 -0.26  -1.08  -2.01**  -3.69***  -0.14 
 (0.890) (0.412) (0.260) (0.718) (0.798) (0.284) (0.046) (0.000) (0.890) 
BBID  3.21***  2.58**  0.10  1.86* -0.74  0.36   1.27*  0.89  3.21*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.920) (0.064) (0.461) (0.718) (0.085) (0.373) (0.001) 
PSQ -1.46  0.60 -0.67 -1.40 -1.34 -1.59 -5.98*** -3.94*** -1.46 
 (0.145) (0.547) (0.504) (0.164) (0.184) (0.118) (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) 
COCQ  2.60***  1.11*  0.53  0.56  2.03**  1.60  3.16***  1.32*  2.60*** 
 (0.010) (0.071) (0.597) (0.574) (0.047) (0.114) (0.002) (0.088) (0.009) 
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Table 6 The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (RMDPI) continued... 
Panel B: Control variables   
Intercept -1.84*  0.11 -3.77*** -6.62***  0.93  0.62  4.79*** -0.91 -1.84* 
 (0.066) (0.910) (0.000) (0.000) (0.355) (0.540) (0.000) (0.364) (0.065) 
LNBS  2.65***  0.06  5.44***  8.55***  1.10  0.55  0.79  4.88***  2.65*** 
 (0.008) (0.955) (0.000) (0.000) (0.274) (0.587) (0.428) (0.000) (0.008) 
ROAA -1.55 -1.70* -0.36  6.03*** -0.09  0.63 -0.45 -1.12 -1.55 
 (0.122) (0.091) (0.716) (0.000) (0.932) (0.533) (0.653) (0.262) (0.121) 
LIQR  3.92***  1.80*  1.20  2.53**  1.09  1.08  1.16**  6.24***  3.92*** 
 (0.000) (0.075) (0.232) (0.012) (0.279) (0.283) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEF  -0.16 -1.59 -0.95  2.06** -0.79 -0.86 -1.08 -1.50 -0.16 
 (0.869) (0.115) (0.344) (0.041) (0.432) (0.395) (0.282) (0.134) (0.869) 
BCAD -0.65  1.09 -1.18 -0.96 -1.28 -1.58 -1.98** -0.13 -0.65 
 (0.517) (0.278) (0.240) (0.340) (0.205) (0.119) (0.049) (0.895) (0.517) 
LENG 14.23***  7.28***  6.27***  5.60***  3.97***  5.21***  6.04*** 11.14*** 14.23*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFL -2.36** -1.53 -0.34 -0.90 -6.51*** -1.15 -0.04 -6.73*** -2.36** 
 (0.019) (0.129) (0.736) (0.370) (0.000) (0.254) (0.970) (0.000) (0.018) 
CGDP -1.22 -1.85* -0.67  0.25  2.04** -1.60 -1.26 -4.27*** -1.22 
 (0.223) (0.067) (0.502) (0.806) (0.046) (0.114) (0.207) (0.000) (0.222) 
Fixed effect Year Year Year Year - Year Year Year Year 
clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank - Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 6 The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (RMDPI) continued... 
F- value (χ2) 41.69*** 26.39*** 15.40*** 22.16*** 5.77*** 5.59*** 9.88*** 622.41*** 38435.44*** 
Hausman chi2 150.71*** 122.48*** 165.53*** 111.48*** 165.21*** 185.21*** 184.36*** ------- 12.37 
Overall R2 0.37 0.47 0.21 0.53  0.62 0.24 0.21 0.48 0.37 
No. of obs 682 183 263 236  73 158 451 682 682 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: risk disclosure 
quality score (RMDPI), Sharia supervisory board (SSB),government ownership (GSHR), family ownership (FOWN), board size (BBSZ), CEO duality (CEOP), 
board independence(BBID),  political strength and absence of violence/ terrorism (PSQ), corruption control (COCQ), bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), 
liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD),annual reports length (LENG), inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 2 
fully defines all the variables used. 
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This result implies that powerful shareholders (i.e., family and government 
shareholders) have both the power and the incentives to monitor insiders’ behaviour to 
safeguard minority rights and bank reputation (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Cascino et al., 
2010). Additionally, these results suggest that banks may engage in increased risk disclosures 
in order to mitigate agency problems with MENA governments and families, as powerful 
shareholders; to signal their compliance with government initiatives and standards that can 
enable them to gain access to important resources, such as finance and business contracts. 
This, therefore, leads us to accept H2, which suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and MENA banks’ risk disclosures. 
The positive relationship among board size (BBSZ), board independence (BBID), and 
the RMDPI provides support for extant evidence that implies bigger boards with more board 
independence are more likely to make more risk disclosures (e.g., Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Al-Shammari, 2014; Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Chen & Jaggi, 2001; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Gao & Kling, 2012; Hussainey & Al-
Najjar, 2011; Jizi et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2013; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Oliveira et al., 2011; 
Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013). These results suggest that bank board size and board 
independence is associated with better executive monitoring; due to increased experience 
and skills, which may offer better access to important resources and enhance bank 
legitimacy.  
Finally, the negative effect of CEO duality (CEOP) on the RMDPI is consistent with the 
results of previous empirical research (Bassett et al., 2007; Forker, 1992; Mokhtar, & 
Mellett, 2013). This result is also in line with the theoretical suggestions (e.g., agency theory) 
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that banks with less powerful CEOs (e.g., the roles of a CEO and the board chairman are 
held by two different people) are generally viewed to have lower agency costs because they 
can be seen both as a sign and an instrument of less managerial power that mitigates agency 
conflicts, and legitimate bank activities. This therefore leads us to accept H3. 
Fifth, at the country-level, this essay examines whether country-level governance 
mechanisms (i.e., control of corruption (COCQ) and political stability and absence of 
violence (PSQ)) can have an effect on the RMDPI. The coefficient of the control of 
corruption (COCQ) on the RMDPI in Model 1 of Table 6 is statistically significant and 
positive, whilst political stability and absence of violence (PSQ) have a negative, but 
insignificant association with the level of bank risk disclosures. The policy suggestion is that 
institutional pressures (i.e., COCQ) might drive banks, especially in strongly governed 
countries to engage in increased risk disclosures. Theoretically, the results are consistent with 
the expectations of the multi-theoretical framework.  
This result implies that better country-level governance in terms of control of corruption 
may enhance investors protection, as well as it improves governance’s effectiveness and 
thereby impact positively on the RMDPI. In addition, the results are consistent with those of 
the few prior studies that suggest that country-level governance mechanisms can have a 
positive effect on risk disclosure and performance (e.g., Claessens & Laeven, 2003; 
Cumming et al., 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Shen et al., 2012). 
Hence, the results suggest that country-level governance in terms of control of corruption 
(COCQ) may play a complementary governance role in reinforcing CG-risk disclosure 
nexus; in strongly governed environments. In contrast, in weakly governed environments in 
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terms of political stability and absence of violence (PSQ), firm-level governance plays a 
stronger bonding governance role to mitigate increased agency costs in such environments 
in order to gain legitimacy.  
Finally and with regard to the other control variables, this study found that LNBS, LIQR, 
and LENG are statistically significant and positively related to risk disclosure, implying that 
MENA banks with high LNBS, LIQR, and LENG are more likely to make more significant 
risk disclosures. This is in line with findings of Amran et al. (2009), Elshandidy et al. (2013), 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), Ntim et al. (2013), and Oliveira et al. (2011). By contrast, 
this study finds a negative, but insignificant relation between ROAA, OPEF, BCAD, and 
CGDP and risk disclosure. 
6.3 Additional Analyses 
This essay conducts a number of additional tests to ascertain the robustness of the results. 
First, the sample consists of Islamic banks, commercial banks, and dual banks. Therefore, to 
ascertain how MLG operates among the three categories, I re-ran equation (1) by separating 
the sample to three sub-samples: (i) Islamic banks (IBs); (ii) commercial banks (CBs); and 
(iii) dual banks (DBs). The results relating to Models 2, 3, and 4 are reported in Table 6 and 
those relating to Models 11, 12, and 13 are reported in Table 7, respectively and are 
principally the same with slight differences in the significance levels as reflected in the 
coefficients’ value. Nevertheless, there is a negative impact of GSHR on risk disclosure, 
although this relation is statistically insignificant in IBs. In addition, the results show that 
FOWN and COCQ have more impact in IBs compared to CBs and DBs. Finally, the BS has 
more impact in DBs compared to CBs and IBs. This may be because dual banks are bigger, 
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have more activities, and have larger boards, which include greater diversity in terms of 
expertise and knowledge, which affect the level of risk disclosure. 
Second, the sample covered the period 2006-2013, in order to ascertain how MLG 
systems operate pre, during, and post the GFC. To achieve this aim I re-ran equation (1) by 
separating the full sample into three sub-samples: (i) pre- (i.e., 2006); (ii) during (i.e., 2007 
and 2008); and (iii) post- (i.e., 2009 to 2013) GFC periods. The results relating to Models 5, 
6 and 7 are reported in Table 6 and those relating to Models 14, 15 and 16 are reported in 
Table 7, respectively and are principally the same with slight differences in the variables’ 
significance levels. Nevertheless, there is a negative impact of SSB, GSHR, FOWN, BBSZ, 
and BBID before GFC, which indicates that governance mechanisms had limited positive 
impact on risk disclosures made by MENA banks before the GFC.  
Third, this study tests the robustness of the results by re-regressing equation (1) and 
equation (2) using weighted RMDPI (W-RMDPI) as an alternative risk disclosure index. The 
results, reported in Table 7, are mostly the same as those results reported in Table 6 with 
slight sensitivity in the variables’ levels of significance. Therefore, these findings indicate 
that the results are robust whether the RMDPI is un-weighted or weighted. Finally, and to 
test for presence of any potential endogeneity problems, which have been debated to be a 
common problem in CG studies (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; 
Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b), this study 
uses three-stage least squares (3SLS) (Belsley, 1988; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Zellner & 
Theil, 1962). The 3SLS methodology consists of three steps. First, MLG instruments are 
generated. Second, estimates the covariance matrix for MLG instrumental values based on 
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the residuals. Third, performs GLS regression based on covariance matrix (Dennis & Taisier, 
2014; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015). Therefore, the model to be assessed is identified as:                           
          ∑∑
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itiit CONTROLSMLGRMDPI εδββα                                    (2) 
where: 
everything remains unaffected as identified in equation (1) except that, this study uses 
the covariance matrix from the second step estimation as instruments for the eight MLG 
variables. The results for Model 8 are reported in Table 6 and for Model 17 are reported in 
Table 7. These results are mostly similar to those reported for Model 1 in Table 6 and for 
Model 10 in Table 7, suggesting that the results are robust to possible endogeneity problems 
that may arise from omitted factors.  
The minor increase in the coefficients’ value of the MLG variables in Model 8 of Table 
6 and in Model 17 of Table 7 compared with those in Model 1 of Tables 6 and in Model 10 
of Table 7 are in line with previous studies which indicate that instrumented variables of 
MLG variables are likely to predict risk disclosure more powerfully than their un-
instrumented variables (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010).  
This study also implements G2SLS (two-stage-least-squares fixed-effects within 
estimator) to fitting panel data model (Balestra & Varadharajan-Krishnakumar, 1987; Baltagi 
& Deng, 2015). The results for Model 9 are reported in Table 6 and for Model 18 are reported 
in Table 7 are mostly similar to those reported in Model 1 of Table 6 and those in Model 10 
of Table 7, suggesting that the results are robust to possible endogeneity problems. 
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Table 7 The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (W-RMDPI) 
Variables 
 
Dependent variable: Bank’s weighted risk disclosure (W-RMDPI) 
(10)  
Full sample 
(11)  
IBs 
(12)  
CBs 
(13)  
DBs 
(14)  
Pre 07/08 
(15)  
07/08 
(16) 
post07/08 
(17)  
3SLS 
(18)  
G2SLS 
Panel A: Independent : multi-layers governance variables 
SSB  3.30***  4.10***  ----  5.84*** -2.03**  1.89*  0.19  2.75***  3.30*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  ---- (0.000) (0.047) (0.063) (0.848) (0.006) (0.001) 
GSHR  2.50** -0.52  1.88*  2.49** -0.19  2.57**  0.85  2.97***  2.50** 
 (0.013) (0.607) (0.062) (0.014) (0.849) (0.013) (0.396) (0.003) (0.012) 
FOWN  2.05**  2.88***  1.23*  0.23 -0.80  1.03  2.19**  2.33**  2.05** 
 (0.041) (0.005) (0.081) (0.818) (0.430) (0.307) (0.047) (0.020) (0.040) 
BBSZ  3.09***  1.63  1.82*  3.04*** -0.58  0.30  2.73**  2.51**  3.09*** 
 (0.002) (0.106) (0.070) (0.003) (0.565) (0.763) (0.046) (0.012) (0.002) 
CEOP -0.10 -0.61  -0.33 -0.08 -0.85  0.81 -2.48** -2.84*** -0.10 
 (0.921) (0.544) (0.741) (0.935) (0.400) (0.422) (0.014) (0.005) (0.921) 
BBID  3.15***  2.25**  0.80  1.81* -0.51  1.12**  0.80  0.87**  3.15*** 
 (0.002) (0.026) (0.427) (0.071) (0.614) (0.046) (0.427) (0.033) (0.002) 
PSQ -1.81*  0.22 -0.42 -2.19** -1.35 -1.89* -6.73*** -3.92*** -1.81* 
 (0.071) (0.830) (0.672) (0.030) (0.181) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.070) 
COCQ  2.42**  1.58*  0.30  0.37*  1.48  1.81*  3.31***  1.25*  2.42** 
 (0.016) (0.064) (0.762) (0.072) (0.145) (0.075) (0.001) (0.020) (0.015) 
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Table 7 The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (W-RMDPI) continued....  
 
Panel B: Control variables   
Intercept -2.47** -0.09 -3.30*** -7.39***  1.19  0.82  4.82***  -0.75 -2.47** 
 (0.014) (0.927) (0.001) (0.000) (0.239) (0.417) (0.000) (0.456) (0.014) 
LNBS  2.42**  0.05  4.41***  8.94***  0.61  0.23  0.02  4.27***  2.42** 
 (0.016) (0.962) (0.000) (0.000) (0.547) (0.820) (0.986) (0.000) (0.015) 
ROAA -1.67* -2.09** -0.82  6.19***  0.11  0.23 -0.98 -1.15*** -1.67* 
 (0.096) (0.038) (0.413) (0.000) (0.912) (0.817) (0.326) (0.000) (0.095) 
LIQR  4.07***  2.15**  0.97  2.68***  1.00  1.22  2.40*  5.83***  4.07*** 
 (0.000) (0.033) (0.335) (0.008) (0.321) (0.227) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEF -0.09 -1.42 -1.31  2.12** -1.28 -1.26 -0.99 -1.35 -0.09 
 (0.930) (0.158) (0.190) (0.035) (0.204) (0.211) (0.325) (0.177) (0.930) 
BCAD -0.50  1.11 -1.67* -0.73 -1.22 -2.55** -1.42  -0.07 -0.50 
 (0.619) (0.271) (0.096) (0.467) (0.227) (0.013) (0.156) (0.947) (0.619) 
LENG 12.98***  6.43***  6.13***  4.15***  3.02***  4.25***  5.39***  9.02*** 12.98*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFL -1.35 -1.02 -0.22 -0.37 -6.79*** -0.48 -1.13 -6.39*** -1.35 
 (0.177) (0.310) (0.830) (0.714) (0.000) (0.637) (0.260) (0.000) (0.177) 
CGDP -1.98** -2.39** -0.59 -0.29  2.74*** -2.08** -1.10 -4.31*** -1.98* 
 (0.048) (0.018) (0.557) (0.773) (0.008) (0.042) (0.272) (0.000) (0.048) 
fixed effect Year Year Year Year - Year Year Year Year 
clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank - Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 7 The impact of multi-layers governance on bank risk disclosure (W-RMDPI) continued... 
F- value (χ2) 35.72*** 21.04*** 13.13*** 20.57***  5.33*** 5.94*** 9.77*** 480.61*** 27205*** 
Hausman chi2 145.65*** 132.98*** 168.23*** 123.45*** 156.28*** 185.21*** 166.36*** ------- 5.37 
Overall R2 0.29 0.38 0.16 0.44  0.60 0.15 0.21 0.41 0.29 
No. of obs 682 183 263 236  73 158 451 682 682 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: risk disclosure 
quality score (RMDPI), Sharia supervisory board (SSB),government ownership (GSHR), family ownership (FOWN), board size (BBSZ), CEO duality (CEOP), 
board independence(BBID),  political strength and absence of violence/ terrorism (PSQ), corruption control (COCQ), bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), 
liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual reports length (LENG), inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 2 
fully defines all the variables used. 
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7. Summary and Conclusion  
The financial crises that have been witnessed over the last decade have raised the 
importance of risk disclosure in the banking sector worldwide. This study examines the 
impact of banks’ multi-layer governance (MLG) on banks’ risk disclosure using a sample of 
14 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region over the period of 2006 to 
2013. The examination of the impact of MLG on banks’ risk disclosure is motivated by the 
dearth of research investigating the impact of board, ownership, SSB, and country 
governance characteristics on risk disclosure in banks. The study is also motivated by the 
fact that during the 2006 – 2013 period, all MENA authorities made considerable changes to 
CG and implemented IFRS standards and Basel accords, which required banks to report more 
information about their risks.  
The multivariate analysis results suggest that the MLG is significant in explaining 
differences in risk disclosure level. Specifically, the results suggest that Sharia Supervisory 
Board index (SSB) is positively associated with the level of risk disclosures by banks. 
Secondly, at the bank-level, this study finds that ownership (governmental ownership and 
family ownership) and board (board size and non-executive directors) structures have a 
positive effect on the level of risk disclosures by banks, whilst CEO duality is negative, but 
insignificantly related to bank risk disclosures. At the country-level, the evidence suggests 
that control of corruption has a positive effect on the level of bank risk disclosure, whilst 
political stability and absence of violence have a negative, but insignificant association with 
the level of bank risk disclosures.  
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These results provide empirical support for the predictions of the multi-theoretical 
framework that incorporates insights from agency, signal, legitimacy, and resource 
dependence theories. Also, the results are robust after controlling for a number of bank- and 
country-level factors in a number of models that address different risk disclosure measures 
in addition to addressing endogeneity problems with different econometric models. 
The results extend, as well as make a number of new contributions to the extant research. 
First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the study provides a first-time cross-country 
evidence on the level of risk disclosures in MENA, especially following the 2007/08 
financial crisis. Second, the essay provides evidence for the first time on the impact of in-
board layer (i.e., SSB) on the level of risk disclosures by MENA banks. Third, the study 
provides evidence on the extent to which differences in bank risk disclosures can be 
explained by bank-level governance, including board and ownership, and country-level 
governance. Finally, the evidence offers insights into risk disclosure and governance 
practices over the pre- and post-2007/08 period.  
This study has a number of implications for policymakers, regulators, practitioners and 
investors, as well as IBs, CBs, and DBs, especially for banks and authorities in other 
emerging markets. Firstly, the results show that the banking sector has responded to the 
recent regulatory pressure to enhance disclosure, transparency, and governance, and thus, 
these results shed light on the importance of risk disclosure reforms for management, policy 
makers, and regulators in the banking sector especially after GFC. Secondly, the findings 
show the importance of current CG reforms in MENA banks and their impact on enhancing 
risk disclosures. Examples of such changes include employing independent chairpersons, 
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increasing board size, and independent members acting as effective bank level advisors and 
monitors of risk disclosure. As a consequence, regulators and policymakers should 
continually pursue reforms to encourage banks to follow CG principles that are promoted as 
good practice.  
Thirdly, for IBs and DBs, the results demonstrate the importance of SSB, which 
mitigates agency costs, and works with BODs as additional governance layers to enhance 
transparency through comprehensive risk disclosures. Finally, for policy makers, regulators 
and investors, country governance results show the importance of sound governance 
institution such as control of corruption in enhancing a banks’ transparency through risk 
disclosure. 
This research contains some limitations. This study depends on banks annual reports 
only. Although important, they are not the only means by which banks disclose information 
about risk. Future research could examine the economic consequences of risk disclosure from 
an equity and debt investors’ perspective, as well as its impact on bank performance and 
value. In addition, this study depends on a number of ownership structures only. Although 
important, they are not the only types of ownership structures. Future research could examine 
the other types of ownership structures such as block, foreign, institutional, and managerial 
ownership. Finally, further research can address sample size limitations and the impact of 
further CG mechanism (e.g., audit committee, risk committee, independent non-executive 
board members) on risk disclosure quality.  
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Abstract 
This essay examines the relationships among national governance quality (NGQM), 
Islamic governance quality, including other bank-level governance mechanisms and risk 
management and disclosure practices (RMDPs); and consequently ascertains whether 
NGQM has a moderating influence on the Islamic governance quality-RMDPs nexus. Using 
Islamic banks dataset from 10 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries from 2006 
to 2013, the findings are four-fold. Firstly, this study finds that RMDPs are higher in banks 
from countries with higher NGQM. Secondly, this essay shows that RMDPs are higher in 
banks with better Islamic governance. Thirdly, the study finds that board size and non-
executive directors have a positive effect on the level of RMDPs. Finally, this study finds 
evidence that suggests that NGQM has a moderating effect on the Islamic governance 
quality-RMDPs nexus. These results are consistent with the predictions of the multi-
theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, signalling, legitimacy, 
institutional, and resource dependence theories.  
 
Keywords: Banks; Islamic Governance; MENA Countries; Multi-Theoretical Framework; 
National Governance; Risk Management and Disclosure Practices 
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1. Introduction 
Risk management and disclosure practices are a significant part of bank’s long-term 
financial sustainability and annual reporting. They often include managerial clarifications 
and commentaries about a bank’s up-to-date state regarding uncertainty and future 
predictions (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). However, regulators and 
stakeholders have been concerned with risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs) 
in recent years, especially following the 2007/2008 global banking crisis (Abedifar et al., 
2013; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015; Laeven, 2013). This notwithstanding, the 
role of macro-level factors, such as religion and national governance in driving business 
decisions and outcomes, such as RMDPs in distinct religious, cultural and business contexts, 
remains largely unexplored (Du et al., 2014; Ullah et al., 2014).  
Specifically, prior studies investigating the relationships among national governance 
quality, Islamic governance quality, including other bank-level governance mechanisms 
(ISGQ) and RMDPs are rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Elshandidy et al., 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, and to the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no extant study examining how national 
governance quality might probably affect the ISGQ-RMDPs nexus. The current study, 
therefore, seeks to examine the relationships among national governance quality, ISGQ, and 
RMDPs. In addition, this essay explores why and how national governance quality may have 
a moderating influence on the ISGQ-RMDPs nexus in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) Islamic banks. 
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RMDPs have witnessed substantial developments and interests in recent years (Abdallah 
et al., 2015; Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). 
Prior literature suggests that Islamic banks may embark on extensive RMDPs derived from 
a number of theoretical reasons. From agency theory perspective, transparent and extensive 
RMDPs may help in reducing information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Safieddine, 2009).  
Signalling theory states that transparent and extensive RMDPs may send signals to 
prospective investors about banks’ prudential risk management and disclosure practices 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). From legitimacy theory perspective, engaging in 
improved RMDPs may be a strategic approach towards enhancing their legitimacy to exist 
and conduct their operations (Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Pittroff, 2014). 
Institutional theory argues that banks often react to societal norms and pressures (i.e., 
coercive, societal, and institutional pressures) by improving RMDPs in order to gain 
organisational legitimacy (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b). Finally, resource dependence theory suggests that improved RMDPs 
can offer Islamic banks access to required resources, such as Sukuk and contracts (Al-Bassam 
et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
Therefore, extant research has examined a wide range of motivations, and antecedents 
of RMDPs (e.g., Abdallah et al., 2015; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Dobler et al., 2011; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013). However, 
existing research seems to suffer from a number of weaknesses. Despite the significance of 
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better RMDPs and the substantial accounting standards (e.g., International Financial 
Reporting Standards - IFRS 7 & 9), International Accounting Standards (IAS 32 & 39), and 
corporate governance (CG) reforms worldwide (Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Miihkinen, 2012; 
Ntim et al., 2013), existing RMDPs research is largely focused on examining the influence 
of either firm characteristics (e.g., Dobler et al., 2011; Linsley & Shrives, 2006) or internal 
CG mechanisms (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013) 
on RMDPs in non-financial firms in developed countries. By contrast, studies investigating 
why and how the banking industry may disclose RMDPs are rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013), especially in developing countries (Abdallah et al., 2015). 
Also, and although growing suggestions that national governance quality (NGQM) is an 
important driver of bank strategies, behaviour, and valuations (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; 
Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), extant research 
relating to the impact of NGQM on disclosure quality (e.g., RMDPs) has received little 
attention (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Cahan et al., 2015; Essen et 
al., 2013; García-Castro et al., 2013; Schiehll et al., 2014).  
Notwithstanding, either the theoretical suggestions or inconsistent empirical results 
about the direction and significance of the ISGQ-RMDPs nexus (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; 
Aguilera et al., 2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2015; Essen et al., 2013; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Williams, 2014; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012), to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, there is no extant research that has examined whether the institutional 
environment (e.g., NGQM) moderates ISGQ-RMDPs relationship.  
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Additionally, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Islamic banks provide a unique 
context for exploring RMDPs. Islamic banks are based on Islamic business principles, 
values, and laws that are drawn from Sharia, and thus arguably offering interesting context 
to assess the drivers of RMDPs. Also, MENA countries have pursued CG, accounting 
standards, and regulatory reforms (Amico, 2014; Moumen et al., 2015). However, the 
relatively poor NGQM in a majority of MENA countries as shown in Table 8 may affect 
Islamic banks (ISBs) trustworthiness. 
Hence, this study seeks to make three main novel contributions to the extant literature. 
Firstly, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study offers first-time evidence on 
the effect of national governance quality on banks’ risk management and disclosure 
practices. Secondly, this study offers first-time evidence on the impact of Islamic governance 
quality on banks’ risk management and disclosure practices. Finally, this essay provides 
evidence for the first time relating to the moderating effect of national governance quality on 
the relationship between Islamic governance quality, and banks’ risk management and 
disclosure practices.  
The rest of this study is organised as follows: Section two outlines the theoretical 
framework. Section three analyses the extant empirical literature and develops research 
hypotheses. Section four outlines the research design. Section five discusses the empirical 
results. Finally, section six draws concluding remarks, discusses implications and 
recommendations for future research.  
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Table 8 National governance quality indicators cross-MENA countries 
Governance  
Indicators Year MENA Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar KSA Syria UAE 
VAQ 
2006 25 23 16 29 31 34 17 29 5 6 21 
2009 23 27 15 27 34 35 18 23 4 6 26 
2013 25 12 18 25 28 34 19 24 3 4 18 
PSQ 
2006 37 32 21 23 57 5 72 76 29 37 77 
2009 38 40 26 32 55 8 74 91 28 28 81 
2013 28 9 7 26 52 7 62 91 33 0 75 
GEQ 
2006 46 66 37 61 63 44 64 70 47 18 80 
2009 49 69 47 63 62 39 66 80 52 34 81 
2013 45 70 21 50 52 43 61 81 58 8 83 
RQM 
2006 43 71 37 62 61 48 68 62 52 7 70 
2009 48 74 47 61 56 53 69 73 57 18 66 
2013 44 71 28 56 50 50 67 74 56 4 75 
ROLQ 
2006 46 63 50 62 67 32 62 70 56 22 61 
2009 49 66 54 62 67 30 69 82 59 38 63 
2013 44 62 34 63 63 25 67 83 61 3 71 
COCQ 
2006 46 64 29 66 72 18 62 83 49 16 79 
2009 48 66 41 65 71 22 67 92 59 13 80 
2013 45 69 32 61 54 18 60 84 58 8 88 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) cross-MENA countries in fiscal years 2006, 2009, and 2013. The 
six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) are defined as follows: Voice and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), 
government quality (GEQ), regulatory quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control of corruption quality (COCQ). Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI), World Bank Group, 2016. 
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2. Islamic Governance Quality, National Governance 
Quality, and Risk management and disclosure 
practices in MENA Islamic Banks 
A considerable number of extant literature has suggested that weak risk management 
and governance framework in the banking industry is a significant contributing factor for the 
recent global banking crisis (Aebi et al., 2012; BCBS, 2015; Grove et al., 2011; Hagendorff 
et al., 2010; Laeven, 2013; Leventis et al., 2013; McNulty et al., 2013; Minton et al., 2014). 
Additionally, ISBs need to comply with religious rules and regulations in addition to 
conventional banking rules, and therefore create additional governance challenges (Abedifar 
et al., 2013; Ahmed, 2015; AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Khediri et al., 2015; Ntim, 2013a, 
2013b). Therefore, CG literature in the banking sector demonstrates that board structure and 
related committees inadequateness interact with banks’ unique features, which played a key 
role in the financial crisis (García-Castro et al., 2013; Kirkpatrick, 2009; McNulty et al., 
2013; Minton et al., 2014; Walker, 2009).  
Specifically, the difference in banks governance structures is due to banks distinctive 
features, such as banks’ heavily regulation, opacity, complexity, and leverage, which 
differentiate bank governance when compared to non-financial firms. Additionally, banks 
deal with numerous agency conflicts, such as conflicts between shareholders and managers 
and/or other stakeholders (e.g., debtholders) (Laeven, 2013; Leventis et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, to stimulate prudential corporate governance practices of banks, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) revised and issued corporate governance (CG) 
principles for banks guidelines in 2015. BCBS (2015, p. 3) defines CG as:  
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“Corporate governance determines the allocation of authority and 
responsibilities by which the business and affairs of a bank are carried out by its 
board and senior management, including how they: (1) set the bank’s strategy 
and objectives; (2) select and oversee personnel; (3) operate the bank’s business 
on a day-to-day basis; (4) protect the interests of depositors, meet shareholder 
obligations, and take into account the interests of other recognised stakeholders; 
(5) align corporate culture, corporate activities and behaviour with the 
expectation that the bank will operate in a safe and sound manner, with integrity 
and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations; and (6) establish 
control functions”. 
Notably, governance reforms in the banking industry worldwide have placed a special 
emphasis on strengthening rigorous risk management, and disclosure practices (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013). In addition, BCBS (2015) and Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) (2014) argue that effective and improved risk management and 
disclosure practices are a key indicator to assess bank strategy, efficiency, and risk culture. 
Moreover, recently, CG reforms and extant literature demonstrate that board of directors and 
related sub-committees adequateness play a crucial role in strengthening a bank’s risk 
management and disclosure practices (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Laeven, 2013; Ntim et 
al., 2013). 
Although extensive literature demonstrates that the Islamic governance quality, 
including other bank-level governance mechanisms may strongly affect bank’s risk 
management and disclosure practices (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Farook et al., 2011; Garas & Pierce, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Laeven, 2013; 
Ntim, 2013c, 2013d; Ntim et al., 2013). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no 
attention has been given to how the national governance quality can affect these practices. 
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As proposed by Aguilera et al. (2008), Baldini et al. (2016), García-Castro et al. (2013), 
Schiehll et al. (2014), and Schiehll and Martins (2016), effective CG structures may be 
contingent on the national governance quality factors. In this study, we explore national 
governance quality as captured by six country governance indicators employed by Kaufmann 
et al. (2010, 2011), and in line with extant literature (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Essen et 
al., 2013; García-Castro et al., 2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016; Yoshikawa et al., 2014). 
Kaufmann et al. (2011, p. 222) define national governance quality as;  
“The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them.”2 
Such national governance quality may affect managers’, shareholders’ and other 
stakeholders’ insights on agency, legitimacy, and resource dependence problems (Essen et 
al., 2013; Hooghiemstra et al., 2015) and thus, eventually, affects RMDPs choices in 
different governance contexts. Therefore, the national governance quality has been argued 
to determine outlooks about the extent to which managers behave versus bank’s stakeholders 
(Alon & Dwyer, 2014). Particularly, the level to which managers decide to disclose risk 
information may depend on the national governance quality that impacts individual 
managers’ ethics, and behaviours. Notwithstanding the importance of RMDPs, the 
                                               
2 Based on Kaufmann et al. (2011) definition for the national governance quality , they construct six dimensions 
to measure the national governance quality: (I) voice and accountability quality (VAQ); (II) political stability 
quality (PSQ); (III) government quality (GEQ); (IV) regulatory quality (RQM); (V) rule of law quality 
(ROLQ); and (VI) control of corruption quality (COCQ). 
 112 
 
understanding of why managers decide to disclose such information; in ISBs context is 
limited. 
ISBs are considered a new trend in banking sector whose religion compliance is at least 
(if not more) as imperative as maximising shareholders wealth (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). 
Simultaneously, Islamic banking has gained specific attention of regulators, academics, and 
investors due to its steady increase in recent years (Abedifar et al., 2013; Elghuweel et al., 
2016). As a result, many international banks operating in sizeable Muslim population 
countries have created a number of Sharia-compliant products. For instance, Citi-group, 
HSBC, Standard Chartered among others, have opened Islamic windows (i.e. dual banks) 
(Khediri et al., 2015).  
Initially, the increasing growth of Islamic banking is due to a corresponding increase in 
demand for Sharia-compliant products, which are generated based on profit and loss sharing 
model (PLSM). Specifically, Islamic banking products must comply with the Islamic religion 
(Sharia principles), which mainly restricts involvement in charging interest, excessive 
uncertainty or gambling, and religion banned products (Gheeraert, 2014). However, ISBs 
special nature increases inherent risks. For instance, liquidity risks raise from heavily rely on 
long-term equity (e.g., Sukuk); operational risks (e.g., withdrawal risk) raise from non-
compliance with Sharia principles (Ahmed, 2015).  
Due to the need to comply with religious rules, Islamic banks are required to establish 
Islamic governance structure combined with the traditional governance structure. Islamic 
governance has been established to ensure all bank’s operations and activities comply with 
Islamic law (Sharia principles) (Abedifar et al., 2013; Khediri et al., 2015). Despite some 
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distinguished exceptions, the extant literature shows insignificant variances among ISBs and 
conventional banks regarding their competition, efficiency, and risk characteristics (Abedifar 
et al., 2013).  
Alternatively, the special religious nature of Islamic banks may trigger these banks to be 
more accountabe (Abedifar et al., 2013). Hence, MENA ISBs provide a unique context 
where RMDPs can be studied since religious factors create coercive and societal pressures 
which may impact banks’ behaviour. Also, MENA countries have pursued corporate 
governance (CG), accounting standards and regulatory reforms (Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; 
Moumen et al., 2015). For example, all MENA countries have issued CG codes to promote 
governance best practices (Amico, 2014).  
In addition, most of MENA countries have adopted Basel accords (I, II, and III) which 
seek to improve the transparency and risk management practices of banks for the benefit of 
stakeholders (Grassa, 2013; Khediri et al., 2015). However, the low country-level 
governance in the majority of MENA countries where ISBs are operating may affect their 
trustworthiness. Hence, MENA context allows us to clearly examine whether national 
governance quality moderates the relationship between Islamic governance quality, 
including other bank-level governance mechanisms and risk management and disclosure 
practices (RMDPs). 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
The variations in RMDPs could be explained through multi-theoretical lens because a 
globally accepted theory of RMDPs and governance is still elusive (Christopher, 2010; Ntim 
et al., 2013; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). In addition, I respond to the latest calls for a more 
holistic view of RMDPs (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Christopher, 2010; Dobler et al., 2011; 
Elshandidy et al., 2015; Ntim, 2012a, 2012c; Ntim et al., 2013). For example, each theory 
may not singularly offer a complete clarification of how Islamic and national governance 
mechanisms affect RMDPs. However, linking insights from multi-theoretical perspectives 
may give unique insights into interpreting and explaining RMDPs in different regulatory and 
institutional contexts. Also, these perspectives may allow examining the interaction between 
Islamic governance quality and national governance quality (Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012; Zona et al., 2015).  
From this perspective, joint insights from agency, legitimacy, signalling, institutional, 
and resource dependence theories are considered an important step in improving the 
relevance of Islamic and national governance mechanisms in explaining the motivations to 
be involved in RMDPs. This is particularly important in the regulatory and socio-
demographical diversity of MENA countries, where multi-theoretical approach could help 
in explaining the seemingly inconsistent results of RMDPs variation (Al-Bassam et al., 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012; Zona et al., 2015).  
Particularly, there are several theoretical reasons why ISBs could be involved in wide-
ranging RMDPs. Agency theory predicts that effective mechanisms of the bank-level and 
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national-level governance may lead to transparent RMDPs. Consequently, it mitigates 
agency costs and reduces the information asymmetry between management and shareholders 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Safieddine, 
2009). Signalling theory literature suggests that ISBs communicate RMDPs information to 
the external environment to drive a message to prospective investors about the bank and the 
effectiveness of national governance through prudential RMDPs (Connelly et al., 2011; 
Ntim, 2012c; Ntim et al., 2013). However, the explanatory power of agency and signalling 
theories is limited, as they tend to focus exclusively on managers and shareholders/investors 
to the detriment of other stakeholders, such as the local community. 
From legitimacy theory (LGT) perspective, engaging in improved RMDPs may be a 
strategic approach towards enhancing ISBs legitimacy to exist and conduct their operations. 
Subsequently, banks may choose to improve RMDPs as symbol instead of a substantive 
systems to avoid reputation damage and increase society’s acceptance (Al-Bassam et al., 
2015; Ntim, 2012c; Ntim et al., 2013; Pittroff, 2014). Also, LGT predicts that ISBs may 
drive a message to the society about prudential RMDPs (e.g., comply with Sharia) to meet 
the society’s boundaries, norms, and requirements (Edkins, 2009; Pittroff, 2014). Similarly, 
legitimacy theory has been criticised for being vague about the identity of the key 
stakeholders of the firm, and therefore, limited ability to explain observable differences in 
RMDPs. 
Institutional theory (IST) research states that banks also react to societal norms impact 
and pressure for improving RMDPs (Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). These 
pressures arise from banks’ external and internal forces and may lead to institutionalization 
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and organizations’ isomorphic behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Martinez & Dacin, 
1999; Ntim et al., 2013). In particular, IST argues that coercive and societal pressures arise 
from banks’ external settings. These pressures may create management incentives to gain 
organizational legitimacy through mimic RMDPs, and consequently, form mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). Similarly, IST 
emphasizes that established RMDPs inside banks may create institutional pressure, which 
arises when RMDPs stay for a long-term, culturally acknowledged, as well as resilient to 
change. Accordingly, institutional pressure forms normative isomorphism (Chandler & 
Hwang, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, IST has been critiqued for paying no 
attention to the role of agency, and hence, providing over-socialised clarifications of 
organizational behaviour (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Scott, 1987). 
Resource dependence theory (RSDT) predicts that improved RMDPs can offer Islamic 
banks access to required resources, such as Sukuk and contracts (Al-Bassam et al., 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Also, RSDT offers a number of benefits 
resulting from the bank and national governance’s effectiveness through wider 
interdependencies of ISBs. Specifically, bank and national governance effectiveness work as 
an instrument for banks to decrease uncertainty and dependence through improved RMDPs. 
Particularly, in increased competitive environment, improved RMDPs may work as an 
indication of bank quality (Christopher, 2010; Zona et al., 2015). However, the ability of 
resource dependence theory to explain discernible differences in RMDPs is also limited by 
its excessive focus on directing RMDPs at securing resources, especially financial resources 
and stakeholders, who may not necessarily be the main users of RMDPs. 
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With these apparent limitations of each individual theory, but yet different bank 
motivations for engaging in risk disclosures, this study seeks to enhance their explanatory 
power by drawing on insights from agency, legitimacy, signalling, institutional and resource 
dependence perspectives to understand the RMDPs phenomenon. Hence, this study merges 
their seemingly inconsistent results concerning the bank-level, national-level governance, 
and RMDPs nexus. The five perspectives have been assimilated to explain the critical 
functions Islamic bank-governance and national-governance quality perform and how these 
functions affect RMDPs. Furthermore, to add further theoretical nuance to the multi-
theoretical lens, this study cogitates how national governance quality and further effects such 
as ethical and religious values of the MENA region (i.e., Islamic governance) may be of 
influence RMDPs as presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 Proposed Empirical Model for the Structural Relations between Islamic 
Governance, Board Structure, NGQM, and RMDPs 
Notes: The graph describes the structural relations between Islamic governance, board structure, national 
governance quality and risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs), either directly (solid lines) or via 
moderating effect of national governance quality (NGQM) (dotted lines). 
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4. Related Literature and Research Hypotheses 
Development 
Most prior literature on risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs) focuses on 
firm-specific factors (e.g., Amran et al., 2008; Deumes, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011; Helbok & 
Wagner, 2006; Hassan, 2009). However, the focus has recently shifted from firm-specific 
factors to a firm’s internal CG, following unprecedented malfeasance and banks failures 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; AlHadi et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Dalton & Dalton, 
2011; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2013). Conversely, there 
is no evidence of regular relations between CG mechanisms and disclosure quality, 
particularly RMDPs in banks (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012; Miihkinen, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013).  
Moreover, an ample amount of prior RMDPs cross-country studies rely on one 
governance level analytical approach, while being inattentive to the national governance 
level (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). Consequently, this study seeks to examine the impact of 
Islamic governance quality, including other bank-level governance mechanisms on the level 
of RMDPs. Additionally, this study investigates the effect of national governance quality on 
the level of RMDPs. Then, it explores why and how national-level governance quality may 
have a moderating influence on the Islamic governance quality-RMDPs nexus in MENA 
Islamic banks.  
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4.1 Islamic Governance Quality and RMDPs 
4.1.1 Islamic Governance and RMDPs 
Prudential supervision and principles regarding Islamic governance may place a better 
emphasis on disclosure practices for many theoretical considerations (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 
2016; Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). According to agency theory, Islamic 
governance is likely to convey additional monitoring requirements to ISBs due to further 
rules, experience, and knowledge relating to being Sharia-compliant (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 
2016; Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Ntim et al., 2016). In particular, Islamic governance may 
offer motivations to engage in greater RMDPs through confirming whether ISBs have 
complied with Sharia and related risks, and thus mitigates information asymmetries (AI-
Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Farook et al., 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2015a, 
2015b, Safieddine, 2009).  
From signalling and legitimacy perspectives, Islamic governance may offer incentives 
to engage in greater RMDPs to avoid reputation damage and increase society’s acceptance 
by verifying ISBs legitimacy (Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Ntim et al., 
2013; Pittroff, 2014). In addition, communicating the sound RMDPs to prospective investors, 
and outside environment, especially as it relates to compliance with Sharia and related risks, 
and hence, banks could achieve a sustainable growth in the society (Connelly et al., 2011; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Pittroff, 2014). Institutional theory (IST) predicts that Islamic 
governance may offer incentives to engage in greater RMDPs especially practices that are 
linked to Sharia and related risks due to coercive and societal pressure arising from banks’ 
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external settings as well as institutional pressure from inside the banks (Chandler & Hwang, 
2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim et al., 2015c; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). 
 Finally, from resource dependence perspective, Islamic governance may offer 
incentives to engage in greater RMDPs so as to offer Islamic banks access to required 
resources such as Sukuk through prudential Sharia and related risks disclosure practices (Al-
Bassam et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
A number of current studies explore the nature of Islamic governance in ISBs. For 
example, Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) examine the ISBs’ ethical identity using annual reports 
data from 7 ISBs in four Gulf countries from 2002 to 2004. They found that ISBs disclose 
information related to Sharia supervisory boards (SSBs) as an ethical identity dimension for 
those banks. Safieddine (2009) explores CG practices using a survey of 43 questions from 
40 ISBs in 5 Gulf countries. In addition, three interviews from three ISBs have been 
conducted. Safieddine (2009) finds that ISBs have and recognize the significance of well-
established Sharia supervisory boards as a proxy for Islamic governance on the basis of 
independence, structure, education, and power. However, Safieddine (2009) argues that ISBs 
suffer from some governance weaknesses regarding audit and transparency.  
Prior studies find strong evidence supporting that Islamic governance has a positive 
impact on social responsibility disclosures (CSRs) within ISBs context (Farook et al., 2011; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Rahman & Bukair, 2013). For instance, using a data from 47 ISBs 
in 14 countries, Farook et al. (2011) found that integrating Islamic governance with Sharia 
supervisory boards (SSBs) have a positive impact on the level of CSRs. Consistently, prior 
literature finds evidence relating to Islamic governance-disclosure quality nexus. For 
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instance, using a data from 75 firms listed on the Saudi market in annual reports from 2004 
to 2010, AI-Bassam and Ntim (2016) find that Islamic governance, including SSBs 
characteristics, have a positive effect on the voluntary CG disclosure. Notably, to the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge, no literature has examined the impact of Islamic governance on 
RMDPs to date. Accordingly, this study hypothesises that: 
H1: The level of Islamic governance is positively related to the level of RMDPs. 
4.1.2  Board Structure of ISBs and RMDPs 
RMDPs are further driven by the ISBs board structure in terms of board size, diversity 
and independence for many theoretical reasons (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-Maghzom et al., 
2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2014; Ntim et al., 2013; Mokhtar 
& Mellett, 2013). According to agency theory, board structure (i.e., larger boards, more 
board diversity, and independence) is likely to deliver improved monitoring requirements to 
ISBs due to further rules, experience and knowledge (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Particularly, board structure (i.e., larger boards, more board diversity, and 
independence) may have a substantial effect on bank’s monitoring activities. Accordingly, it 
places more pressure on management to engage in greater RMDPs, and thus, mitigates 
agency costs (Blessy Sekome & Taddesse Lemma, 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Ntim et al., 2013).  
From signalling and legitimacy perspectives, board structure (i.e., larger boards, more 
board diversity, and independence) may offer motivations to engage in greater RMDPs to 
avoid reputation damage and increase society acceptance (Al-Bassam et al., 2015;Ntim et 
al., 2013; Pittroff, 2014). In addition, communicating the sound RMDPs to prospective 
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investors and outside environment, helps banks achieve a sustainable growth in the society 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Pittroff, 2014).  
IST research suggests that board structure (i.e., larger boards, more board diversity, and 
independence) may offer isomorphism incentives to engage in greater RMDPs due to 
coercive and societal pressure arising from banks’ external settings as well as institutional 
pressure from inside banks (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b).  
Finally, from resource dependence perspective, board structure (i.e., larger boards, more 
board diversity and independence) may offer incentives to engage in greater RMDPs to offer 
Islamic banks access to required resources, such as Sukuk that can assist their prospects for 
sustainable survival (Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). 
However, it could be debated that larger boards could impact RMDPs negatively (Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006) as a result of co-ordination and communication weaknesses (Jensen, 1993; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b).  
Literature has provided an unsystematic relationship between board size and RMDPs 
level (e.g., Domínguez & Gámez, 2014; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013). 
However, most of previous studies suggest a positive relationship between board size and 
RMDPs level (e.g., Al-Shammari, 2014; Allegrini & Greco, 2011; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Jizi et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013).  
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For instance, using data from 50 firms in South Africa over the period from 2002 to 
2011, Ntim et al. (2013) report a positive relationship between board size and RMDPs level. 
By contrast, Domínguez and Gámez (2014) find a negative relationship between board size 
and RMDPs in Spanish context. While, other studies (Allini et al., 2016; Cheng & Courtenay, 
2006; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012) suggest a non-significant association between board size 
and RMDPs. It is advocated that larger boards should focus on benefits such as further 
experiences and knowledge in such complex industry.  
Similarly, the prior literature suggests that board diversity would strengthen the RMDPs 
level (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Allini et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 
2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). For instance, Al-Maghzom et al. (2016) found a positive 
association between board diversity and RMDPs in Saudi Arabia context. However, Allini 
et al. (2014) found a negative association between board diversity and RMDPs in the Italian 
context.  
Also, prior literature suggests board independence (BBID) would underpin the RMDPs 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Chen & Jaggi, 2001; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 
2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2011). For instance, 
using a data from 290 firms in the UK from 2005 to 2009, Elshandidy et al. (2013) found a 
positive relationship between board independence and RMDPs suggesting that BBID has a 
valuable knowledge and place further monitoring power over management, and hence, 
reduces information asymmetry.  
By contrast, Al-Maghzom et al. (2016) found a negative association between board 
independence (i.e., BBID) and RMDPs in Saudi Arabia context. However, other studies 
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suggest a non-significant association between board independence (i.e., BBID) and RMDPs 
(Al-Shammari, 2014; Allini et al., 2016; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013). Accordingly, I 
hypothesise that: 
H2: Board structures (i.e., larger boards, more board diversity, and independence) are 
positively related to the level of RMDPs. 
H2a: Board size is positively related to the level of RMDPs. 
H2b: Board diversity is positively related to the level of RMDPs. 
H2c: Board independence is positively related to the level of RMDPs. 
4.2 National Governance Quality and RMDPs 
Effective national governance may place further emphasis on RMDPs (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2011; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). 
Agency theory literature suggests that banks in countries with improved national governance 
may provide additional monitoring level to mitigate information asymmetries, and hence 
offer motivations and pressures to engage in greater RMDPs (Aguilera et al., 2008; Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012).  
Similarly, from signalling and legitimacy viewpoints, national governance quality may 
offer incentives to engage in greater RMDPs to avoid reputation damage, and increase 
society’s acceptance by confirming ISBs legitimacy (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; Pittroff, 2014). Additionally, to communicating the sound 
RMDPs to prospective investors and outside environment (Connelly et al., 2011; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2007; Pittroff, 2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014).  
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IST also, suggests that national governance quality may offer incentives to engage in 
greater RMDPs due to coercive and societal pressures that arise from banks’ external settings 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). Finally, from resource dependence perspective, 
effective national governance may offer motivations and pressures to engage in greater 
RMDPs so as to offer Islamic banks access to required resources, such as Sukuk (Alon and 
Dwyer, 2014; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
Previous studies have largely suggested that national governance quality is an important 
driver of bank strategies, behaviour, and valuations (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & 
Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). However, empirical literature 
regarding the impact of national governance quality on disclosure quality and RMDPs 
especially has received little attention. For instance, using 85 banks from 20 European 
countries, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) found that countries with stronger national 
governance quality (i.e., the rule of law) are associated with an increase in the operational 
risk disclosure.  
On the other hand, using a data from 71 nations, Alon and Dwyer (2014) found that 
countries with weaker national governance quality mechanisms are the early IFRS adopters 
compared with their counterparts to access critically needed resources. Remarkably, to the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior studies have examined the impact of national 
governance quality on RMDPs to date, and therefore offers genuine opportunities to 
contribute to the extant literature by examining the effect of national governance quality on 
risk disclosures. Accordingly, this study hypothesises that: 
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H3: National governance quality is positively related to the level of RMDPs. 
4.3 Governance Quality and RMDPs: The Moderating 
Effect of National Governance Quality 
Inconsistent results about the sign and significance of the governance quality-RMDPs 
nexus have triggered a number of studies to explore them further (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; 
Aguilera et al., 2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2015; Essen et al., 2013; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Williams, 2014; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). On the one hand, a number of 
studies have indicated that different methodological approaches have led to inconsistent 
results (e.g., Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). For 
instance, endogeneity problem (e.g., Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), time 
frames differences (e.g., Abraham & Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013) and different RMDPs 
measures (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013).  
On the other hand, other research shows that reconciling the mixed results of the 
governance-RMDPs literature can be done by concentrating on how probable theory-driven 
variable moderates such relation (Aguilera, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2008; Alon & Dwyer, 
2014; Cahan et al., 2015; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013). Hence, this essay 
assumes that Islamic governance quality-RMDPs relationship is highly sensitive to the 
institutional environment, as characterised by the national governance quality. Accordingly, 
I hypothesise that: 
H4a: National governance quality moderates the relationship between Islamic 
governance and RMDPs. 
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H4b: National governance quality moderates the relationship between board structure 
and RMDPs. 
The earlier hypothesised relations are shown in Figure 1. 
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5. Research Design 
5.1 Describing the Characteristics of the Sample 
The sample is based on all listed Islamic and dual banks (ISBs) located in 10 countries 
in the Arab MENA region namely, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. This essay sample is based on the Bankscope database as 
shown in Table 9, from 2006 to 2013, covering pre-, during- and post 2007/2008 banking 
crisis period. In addition, this essay begins with 2006 since Basel II become effective from 
mid-2005 and data before 2006 in the vast majority of the sample is unavailable. This results 
in a final sample of 64 banks for over 8 years from 2006 to 2013, which generated 425 bank-
year observations for the tests relating to Hypotheses. 
Table 9 Sample structure 
Country Banks 
Islamic banks 
obs 
Dual banks 
obs 
All Banks obs Percentage 
Bahrain 9 44 24 68 14.56% 
Egypt 6 13 20 33 8.01% 
Jordan 3 3 13 16 3.88% 
Kuwait 6 36 5 41 9.95% 
Lebanon 2 0 16 16 3.88% 
Oman 4 0 5 5 1.21% 
Qatar 8 24 28 52 12.62% 
Saudi Arabia 11 21 63 84 20.39% 
Syria 1 6 0 6 0.24% 
UAE 14 32 72 104 25.24% 
Sum 64 179 246 425 100.00% 
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This study collected the data from three different sources. Firstly, RMDPs and 
governance variables were collected from annual reports which were obtained mainly from 
the Perfect Information database and banks’ websites. Secondly, financial data was obtained 
from Bankscope database. Finally, national macro statistics and national governance quality 
(NGQM) were obtained from World Bank databases. 
5.2 Definition of Variables  
The study variables are categorised into four main types, and Table 10 presents the full 
definitions of all variables used in this study. To examine H1 to H4, the main dependent 
variable is the RMDPI scores, which seek to measure the risk management and disclosure 
practices level.  
The study measured RMDPs variable using self-constructed risk management and 
disclosure practices index (RMDPI) based on several sources. Particularly, the study uses the 
Basel II guidelines, IFRS 7 and other RMDPs items that are employed in closely related 
studies (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 2009; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 
2013).  
Hence, RMDPI contains 96 items classified as follows: (a) bank financial risk 
management and disclosure practices, consisting of (i) credit (ii) liquidity (iii) market and 
(iv) capital risk management and disclosure practices; and (b) bank non-financial risk 
management and disclosure practices, consisting of (i) operational and (ii) strategic risk 
management and disclosure practices.  
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Table 10 Summary of definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions and coding 
Panel A: Dependent variable (risk management and disclosure practices index). 
RMDPI  The total risk management and disclosure practices score (RMDPI) is 
calculated based on the un-weighted (weighted) risk management and 
disclosure practices index and full scoring criteria are clarified in Appendices 
1 and 2.  
Panel B: Islamic governance quality variables 
SSBs  The total Islamic governance characteristics score (SSBs) is calculated based 
on SSBs index which involving of 7 items in addition to scoring criteria are; 
SSBs Existence=1, if a bank has SSBs board, 0 otherwise; SSBs Report=1, if 
a bank has disclosed SSBs report, 0 otherwise; Number of SSBs Member=1, 
if a bank has disclosed number of SSBs’ member, 0 otherwise; SSBs 
Meetings=1, if a bank has disclosed number of SSBs meetings, 0 otherwise; 
Independent=1, if SSBs’ members are independent from management, 0 
otherwise; Experience=1, if if a bank discloses SSB experience, 0 otherwise; Total 
SSBs fees disclosed=1, if a bank discloses SSBs fees, 0 otherwise. 
BDSZ Board size for each bank year is calculated based on number of board of 
directors. 
GNDI Gender diversity for each bank year is calculated based on number of female 
directors divided by the total number of board of directors. 
BBID Board independence for each bank year is calculated based on the non-
executive directors divided by the total number of board of directors. 
Panel C: National governance quality (NGQM) 
NGQM National governance quality for each bank year is calculated as a composite 
measure for the overall NGQM dimensions, which are Voice and 
accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government 
quality (GEQ), regulatory quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control 
of corruption quality (COCQ).  
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Table 10 Summary of definitions of variables continued...  
Panel D: Control variables 
LNBS Bank size for each bank year is calculated based on natural log of the book 
value of total assets. 
ROAA Performance for each bank year is calculated based on return on assets 
(ROAA) which is net income divided by total asset. 
LIQR Liquidity for each bank year is calculated based on net loans divided by total 
assets.  
OPEF Operations efficiency for each bank year is calculated based on cost divided 
by income. 
BCAD Bank’s capital adequacy for each bank year is calculated based on capital 
divided by risk-weighted asset. 
INFL Annual inflation for each bank year is consumer prices change (annual %). 
CGDP GDP per capita for each bank year is average income per individual (current 
US$). 
Islamic governance quality data contains Islamic governance (SSBs), board size (BDSZ), 
gender diversity (GNDI) and non-executive directors (BBID). This study implemented the 
“Worldwide Governance Indicators” developed by the World Bank to measure national 
governance quality (NGQM). Kaufmann et al. (2011) identify six dimensions of NGQM: 
voice and accountability (VAQ), political stability (PSQ), government effectiveness (GEQ), 
regulatory quality (RQM), the rule of law (ROLQ), and control of corruption (COCQ). 
Correlation matrix in Table 11 shows that there are high inter-correlations among NGQM 
dimensions which are consistent with prior studies (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Chang et al., 
2012).  
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Table 11 Correlation matrix of the national governance quality’ dimensions 
Variable VAQ PSQ GEQ RQM ROLQ COCQ 
VAQ 1      
PSQ 0.3005 1     
GEQ 0.2839 0.7928 1    
RQM 0.2423 0.6025 0.862 1   
ROLQ 0.2161 0.8197 0.7615 0.7902 1  
COCQ 0.2899 0.8731 0.9379 0.7849 0.8349 1 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) correlation 
matrix. The six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) are defined as follows: Voice 
and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), regulatory 
quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control of corruption quality (COCQ).  
Therefore, following prior research (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Nguyen et al., 
2015; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), the study employs the principal component analysis (PCA) to 
create a composite measure for the overall NGQM dimensions. PCA aims at reduce high 
correlated variables by extract the significant information.  
Specifically, PCA is a linear dimensionality reduction technique that employs an 
orthogonal transformation to transform a set of observations of probably correlated variables 
into a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables named principal components to resolve 
the colinearity issue. Thus, using PCA will allow to identify data patterns, and highlight data 
similarities and differences. Also, PCA is a powerful instrument for analysing high 
dimension data. Thus, PCA arguably reduce the number of dimensions without loss 
significant information which reflect the original variables. On the other hand, other methods 
such as mean, sum, median, measures of central tendency, do not reflect the original 
variables. Specifically, the measures of central tendency is mainly vulnerable to the effect of 
either outliers or when the frequency distribution for our data is skewed. 
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Table 12 shows the PCA (eigenvectors) and diagnostics of NGQM dimensions. The 
overall KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) which I used as a measure of sampling adequacy 
(MSAD) is 0.7029, which is higher than the recommended PCA minimum of 0.50 (Tunyi & 
Ntim, 2016). 
Table 12 PCA (eigenvectors) and diagnostics of the national governance quality’ 
dimensions 
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained KMO 
VAQ 0.176 0.979 0.060 0.075 -0.035 -0.019 0 0.8226 
PSQ 0.428 -0.008 -0.659 -0.054 0.599 0.148 0 0.7523 
GEQ 0.455 -0.067 0.203 -0.530 0.018 -0.683 0 0.6687 
RQM 0.419 -0.111 0.699 0.178 0.393 0.369 0 0.6309 
ROLQ 0.435 -0.145 -0.130 0.755 -0.307 -0.329 0 0.6658 
COCQ 0.463 -0.063 -0.125 -0.329 -0.626 0.517 0 0.7950 
Eigenvalue 4.336 0.900 0.416 0.250 0.070 0.028   
Proportion 0.723 0.150 0.069 0.042 0.012 0.005   
KMO        0.7029 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) PCA 
(eigenvectors). The six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) are defined as 
follows: Voice and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), 
regulatory quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control of corruption quality (COCQ). Also Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) is a measure of sampling adequacy (MSAD). 
Finally, a wide range of bank characteristics was included as control variables. These 
include bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency 
(OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), as well as macro-economic variables such as annual 
inflation (INFL), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). This essay does not develop direct 
theoretic relations between these variables and RMDPI for brevity, but there are wide prior 
studies that find they can impact RMDPI (e.g., Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Farook et al., 2011; Ford et al., 2009; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013). 
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5.3 Model Specification 
This study uses fixed effects regression analysis (Elshandidy et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 
2013) to investigate the moderating effect of NGQM on the relationship between Islamic 
governance quality and RMDPs in MENA ISBs.  
Therefore, regression model to be considered is identified as follows: 
∑∑∑
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where: 
RMDPI is a proxy of risk management and disclosure practices level for bank i during 
year t. ISGQ refers to Islamic governance (SSBs), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity 
(GNDI), and non-executive directors (BBID). NGQM refers to national governance quality. 
CONTROLS refers to bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations 
efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFL), and annual GDP per 
capita (CGDP).δ is the bank-year specific fixed-effects, and ε is the white noise error term.  
The main model defined in equation (3) is a standard panel data regression model that 
may possibly be estimated by pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects models. Pooled 
OLS assumes continuous variance and uncorrelated observations. To choose pooled OLS or 
the random effects and fixed effects, I used Breusch and Pagan test to decide the presence of 
the heterogeneity.  
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The empirical results find that there are unobserved variables. Thus, pooled OLS 
estimator, arguably, is inconsistent and biased. At that point, to decide whether random 
effects or fixed effects will be employed, the Hausman specification test was used to choose 
the best model that yield more consistency and efficiency of the estimators. I chose fixed-
effects regression model rather than random-effects regression model because the Hausman 
favoured fixed-effects over random effects. 
The empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, bivariate and regression are 
presented in the following sections. 
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6. Empirical Results and Discussion 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses  
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics for the main indices i.e., the un-weighted risk 
management and disclosure practices index (RMDPI), the weighted risk management and 
disclosure practices index (W-RMDPI) and national governance quality (NGQM) for the full 
data-set, as well as for each of the 8 bank-years examined, respectively. On average, the 
distribution of the RMDPI differs considerably, ranging from 1.04 per cent (1 out of 96 items 
disclosed) to 87.50 per cent (84 out of 96) with the mean of 58.07 per cent. Also, Table 13 
reports that RMDPI improves over time.  
For instance, RMDPI mean is improved steadily from 35.87 per cent in 2006 to 65.14 
per cent in 2013. The steady improvement in RMDPI suggests that the implementation of 
Basel II from 2006 and CG codes have improved RMDPs among banks. This reflects the 
importance given to RMDPs and national governance particularly during and after the 
2007/08 crunch (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). 
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Table 13 Summary statistics for RMDPI, W-RMDPI, and NGQM for all 425-bank 
years 
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Dependent The un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (RMDPI) 
Mean   58.07 35.87   49.77 55.87 59.49 62.26 62.15 63.70 65.14 
STD 14.81 12.27   15.73 16.15 15.38 10.65 10.89 9.86 8.51 
Min     1.00     6.00     7.00     1.00     7.00 33.00 29.00 35.00 36.00 
Max   84.00   77.00 73.00 77.00 77.00 77.00 77.00 77.00   84.00 
Panel B: Dependent The weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (W-RMDPI) 
Mean   83.08 44.97   69.99 80.42 85.2 89.96 90.29 92.39 94.33 
STD 22.89 17.99   24.97 24.16 24.39 14.89 14.77 13.69 12.51 
Min     2.00     7.00     7.00     2.00     7.00 45.00 45.00 50.00 61.00 
Max 135.00 106.00 106.00 109.00 116.00 116.00 116.00 116.00 135.00 
Panel C: Independent national governance quality (NGQM) 
 
Mean 0.48 -0.13 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.09 -0.27 -0.14 -0.05 
STD 2.08 1.84 1.78 1.88 2.00 1.79 2.11 2.41 2.53 
Min -8.19 -3.71 -4.00 -4.80 -4.55 -4.66 -5.44 -7.59 -8.19 
Max 3.22 1.69 1.82 2.16 3.22 2.83 2.14 2.99 3.05 
Notes: This table present summary of descriptive statistics of compliance levels with un-weighted 
risk management and disclosure practices index (RMDPI) and weighted risk management and 
disclosure practices index (W-RMDPI), in addition to national governance quality (NGQM) in the 
full sample and each year separately from 2006 to 2013. See Table 10 for the definitions of each 
variable. 
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Similarly, the distribution of the W-RMDPI shows a similar pattern to RMDPI 
distribution. By contrast, the distribution of the NGQM fluctuates substantively, ranging 
from -8.19 to 3.22 with the mean of 0.48. Also, Table 13 reports that NGQM has been 
fluctuating over time. Continues fluctuations in NGQM reflect the nature of MENA context. 
In particular, MENA countries face considerable political instability as well as the impact of 
the 2007/08 crunch in MENA region (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Hasan & Dridi, 2010). 
Table 14 Summary statistics of all variables for all 425 observations 
Variables         N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
RMDPI  425.00   58.07 14.81     1.00   84.00 
W-RMDPI  425.00   83.08 22.89     2.00 135.00 
NGQM 425.00 0.48 2.08 -8.19 3.22 
BDSZ 425.00 10.17 2.01 3.00 15.00 
GNDI 425.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.23 
BBID 425.00 0.88 0.19 0.00 1.00 
SSBs  425.00 2.48 1.87 0.00 7.00 
LNBS 425.00 16.03 1.58 3.73 21.09 
ROAA 425.00 0.01 0.05 -0.52 0.24 
LIQR (%) 425.00 53.42 15.74 0.00 79.93 
OPEF (%) 425.00 41.04 38.29 11.91 284.00 
BCAD (%) 425.00 21.18 16.83 9.26 204.41 
INFL 425.00 4.70 4.12 -5.00 15.00 
CGDP 425.00 28068.99 24723.56 1472.60 93714.10 
Notes: This table reports the mean, standard deviation and values of the minimum and the maximum range 
for the following variables: un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (RMDPI), weighted 
risk management and disclosure practices index (W-RMDPI), national governance quality (NGQM) board 
size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (BBID), Islamic governance(SSBs), bank size 
(LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), 
annual inflation (INFL), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 10 for the definitions of each 
variable. 
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Table 14 shows summary statistics for all variables. Similar to the RMDPI, all the 
independent and control variables distributions generally show widespread variations. For 
instance, Islamic governance (SSBs) ranges from 0.00 to 7.00 with a mean of 2.48. Also, 
board size (BDSZ) ranges from 3.00 to 15.00 with a mean of 10 board members. These results 
are in line with previous related studies in the banking sector (e.g., Erkens et al., 2012; Hasan 
& Dridi, 2010; Rosman et al., 2014). Lastly, the values of other variables reported in Table 
14 suggest widespread variations in the sample, and hence decreasing potentials of a biased 
sample selection. 
Table 15 reports the correlation matrix of Pearson’s parametric for all variables to test 
multicollinearity for the regression analysis. Evidently, low correlation coefficients between 
the variables of Table 15 indicate that the examination does not encounter multicollinearity 
problems. In addition, Table 15 shows statistically significant correlation between RMDPI 
and variables. For instance, BDSZ, BBID, SSBs, NGQM, LNBS, and LIQR are substantially 
statistically and positively correlated with RMDPI, whilst BCAD and INFL are substantially 
statistically and negatively correlated with RMDPI. 
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Table 15 Correlation matrix for variables used for all 425 observations 
Variable RMDPI  BDSZ GNDI BBID SSBs NGQM LNBS ROAA LIQR OPEF BCAD INFL CGDP 
RMDPI    0.461** -0.078  0.343**  0.364**  0.244**  0.501** -0.080  0.317** -0.073 -0.133** -0.421**  0.037 
BDSZ  0.475**   0.093  0.104*  0.116* -0.068  0.263** -0.021  0.000 -0.057 -0.216** -0.116* -0.151** 
GNDI -0.025  0.117*   0.050  0.135**  0.084 -0.167** -0.147** -0.235**  0.225** -0.076  0.040 -0.152** 
BBID  0.251**  0.036  0.007   0.246**  0.125**  0.112* -0.045  0.232** -0.079 -0.095* -0.231** -0.033 
SSBs  0.332**  0.127**  0.161**  0.214**  -0.041  0.009 -0.188** -0.046  0.088  0.004 -0.223** -0.040 
NGQM  0.282** -0.093  0.003  0.205** -0.065   0.098*  0.052  0.306** -0.065 -0.040 -0.301**  0.269** 
LNBS  0.564**  0.323** -0.195**  0.061  0.100*  0.091   0.045  0.279** -0.144** -0.077 -0.227**  0.067 
ROAA -0.053 -0.054 -0.139**  0.024 -0.168**  0.159**  0.124*   0.086 -0.226**  0.085  0.074  0.125* 
LIQR  0.292**  0.022 -0.160**  0.328** -0.073  0.372**  0.280**  0.278**  -0.151** -0.234** -0.109*  0.266** 
OPEF -0.069 -0.009  0.330** -0.008  0.181** -0.222** -0.286** -0.541** -0.293**   0.194**  0.043 -0.102* 
BCAD -0.116* -0.197** -0.162**  0.092 -0.009  0.051 -0.074  0.148**  0.020 -0.027  -0.125* -0.047 
INFL -0.316** -0.043  0.010 -0.269** -0.168** -0.434** -0.174** -0.011 -0.173**  0.038 -0.303**   0.079 
CGDP  0.053 -0.121* -0.099*  0.105*  0.073  0.244**  0.126**  0.274**  0.301** -0.222** -0.043  0.085  
Notes: This table reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients in upper right (lower left) half between the following variables: risk management and 
disclosure practices (RMDPI), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (BBID), Islamic governance (SSBs), national governance 
quality (NGQM), bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFL), and 
annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 10 for the definitions of each variable. 
∗∗ Significant at the 1% level. 
∗   Significant at the 5% level. 
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6.2 Regression Analyses and Discussion 
Table 16 reports the fixed-effect regression analysis results of the moderating effect of 
NGQM on the relationship between Islamic governance quality and RMDPs. The findings 
of Models 1, 2, and 3 indicate that Islamic governance quality and NGQM are important in 
explaining differences in RMDPs as follows. Firstly, this study examines whether Islamic 
governance impacts the RMDPI level. The coefficients of the Islamic governance (SSBs) in 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 16 are positive (t = 8.35, p < .001 and t = 8.79, p < .001, 
respectively), thus providing empirical support for H1. Specifically, better Islamic-governed 
banks disclose more risk management and disclosure practices.  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact 
of Islamic governance (SSBs) on RMDPs. This evidence is largely in line with previous 
studies that support the role of Islamic governance to improve disclosure quality (e.g., AI-
Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). This evidence is 
consistent with the expectations of the multi-theoretical framework presented in Figure 1, 
which suggests that effective Islamic governance conveys additional monitoring frames and 
accountability to ISBs by engaging in greater RMDPs (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Similarly, enhanced RMDPs, due to coercive and societal pressures, can 
increase society’s acceptance and legitimate ISBs operations as well as offer access to 
required resources (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Connelly et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Pittroff, 2014).  
Secondly, Models 2 and 3 of Table 16 largely indicate that board structure significantly 
impacts the RMDPs. Specifically, board size (BDSZ) is positively related to the RMDPI level 
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in Models 2 and 3 of Table 16 (t = 12.09, p < .000 and t = 14.06, p < .000, respectively), 
providing empirical support for H2a. These findings are similar to previous studies, which 
suggest that BDSZ positively impacts RMDPI (Al-Shammari, 2014; Allegrini & Greco, 
2011; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Gao & Kling, 2012; Hussainey & 
Al-Najjar, 2011; Jizi et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2013; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013). This evidence 
is consistent with the expectations of the multi-theoretical frame, which suggests that larger 
board size places more pressure on management to engage in greater RMDPs and thus, 
mitigates agency costs (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; Elshandidy et al., 2013). Similarly, larger 
board size engages in more RMDPs to increase banks’ legitimacy as well as send signal to 
the external environment about board effectiveness to offer Islamic banks access to required 
resources.  
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Table 16 National Governance Quality, Islamic Governance Quality, and Risk Disclosures 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Bank’s risk management and disclosure practices index (RMDPI) 
(1) RMDPI  (2) RMDPI  (3) RMDPI  (4) G2SLS (5) W-RMDPI  (6) W-G2SLS 
Panel A: Independent variables 
BDSZ   12.090***  14.06***  13.47***  13.13***  11.88*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GNDI  -1.600 -0.86 -1.37 -0.96 -1.55 
  (0.110) (0.388) (0.388) (0.337) (0.122) 
BBID   5.300***  4.78***  4.23***  4.39***  3.47*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
SSBs   8.350***  8.79***  10.08***  7.09***  8.70*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGQM   2.840***  6.46***  5.73***  4.95***  4.28*** 
  (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGQM* BDSZ    8.63***  7.80***  8.10***  6.93*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGQM*GNDI    3.55***  3.21***  3.41***  2.98*** 
   (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
NGQM* BBID    0.080  0.15  1.37  1.10 
   (0.934) (0.878) (0.171) (0.269) 
NGQM* SSBs    1.80*  1.71*  0.62  0.70 
   (0.072) (0.086) (0.537) (0.486) 
 
 
 144 
 
Table 16 National Governance Quality, Islamic Governance Quality and Risk Disclosures continued... 
Panel B: Control variables.   
LNBS  6.07***  3.930***  3.86***  5.48***  4.33***  5.65*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAA -1.52 -0.440 -0.23 -0.75 -0.58 -1.14 
 (0.130) (0.659) (0.821) (0.453) (0.561) (0.252) 
LIQR  4.99***  4.260***  4.95***  5.08***  5.01***  4.83*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEF  1.20  0.850  0.64  0.86  0.79  1.05 
 (0.231) (0.398) (0.520) (0.389) (0.431) (0.293) 
BCAD -2.07**  0.730  0.84  0.62  1.03  0.91 
 (0.039) (0.466) (0.400) (0.535) (0.305) (0.361) 
INFL -3.51*** -2.080** -1.77* -2.57** -0.60 -1.88 
 (0.001) (0.039) (0.078) (0.010) (0.547) (0.060) 
CGDP -2.13** -0.570 -0.96 -0.54 -1.81* -0.87 
 (0.034) (0.566) (0.339) (0.592) (0.071) (0.382) 
Constant -0.65 -6.140*** -6.58*** -6.20*** -7.71*** -6.68*** 
 (0.514) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
fixed effect  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year 
Standard error 
clustering 
 Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
F- value (Wald chi2)  23.02***  59.74***  60.02***  903.61***  50.06***  712.86*** 
Hausman chi2  237.71***  242.48***  265.53***  1.48  185.21***  15.21 
Overall R2  0.3284  0.5395  0.5628  0.5941  0.4903  0.5329 
No of obs  425  425  425  425  425  425 
Notes: This table reports the following variables: un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPI), weighted risk management and disclosure 
practices (W-RMDPI), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (BBID), Islamic governance (SSBs), national governance quality 
(NGQM), bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFL), and 
annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 10 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Significant at the 1% level. 
**     Significant at the 5% level. 
*       Significant at the 10% level. 
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Observably, non-executive directors percentage (BBID) is positively related to the 
RMDPI level in Models 2 and 3 of Table 16 (t = 5.30, p < .000 and t = 4.78, p < .000, 
respectively); thus, H2c is empirically supported. These findings are similar to previous 
studies, which suggest that BBID positively impacts RMDPs (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013).  
This evidence is consistent with the expectations of the multi-theoretical frame, which 
suggests that BBID serves as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetry by placing 
more pressure on management to engage in better RMDPs (AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013). Similarly, increased board independence places more pressure on 
bank management by engaging in better RMDPs to increase banks’ legitimacy. Also, better 
RMDPs send a signal to the external environment about board independence to offer access 
to required resources. Board diversity based on gender displays a weak negative relationship 
with the RMDPI level in Models 2 and 3 of Table 16 (t = -1.60, p < .11 and t = -0.86, p < 
.388, respectively), and therefore, H2b is rejected. These results are similar to Allini et al. 
(2014); however, they are inconsistent with Al-Maghzom et al. (2016), and Ntim et al. 
(2013). 
Thirdly, the results show that cross-sectional differences in the RMDPI level can largely 
be explained by NGQM. Specifically, the coefficient of the national governance quality 
(NGQM) in Models 2 and 3 of Table 16 is positive (t = 2.84, p < .005 and t = 6.46, p < .000, 
respectively), thus providing empirical support for H3. In particular, banks in better-governed 
countries engage in greater RMDPs compare to their counterparts.  
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To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence that 
examines the impact of NGQM on RMDPs; however, this evidence is largely in line with 
previous studies that support the role of NGQM to improve disclosure quality (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Cahan et al., 2015). This evidence is consistent with the expectations of 
the multi-theoretical frame, which suggests that improved NGQM can provide additional 
monitoring level to mitigate information asymmetries, and hence, offer motivations and 
pressures to engage in greater RMDPs. Similarly, NGQM offers incentives to engage in 
greater RMDPs so as to avoid reputation damage and increase society acceptance by 
confirming ISBs legitimacy, as well as to offer Islamic banks access to required resources. 
Also, NGQM offers incentives to engage in greater RMDPs due to coercive and societal 
pressures arising from banks’ external settings.  
Finally, to ascertain whether the Islamic governance quality-RMDPs relationship can be 
moderated by NGQM, this study contains interaction variables for the four Islamic 
governance quality variables and NGQM (i.e., NGQM*SSBs, NGQM*BDSZ, NGQM*GNDI, 
and NGQM*BBID) in Model 3 of Table 16. The estimation is established on the developing 
theoretical and empirical evidence (Aguilera, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2008; Alon & Dwyer, 
2014; Cahan et al., 2015; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013), which suggests 
that the impact of the Islamic governance quality on RMDPs can be enhanced in stronger 
NGQM context.  
Observably, the respective coefficients of NGQM*BDSZ, NGQM*GNDI, 
NGQM*BBID, and NGQM*SSBs on the RMDPs index in Model 3 of Table 16 (t = 8.63, p 
< .000; t = 3.55, p < .001; t = 0.08, p < .934 and t = 1.80, p < .072, respectively) are positive, 
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thus providing original evidence, which supports H4a, and H4b. That is, the Islamic 
governance quality-RMDPs relationship is significantly and positively improved by NGQM. 
The evidence indicates that ISBs managers in better-governed countries are more expected 
to carry out improved risk management and disclosure practices that can support 
legitimization of banks’ operations by mitigating conflicts of interests between the different 
stakeholders. 
6.3  Additional Analyses 
This study performs a number of further analyses to determine the robustness of the 
results. Firstly, as a robustness check, this study reproduces the analyses in Model 3 of Table 
16 by replacing the RMDPI with W-RMDPI, and the results are presented in Model 5 of 
Table 16. These results are similar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 16, implying that 
the results are obviously robust to the use of disclosure indices measure.  
Secondly, following extant research (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), 
this essay addresses potential endogeneities that may be affected by omitted variable bias, 
by estimating two-stage least squares for panel-data estimators (G2SLS). In the first stage, I 
replaced the Islamic governance quality variables with instrument variables, which is 
influenced by all the control variables. In the second stage, I used the instrumented variables 
of the Islamic governance quality and re-run equation (4) as follows:  
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where: 
Everything remains unaffected as stated in equation (3) except that this study used the 
instrumented Islamic governance quality variables. The results are presented in Model 4 of 
Table 16. These results are also similar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 16, implying 
that the results are obviously robust to the probable endogeneities issue that could be affected 
by omitted variable bias. 
Thirdly, this essay considers the robustness of the results on sub-samples: Islamic banks 
and dual banks by re-running equations (3) and (4) and results reported in Table 17. Apart 
from a few sensitivities (such as the significant of GNDI), the results in Table 17 have 
similarities to those reported in Table 16, and this implies that the results are obviously robust 
to the use of sub-samples. Inconsistently, this study finds that gender diversity (GNDI) has 
an impact on RMDPI in Islamic banks, unlike dual banks. Finally, Table 18 indicates the 
variables that influence banks to provide RMDPs, and how those variables work among 
banks, operating in strongly-governed and poorly-governed environments.  
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Table 17 National Governance Quality, Islamic Governance Quality, and Risk Disclosures (Islamic vs. dual banks) 
Variables Dependent variable: Bank’s risk management and disclosure practices index (RMDPI) Islamic banks Dual banks 
 (1) RMDPI (2) W-RMDPI (3) G2SLS (4) RMDPI (5) W-RMDPI (6) G2SLS 
Panel A: Independent variables 
BDSZ 9.20*** 8.97*** 7.46*** 10.30*** 9.75*** 10.26*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GNDI 2.92*** 3.48*** 0.72 -4.33*** -4.76*** -3.36*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.469) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
BBID 4.25*** 3.96*** 3.31*** 3.73*** 3.53*** 2.65*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) 
SSBs 7.35*** 5.73*** 8.40*** 6.33*** 5.79*** 5.23*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGQM 2.91*** 1.21 3.83*** 3.23*** 2.95*** 2.79*** 
 (0.004) (0.229) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
NGQM* BDSZ 3.10*** 2.33** 3.60*** 5.25*** 4.98*** 6.45*** 
 (0.002) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGQM*GNDI 2.09** 1.92* 2.45** 1.95* 1.67* 3.10*** 
 (0.038) (0.057) (0.014) (0.053) (0.097) (0.002) 
NGQM* BBID 2.47** 1.07 2.73*** 0.41 0.39 1.63 
 (0.015) (0.286) (0.006) (0.679) (0.695) (0.104) 
NGQM* SSBs 2.04** 3.20*** 0.94 2.19** 1.15 0.41 
 (0.043) (0.002) (0.348) (0.030) (0.250) (0.684) 
Panel B: Control variables. 
LNBS -0.57 -0.41 1.26 8.01*** 8.34*** 7.87*** 
 (0.569) (0.679) (0.208) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAA 0.58 0.33 -0.89 5.55*** 5.65*** 4.67*** 
 (0.560) (0.746) (0.375) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQR 4.06*** 4.27*** 3.60*** 4.21*** 4.19*** 3.18*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
OPEF 0.68 0.89 0.38 2.14** 2.31** 2.08** 
 (0.498) (0.377) (0.703) (0.034) (0.022) (0.037) 
BCAD 1.26 1.10 1.30 -0.10 0.62 0.98 
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Table 17 National Governance Quality, Islamic Governance Quality, and Risk Disclosures (Islamic vs. dual banks) 
continued... 
 (0.211) (0.271) (0.194) (0.921) (0.536) (0.329) 
INFL -0.12 0.34 -1.26 -1.43 -0.29 -0.89 
 (0.903) (0.733) (0.207) (0.156) (0.770) (0.375) 
CGDP -3.32*** -3.56*** -1.89* 0.46 -0.05 0.56 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.059) (0.645) (0.963) (0.573) 
Constant -1.66 -2.12** -2.37** -9.91*** -11.21*** -8.29*** 
 (0.100) (0.035) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
fixed effect Year Year Year Year Year Year 
Standard error clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
F- value (Wald chi2) 42.45*** 35.04*** 542.71*** 38.90*** 35.87*** 712.86*** 
Hausman chi2  89.71*** 77.48*** 15.53 91.48*** 85.21*** 15.21 
Overall R2 0.4207 0.3118 0.5734 0.6112 0.5708 0.5329 
No of obs 189 189 189 236 236 236 
Notes: This table reports the following variables: un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPI), weighted risk management and disclosure 
practices (W-RMDPI), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (BBID), Islamic governance(SSBs), national governance quality 
(NGQM), bank size (LNBS), performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFL), and 
annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 10 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Significant at the 1% level. 
**     Significant at the 5% level. 
*       Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 18 also offers a number of remarkable results as well as  reveals that Islamic 
governance quality and national governance quality have a significant impact on RMDPs in 
banks operating in strongly-governed environments compared with their counterparts.  
Similarly, this study found that gender diversity positively impacts RMDPs in banks that 
operate in strongly-governed environments unlike their counterparts; however, this 
relationship is not statistically significant. Furthermore, Islamic governance strongly impacts 
RMDPs in banks that operate in poorly-governed environments compare to their 
counterparts. These results demonstrate the accountability role, ethical values, and 
effectiveness of Islamic governance to boost and monitor ISBs’ transparency level. 
Remarkably, this essay found that NGQM exacerbates the relation between BBID, SSBs, and 
RMDPI in poorly-governed environments. These results support the argument that NGQM 
plays an important role in determining the sign and significance of the Islamic governance 
quality-RMDPs nexus.  
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Table 18 National Governance Quality, Islamic Governance Quality, and Risk Disclosures (Strong vs. poor governed 
environments) 
Variables Dependent variable: Bank’s risk management and disclosure practices index (RMDPI) Strongly governed environment Poorly governed environment 
 (1) RMDPI  (2) W-RMDPI  (3) G2SLS (4) RMDPI  (5) W-RMDPI  (6) G2SLS 
Panel A: Independent variables 
BDSZ  11.04***  9.37***  11.85***  7.15***  6.78***  6.70*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GNDI  0.42  0.23  0.32 -0.71 -0.40 -1.43 
 (0.672) (0.821) (0.751) (0.478) (0.691) (0.151) 
BBID  5.82***  4.87***  5.70*** -0.39 -0.66  0.64 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.701) (0.511) (0.519) 
SSBs  2.74***  2.15**  3.97***  7.64***  5.58***  8.66*** 
 (0.007) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NGQM  7.16***  5.10***  8.47***  1.50  1.27  0.34 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.205) (0.732) 
NGQM* BDSZ  6.67***  5.56***  7.37***  0.80  0.84  0.02 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.424) (0.402) (0.985) 
NGQM*GNDI -0.78 -1.01  0.42  0.25  0.93  0.32 
 (0.438) (0.312) (0.673) (0.801) (0.355) (0.752) 
NGQM* BBID -1.19  0.21 -2.01** -2.66*** -2.22** -1.84* 
 (0.235) (0.830)   (0.045) (0.009) (0.028) (0.066) 
NGQM* SSBs  1.12  0.22  1.52 -2.50** -2.48** -2.24** 
 (0.265) (0.824) (0.127) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) 
Panel B: Control variables 
LNBS  3.17***  3.22***  3.23***  0.91  1.71*  2.69*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.363) (0.089) (0.007) 
ROAA  1.32  1.02  0.96 -0.55 -1.16 -1.35 
 (0.189) (0.309) (0.336) (0.581) (0.247) (0.177) 
LIQR  3.05***  3.24***  3.15***  2.49**  2.14**  2.07** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014) (0.034) (0.039) 
OPEF  2.09**  1.90*  1.68* -0.21 -0.10  0.37 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.093) (0.837) (0.922) (0.713) 
BCAD  0.62  1.30  0.74  1.10  0.65  0.53 
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Table 18 National Governance Quality, Islamic Governance Quality, and Risk Disclosures (Strong vs. poor governed environments) 
continued... 
 (0.537) (0.194) (0.459) (0.273) (0.515) (0.596) 
INFL -1.82* -0.42 -1.83*  0.72  0.68 -1.07 
 (0.071) (0.672) (0.067) (0.473) (0.500) (0.283) 
CGDP -0.53 -1.50 -1.33  0.57  1.03  2.49** 
 (0.599) (0.135) (0.183) (0.571) (0.303) (0.013)   
Constant -5.77*** -5.91*** -5.16*** -1.68* -2.96*** -2.78*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.096) (0.004) (0.005) 
fixed effect  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year 
Standard error clustering  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank  Bank 
F- value (Wald chi2)  47.36***  37.69***  829.46***  34.91***  27.88***  542.27*** 
Hausman chi2  150.71***  122.48***  5.53  151.48***  135.21***  4.21 
Overall R2  0.6900  0.5952  0.7732  0.5858  0.5351  0.6767 
No of obs  199  199  199  226  226  226 
Notes: This table reports the following variables: un-weighted risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPI), weighted risk management and disclosure practices (W-
RMDPI), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), non-executive directors (BBID), Islamic governance(SSBs), national governance quality (NGQM), bank size (LNBS), 
performance (ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFL), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 
10 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Significant at the 1% level. 
**     Significant at the 5% level. 
*       Significant at the 10% level. 
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7. Conclusion and Areas for Future Research 
This essay examines the relationships among Islamic governance quality, including 
other bank-level governance mechanisms, national-level governance, and RMDPs using a 
data-set from MENA Islamic banks for financial years from 2006-2013. The results confirm 
the substantial role of Islamic governance quality, and national governance quality in 
improving RMDPs in MENA Islamic banks. Specifically, the results indicate that RMDPs 
are high in banks with high Islamic governance, board size, board independence, and national 
governance quality (NGQM). Also, the results indicate that NGQM moderates Islamic 
governance quality-RMDPs nexus. These results are consistent with the predictions of the 
multi-theoretical framework shown in Figure 1. 
Whilst the effect of business level factors on the level corporate risk management and 
disclosure practices (RMDPs) have been fairly documented, the role of religion and macro-
level factors, such as Islamic and national governance quality on RMDPs are rare. Therefore, 
this research makes three noteworthy contributions to the disclosure quality and governance 
literature. Firstly, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the study offers first-time 
evidence on the effect of national governance quality on bank risk management and 
disclosure practices using a multi-theoretical framework. Secondly, the essay offers first-
time evidence of the impact of religious governance, especially Islamic governance quality 
on bank risk management and disclosure practices. Finally, the study provides evidence 
relating to the moderating effect of national governance quality on the relationship between 
Islamic governance quality and bank risk management and disclosure practices for the first 
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time. Consequently, the results have a number of implications for regulators, banks, and 
investors, especially in emerging markets.  
The results suggest that better-governed banks at bank-level or national-level have 
higher expectancy for more RMDPs. These results offer regulators a resilient incentive to 
pursue CG reforms officially and mutually with national-level governance. Regarding banks, 
the results suggest that better Islamic governance is more expected to have better RMDPs. 
These results empower banks’ shareholders to enhance board structure (e.g., board size, and 
BBID) and pay considerate attention to Islamic governance. These results also indicate the 
importance of Islamic governance to mitigating information asymmetry and gain more 
legitimacy to achieve society’s acceptance. Lastly, the findings offer investors an opportunity 
to build specific expectations about the disclosure quality in term of RMDPs. Further 
research might investigate the impact of further governance mechanisms (e.g., risk 
committee and remuneration committee) on RMDPs, and might be also extended to use non-
parametric statistical techniques such as neural networks to investigate whether different 
results can be obtained.  
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Abstract 
This study examines whether risk disclosures have a predictive effect (informativeness) 
on banks’ credit ratings (BCRs) and consequently, ascertains whether governance structures 
can moderate such an association. This essay applies both conventional ordered logistic 
regression and Probabilistic Neural Networks (PNNs) using firm-level data from 12 Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries for the period from 2006-2013. The findings 
suggest that risk disclosures have a predictive effect (informativeness) on BCRs. The study 
finds that the quality of the BCR is higher in banks that have higher risk disclosures, board 
size, government ownership, board independence, women directors, and established Sharia 
supervisory board. On the other hand, the results indicate that the BCR quality is lower in 
banks that have higher foreign ownership, and CEO role duality. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that governance structures moderate the relation between risk disclosures and BCRs. 
The central tenor of findings remains unchanged after controlling a number of firm- and 
country-level factors, alternative risk, and governance proxies, conventional vs. Islamic 
banks, and potential endogeneities. PNN results partially support the ordered logistic 
regression results and provide new insights in relation to the importance of risk disclosure 
pre-, during-, and post the financial crisis by rating agencies. The findings were interpreted 
within the predictions of agency, signalling, legitimacy and resource dependence theories. 
The findings have important implications for investors, especially bondholders, standard 
setters, regulators, and central governments. 
Keywords: Risk Disclosures; Banks’ Credit Ratings; Governance Structures; Sharia 
Supervisory Board; Probabilistic Neural Networks; MENA  
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1. Introduction 
Unlike current literature on the impact of risk disclosures and governance structures, 
which tend to focus largely on equity markets in one national financial market, this study 
examines the predictive effect (informativeness) of risk disclosures on banks’ credit ratings 
(BCRs). Consequently, it ascertains whether governance structures have a moderating effect 
on the risk disclosures-BCRs nexus using the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) BCRs 
for fiscal years 2006-2013. The past decade has witnessed the global financial crisis (GFC) 
of 2007/2008, the Eurozone crisis, Chinese stock market crash in 2015 and several high-
profile bank failures around the world (e.g., Lehman Brothers in USA, Northern Rock in the 
UK, Islas Finance House in Turkey, the Dubai Islamic Bank, the Islamic Investment 
Companies of Egypt, Bank Islam Malaysia Berthed, and Islamic Bank of South Africa). 
These crises have affected the banking sector worldwide as well as reignited concerns 
relating to the effectiveness of risk management and disclosure practices (Aebi et al., 2012; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; BCBS, 2015a, 2015b; Beisland., 2014; Dardac & Grigore, 
2011; Hasan, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015).  
GFC has stimulated regulators worldwide in the recent years to enhance codes and 
regulatory reforms to avoid weak governance mechanisms as well as enhance the 
effectiveness of risk disclosures, especially in banking sector (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; 
Iatridis, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013; Vandemaele et al., 2009; Walker, 2009). Similarly, The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) states that comprehensive and effective 
risk disclosures and governance structures are critical for achieving and maintaining public 
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trust and confidence (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015a, 2015b; Deumes, 2008; 
Liang et al., 2013).  
Basel Accords (i.e. I, II, and III), international and domestic equivalent accounting (e.g., 
IFRS 7, 9; IAS 32, 39), and governance standards (e.g., World Bank and Saudi CG codes) 
are often aimed at strengthening the necessity for comprehensive risk management and risk 
disclosure practices. Similarly, identifying, measuring, managing, controlling and more 
importantly, disclosing risks are becoming more critical as the global banking sector 
becomes increasingly complex and opaque. Generally speaking, Basel Accords and IFRS 
concentrate on qualitative and quantitative disclosure regarding credit, liquidity, and market 
risks (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015b). Therefore, from a theoretical viewpoint, 
market reactions to risk disclosures may differ for several reasons. 
Agency theory predicts that increased risk disclosures enhance the monitoring of 
managerial decisions and reduce information asymmetry, which might result in reducing 
costs of capital and enhancing BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; 
Chan et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kuang & Qin, 2013). Signalling, legitimacy 
and resource dependence theories can be used to understand the risk disclosures-BCRs 
nexus. Also, signalling, legitimacy and resource dependence theories predict that improved 
risk disclosures send important signals to credit rating agencies about performance and risk 
management in banks. Such improved risk disclosure may secure access to resources, 
legitimise banks’ operations, and hence, reduce the cost of capital and improve BCRs.  
Accordingly, previous studies have concentrated on the drivers of, and reasons for the 
incident and amount of risk disclosures (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Iatridis, 2008; Ntim et 
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al., 2013). However, prior evidence relating to the economic consequences of risk 
disclosures especially BCRs is rare. But Aman and Nguyen (2013), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Chan et al. (2013), DeBoskey and Gillett (2013), 
Heflin et al. (2011), Kuang and Qin (2013), and Sengupta (1998) found a positive relation 
between voluntary disclosure quality and BCRs. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
there is no previous research that has examined whether credit rating agencies incorporate 
risk disclosures into their risk evaluation.  
Similarly, the empirical evidence relating to governance structures is limited, but largely 
suggests that good governance structures in terms of board size, independent and diverse 
boards, and CEO power can have an impact on BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta.; 2003; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Grassa, 2015; Grove 
et al., 2011; Kuang & Qin., 2013; Lian et al., 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Li et al., 2014; Nguyen 
& Nielsen., 2010; Ziebart & Reiter, 1992). However, prior literature appears to suffer from 
a number of limitations.  
Firstly, limited prior studies have generally examined the informativeness of risk 
disclosures in developed countries (Abraham & Shrives., 2014; Maffei et al., 2014; 
Elshandidy & Neri., 2015; Rajgopal, 1999) and observably, large-scale, cross-country 
studies are limited (Elshandidy & Neri., 2015; Lau et al., 2015). Secondly, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is no evidence on whether Islamic governance and governance 
structures, in general, moderate the relationship between risk disclosures and BCRs in 
different regulatory environments such as MENA countries.  
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The MENA setting is particularly important for this study because MENA banks have 
significant weaknesses regarding governance structures. MENA banks are characterised by 
high level of ownership concentrations in the form of family-owned banks (FOBs), or 
government-owned banks (GOBs), and by recently increased foreign participation, as well 
as dualistic aspect in the board of directors (Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; World 
Bank, 2009).  
Also, MENA banks are characterised by weak disclosure and transparency which are 
common practices due to disclosure–averse culture and a weaker government oversight 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 2009). Therefore, regulators and 
policymakers in MENA region have established several CG codes depending on best CG 
practices since the mid-2000s to enforce minority shareholder rights, accountability, and to 
improve market transparency (Amico, 2014; Koldertsova, 2011; World Bank, 2009).  
It is worth considering in addition to CG and IFRS reforms in MENA region that many 
commercial banks have transformed completely or opened windows for Islamic banking. 
Especially after the remarkable large-scale growth in Islamic banking and finance worldwide 
and particularly in the MENA region (Beck et al., 2013; Ernst & Young, 2012; Ozturk, 2014; 
Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Safieddine, 2009). Although Islamic banks have the same CG 
structures, they are required to be operated in Sharia compliant manner, which often creates 
unique CG and risk challenges, especially the risk concerning Sharia incompliance (Beck et 
al., 2013; Safieddine, 2009).  
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Also, the Islamic banking sector has generally been operating with limited central 
government oversight, which can arguably increase the risk of Islamic banks failing (e.g., 
Islas Finance House in Turkey, the Dubai Islamic Bank, the Islamic Investment Companies 
of Egypt, Islamic Bank of South Africa, and Bank Islam Malaysia Berthed) (Chapra & 
Ahmed, 2002; Darmadi, 2013; Grassa, 2015; Hasan, 2011; Safieddine, 2009).  
Therefore, the study creates three unique contributions. First, it seeks to contribute to 
the literature by providing a first-time evidence on the level of risk and governance 
disclosures by banks across the MENA region. Second, the study contributes to the literature 
by providing a first-time evidence on the link between risk disclosures and BCRs. Finally, 
the study contributes to the literature by providing a first-time evidence on the moderating 
effect of governance structures on the risk disclosure- BCRs nexus. A subsidiary contribution 
is that the study contributes to the literature by applying both ordered logistic regression and 
probabilistic neural networks as mutually supportive techniques for the first time.  
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. The following section reviews 
BCRs, risk disclosures, CG reforms and Islamic governance in MENA context. The next 
sections discuss the theoretical framework for BCRs, review empirical literature on risk 
disclosures and governance structures, outline the research design, report the empirical 
results, and provide a conclusion. 
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2. BCRs, Risk Disclosure, and Governance Reforms 
in MENA Banks  
BCRs have recently expanded and attracted significant attention from financial market 
investors, debt issuers, analysts, regulators, and policymakers seeking unbiased assessments 
of creditworthiness and a measure of the riskiness of the banks, especially in murky 
information environments. BCRs are important due to the credit rating agencies 
independence; its ability to access the undisclosed information, the growing complexity of 
financial innovation including securitization and credit derivatives, a high level of 
asymmetric information, and globalization (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bannier & Hirsch, 
2010; Bellotti et al., 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Chen, 2012; Duff & Einig, 2009b; Huang 
et al., 2004; Shen et al., 2012).  
BCR is a common index which includes a combination of several quantitative and 
qualitative variables (economic, social, and political) including all public and non-public 
information sources to evaluate the financial soundness of banks. BCRs provide independent 
opinions on the ability of firms to fulfil their financial commitments, which can help in the 
banks’ credit risk evaluation and assessment, and hence, it reduces information asymmetry 
effects, increases the marketability or evaluation of their financial commitments, highlights 
key investment targets, and improves bank brand image by signalling management’s quality 
and integrity (Akdemir & Karslı, 2012; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bannier & Hirsch, 
2010; Caporale et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2013; Chen, 2012; Erdem & Varli, 2014).  
Moreover, rating score is more efficient to reflect overall performance since banks are 
inherently opaque and are exposed to a multiplicity of risks, and hence, stakeholders rely 
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comprehensively on the rating scores (Beisland & Mersland, 2012; Beisland et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the rules that credit rating agencies apply to measure bank rating score do not 
rely on banks’ conventional performance metrics only, but also on other characteristics. 
These includes management quality, capital adequacy, asset quality, risk management, 
growth prospects, efficiency, internal control processes, IT systems, governance structure 
quality, the regulatory and competitive circumstances and other environmental and 
organizational considerations.  
Thus, BCRs accurately reflect real bank credit quality (Beisland & Mersland, 2012; 
Beisland et al., 2014; Cheng & Subramanyam, 2008; Duff & Einig, 2009b; Gutierrez-Nieto 
et al., 2007). Moreover, when a rating score is assigned, the credit rating agencies generally 
are concerned with banks’ governance structures since weak firm- and country-level 
governance structures can impair bank’s financial soundness. This impacts the financial 
information quality disclosed to stakeholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & 
Sengupta, 2003; Claessens & Laeven, 2003; Fitch Ratings, 2004; Grassa, 2015; Huang & 
Shen, 2015).  
Therefore, GFC has stimulated regulators worldwide to enhance codes and regulatory 
reforms to avoid weak governance structures that further enhances the effectiveness of risk 
management and disclosure practices especially in the banking sector (Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Iatridis, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013; Vandemaele et al., 2009; Walker, 2009). Similarly, 
BCBS indicates that comprehensive and effective risk disclosures as well as CG are critical 
to achieving and maintaining public confidence, enhance the level of trust in the banking 
sector and subsequently the overall economy (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2006; 
 165 
 
Deumes, 2008; Liang et al., 2013). Moreover, the Basel II Capital Accord emphasizes on the 
role of external credit ratings agencies by permitting banks to measure credit risk weighted 
assets (standardized approach) which are based on the external ratings assigned by an 
accepted rating agency (BCBS, 2006; Duff & Einig, 2009a; Pasiouras et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, Basel III adds an additional role to these agencies regarding counterparty credit 
risk from over-the-counter derivatives (BCBS, 2011). 
Consequently, regulators in MENA countries place significant focus on the 
comprehensive risk management and risk disclosures in banks that are widely perceived as 
being insufficient and have a significant impact on attracting foreign investment (Amico, 
2014). Thus, most of the MENA countries have adopted the Basel Accords (I, II, III) and 
IFRS (7, 9) or the domestic equivalent standard. These reforms and standards strengthen the 
need for comprehensive risk management and risk disclosure practices. Basel Accords (I, II, 
III) and IFRS (7, 9) concentrate on qualitative and quantitative disclosure in relation to credit, 
liquidity, and market risks.  
However, Basel Accords only consider operational risk as a separate category. 
Nonetheless, Basel Accords and IFRS lack sufficient granularity in some key risk areas (e.g., 
operational risks and strategic risks), which in general are omitted from risk disclosures 
regulations (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Bischof & Daske, 2012). Hence, a major reform 
has been done to Pillar 3 to improve risk disclosures by demonstrating that banks must 
provide clear, comprehensive, informative, consistent and comparable risk disclosures on 
main risks in highly comparable formats (BCBS, 2015b). Revised Pillar 3 considers another 
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step forward in the development of risk disclosures. However, risk disclosure requirements 
should be developed frequently to ensure the quality and relevance of the risk disclosures.  
Additionally, the continuation of GFC and credit crunch ending with Chinese stock 
market crash in 2015 have reignited the debate about regulatory reforms to enhance 
weaknesses in governance structures at the country- and firm- level. This is mainly to ensure 
the financial reporting process quality and the financial information reliability, especially at 
a time of great turbulence and uncertainty in the global financial system (Alali et al., 2012; 
Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Sudworth, 2015, August 24). Correspondingly, this crises affect 
banking sector worldwide and highlighted weak governance mechanisms which have been 
suggested as one of the main obstacles that hinders the performance of the banking sector 
(Aebi et al., 2012; Beisland et al., 2014; Dardac & Grigore, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Mersland & Strøm, 2009).  
It worth to mention that many countries in the MENA region and other emerging 
markets, which suffered during GFC, have weaknesses in political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality environments and poor governance systems, as shown in 
Table 19 (Kaufmann et al., 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Moreover, MENA banks have 
significant weaknesses regarding governance structures. MENA banks are characterised by 
high level of ownership concentration in the form of family-owned banks (FOBs), or 
government-owned banks (GOBs), and by recently increased foreign participation, as well 
as dualistic aspect in the board of directors (Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; World 
Bank, 2009). Also, MENA banks are characterised by weak disclosure and transparency 
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which are common practices due to disclosure–averse culture and a weaker government 
oversight (Kaufmann et al., 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 2009).  
To bridge the gap, regulators and standard-setters in MENA region established several 
CG codes depending on best CG practices since the mid-2000s to enforce minority 
shareholder rights and accountability, as well as to improve market transparency. Notably, 
these codes are mandatory in some countries such as Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
UAE or exist on a “comply or explain” basis in countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, and Qatar. 
In other countries such as Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia CG codes are voluntary (Amico, 
2014). Furthermore, weak CG in banks can destabilise the financial system and given the 
significant socio-economic effect on the circumstance of bank turmoil, specific attention has 
been given to banks’ CG (World Bank, 2009).  
Thus, in recent years, several MENA countries such as Egypt, Jordan and UAE have 
issued mandatory CG codes for banks, while the remaining countries have issued CG 
guidelines to ensure financial strength in the MENA banking sector and in capital markets 
(Amico, 2014; Koldertsova, 2011; World Bank, 2009). Moreover, BCBS issued revised CG 
principles for banking sector in the wake of GFC to the well-functioning of the banking 
sector and the safeguarding of stakeholders’ interest to achieve a sustainable growth (BCBS, 
2015b).  
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Table 19 Cross-regional worldwide governance indicators comparison (2013) 
 Voice and 
accountability 
Political Stability 
and absence of 
violence/terrorism 
Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory 
quality 
Rule 
of 
law 
Control of 
corruption 
East Asia 
& Pacific 54 63 49 47 56 53 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
66 63 68 69 66 63 
Latin 
America& 
Caribbean 
61 55 58 56 51 57 
MENA 25 28 44 44 44 45 
North 
America 87 77 89 90 60 89 
South Asia 34 23 34 26 32 34 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
32 34 27 30 29 30 
Notation: each number in each cell refers to the overall score (%) given to each region under each 
of the worldwide governance indicators. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (World 
Bank, 2015).  
Soundly-governed banks could acutely impact the bank’s risk profile. For instance, 
soundly-governed banks improve supervisory process through maintaining a competent and 
cost-effective management as well as prudential board oversight, sound and effective risk 
management, resilient internal controls, and compliance (BCBS, 2015b). Hence, the revised 
CG principles emphasise the importance/implementation of rigorous risk governance, and 
hence, improve risk governance and disclosures practices (BCBS, 2015b). 
In addition to CG and IFRS reforms in MENA region, many commercial banks have 
transformed completely or opened windows for Islamic banking especially after the 
remarkable large-scale growth in Islamic banking and finance worldwide, particularly in 
MENA region (Beck et al., 2013; Ernst & Young, 2012; Ozturk, 2014; Rahman & Bukair, 
2013; Safieddine, 2009). Although Islamic banks have the same CG structures, they are 
required to operate in Sharia-compliant manner.  
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It creates unique CG structures as well as raises a new risk called “Sharia risk” 
concerning Sharia incompliance which can generate a financial turmoil and threaten Islamic 
bank activities (e.g., considerable withdrawal), and hence damage the banks’ reputation 
(Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Darmadi, 2013; Grassa, 2015; Safieddine, 2009). Also, Islamic 
banking has been operating in a weaker government oversight which leads to several banks’ 
failures e.g., Islas Finance House in Turkey, the Dubai Islamic Bank, the Islamic Investment 
Companies of Egypt, Islamic Bank of South Africa, and Bank Islam Malaysia Berthed 
(Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Darmadi, 2013; Grassa, 2015; Hasan, 2011; Safieddine, 2009).  
Therefore, most Islamic banks worldwide create additional layer of internal governance 
mechanisms called “Islamic governance” as a key feature of their governance structures in 
order to confirm banks’ compliance with Islamic Sharia principles/values within the Islamic 
paradigm (Darmadi, 2013; Hasan, 2009; Kettell, 2011; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; 
Safieddine, 2009). The backbone of Islamic governance is Sharia supervisory boards (SSB). 
SSB is an independent committee with the duty of directing, guiding, and reviewing all the 
operations and activities of the Islamic banks to confirm that they work within the Islamic 
paradigm and are compliant with Islamic Sharia rules and principles. These are including 
but are not limited to prohibition of charging interest (Reba) and prohibition from engaging 
in speculation.  
In the same vein, Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) guidelines emphasise that 
SSB should be characterised by independence, competency, integrity, and consistency 
(NuHtay & Salman, 2013). Therefore, Islamic banks are likely to disclose a number of SSB 
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criteria such as SSB members’ names, experiences, meetings, qualifications, remunerations 
and SSB reports in relation to whether their products, services, and profits/losses have been 
compliant with Sharia rules and principles (Darmadi, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Grassa, 
2015).  
Moreover, Islamic banks rely on a risk-sharing model, and are required to be more 
transparent and accountable compared to conventional counterparts, because they mainly 
face and monitor more risks. For example, they monitor Investment Account Holders (IAHs) 
investments and report their risks (Ariffin et al., 2009; Farook et al., 2011; Mollaha & 
Zamanb, 2015; Safieddine, 2009).  
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3. Theoretical Literature Review  
The incentives and prediction to change bank-level outcomes (e.g. BCRs) are generally 
explained by many theories due to the complex and opaque of bank performance. However, 
a comprehensive theory to understand the performance and implications of CG and 
disclosure does not yet exist. Hence, recent studies call for richer explanations (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Grove et al., 2011; Heflin et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013).  
Agency theory might be relevant and powerful when disclosure or governance structures 
are linked with various operationalisations of banks’ performance and risks. Agency theory 
suggests that there are inherent conflicts, which creates agency costs between bank 
shareholders and their managers as well as the conflict between bondholders and 
shareholders. Consequently, commitment to improving disclosure or governance structures 
leads to a better alignment of the interests of shareholders and their managers (or 
bondholders) which can subsequently enhance BCRs (Chan et al., 2013; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Grove et al., 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Klock et al., 2005). Sound CG and risk 
disclosures enhance monitoring mechanisms by reducing agency costs and information 
asymmetry (e.g., risk disclosures) (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
The impact of agency theory on CG research can be witnessed in the majority of studies 
that explore three main questions. Firstly, how does the board of directors characteristics 
(e.g. board size, the CEO/chairman role duality, board independence) affect bank 
performance indicators such as BCRs (Adams & Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Andres et 
al., 2012; Coles et al., 2008; O’Sullivan et al., 2015)? Secondly, how does bank ownership 
structure (e.g. block, foreign, governmental ownership) affects bank performance indicators 
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such as BCRs (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Grassa, 2015)? 
Finally, how does special region or banks characteristics (e.g. Islamic banks) affect bank 
performance indicators such as BCRs (Grassa, 2015; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015). However, 
the moderating effect of CG was rarely used in prior studies (e.g., Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013).  
According to signalling theory (Spence, 1973), the primary objective of corporate 
disclosure and CG is to inform stakeholders about the firm’s performance and value. This 
suggests that disclosure decisions such as risk disclosures and good governance structures 
send signals to the market regarding bank performance and risks. Based on these theoretical 
suggestions, prior studies have attempted to empirically examine the relevance of banks 
disclosure and governance as a signal to the market, which might reduce the cost of capital 
and improve BCRs. In addition, risk disclosures and good governance structures can enhance 
banks’ legitimacy to achieve social acceptance (Edkins, 2009; Suchman, 1995).  
Finally, resource dependence theory predicts that enhanced disclosures provide an 
essential link between the bank and the necessary resources, such as access to ﬁnance or 
capital, a nation’s business elite, links to competitors or suppliers (Jizi et al., 2014; Nicholson 
& Kiel, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Based on these theoretical 
suggestions, prior studies examined the relevance of banks’ disclosure and governance to 
improve links with the external environment to gain necessary resources, and consequently 
enhance BCRs (Jizi et al., 2014; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Therefore, this study uses a multi-
theoretical framework that includes agency, signalling, legitimacy and resource dependence 
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theories to explain the relevance of banks’ risk disclosures as well as governance structures 
and its impact on bank-level outcomes (BCRs).  
4. Empirical Literature Review and Formation of 
Research Hypotheses  
Prior studies (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & 
Sengupta, 2003; Chan et al., 2013; DeBoskey & Gillett, 2013; Kuang & Qin, 2013; 
Sengupta, 1998) have suggested a number of governance structures which can drive BCRs. 
Unlike current literature on the economic consequences of risk disclosures and governance 
structures, this study, first discusses how risk disclosures drive BCRs. Secondly it 
investigates how Islamic governance (SSB) drives BCRs. Thirdly, it examines how bank-
level CG structures in the form of board structure and ownership structure drive BCRs. And 
finally, it explores the moderating effect of governance structures. 
4.1 The Informativeness of Risk Disclosures and BCRs 
IFRS and Basel accords have placed growing importance on risk disclosures (Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015b). In fact, it is crucial to identify the benefits that risk 
disclosures can provide. If external users find risk disclosures valuable, agency theory 
assumes that facilitating the management decisions’ monitoring and hence reducing 
information asymmetry arising from risk disclosure quality can lead to enhancing the BCRs 
and decreasing the capital costs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Chan 
et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kuang & Qin, 2013). On the other hand, if banks 
disclose additional information regarding risk, it might have adverse effects, and thus the 
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risk disclosure depends upon market transparency levels and the cost/benefits of risk 
disclosures (Hertig, 2006).  
Signalling and resource dependence theories are also suggested to enhance the level of 
understanding of the risk disclosure and the BCRs nexus. Signalling theory and resource 
dependence theory assume that increasing the level of risk disclosure can send important 
signals to credit rating agencies regarding performance and risk management practices in 
banks, which might secure access to resources, reduce the cost of capital and improve the 
BCRs. 
Prior evidence related to the relationship between disclosure and BCRs is limited. Aman 
and Nguyen (2013), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Chan et 
al., 2013, DeBoskey and Gillett (2013), Heflin et al. (2011), Kuang and Qin (2013), and 
Sengupta (1998) find a positive association between disclosure quality and BCRs. However, 
examining the relationship between risk disclosure and BCRs is totally neglected in previous 
literature. Therefore, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study that 
examines if credit rating agencies incorporate risk disclosure level into their risk evaluation 
processes. Based on the above argument, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H1: risk disclosures have a statistically significant positive impact on BCRs. 
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4.2 The Informativeness of Islamic Governance (SSB) and 
BCRs 
Islamic governance is considered as an additional layer of internal governance 
mechanisms for Islamic and dual banks, which plays an important role in ensuring that banks 
provide Sharia-compliant services within the Islamic paradigm (Darmadi, 2013; Hasan, 
2009; Kettell, 2011; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Safieddine, 2009). Agency theory assumes 
that adequate monitoring mechanisms through SSB with the necessary skills can reduce the 
agency conflicts between shareholders and management. This can also decrease the probable 
conflicts between depositors, bondholders and shareholders by reducing information 
asymmetry and agency costs, and consequently could positively affect BCRs (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Safieddine, 2009).  
Similarly, resource dependence theory suggests that larger SSB with greater level of 
expertise, knowledge, and skills may offer better access to firm's external environment. This 
can facilitate and secure an access to vital resources and consequently lead to improving 
BCRs (Aman & Nguyen, 2013). In addition, such SSB may place greater efforts to ensure 
that banks make true, fair, and transparent disclosures to signal their performance and comply 
with the Sharia principles. It may also legitimise the practices of banking industry not only 
to shareholders but also to other stakeholders. 
Empirically, it should be noted that there is a dearth of literature that has focused on the 
association between SSB and BCRs. Mollaha and Zamanb (2015) examined the effect of 
Sharia supervision on bank performance from 2005-2011, which covered 25 countries. They 
found that Sharia supervision has a positive impact on the Islamic banks’ performance. 
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However, the investigation done by Mollaha and Zamanb (2015) only depends on the size 
of the SSB regardless of their level of expertise or other qualifications. Grassa (2015) 
examined whether SSB has an impact on BCRs in Islamic banks operating in GCC and 
Southeast Asia from 2005–2011 and find inconsistent results regarding SSB attributes and 
BCRs. Based on the above argument, the study submits the following hypothesis:   
H2: SSB has a statistically significant positive impact on BCRs. 
4.3 The Informativeness of Board Structures and BCRs 
Prior studies point out that banks’ board of directors may play significant role than non-
financial institutions. Overall, financial institutions have larger board size than non-financial 
institutions due to complex, opaque and diverse operations as well as heavy regulation 
(Adams & Mehran, 2003; Laeven & Levine, 2009; O’Sullivan et al., 2015). Previous studies 
have identified a number of board characteristics which influence the level of board 
effectiveness, including board size, duality, gender diversity, and board independence- 
BBID. These characteristics can have important implications for CG, and the BCRs (Aebi et 
al., 2012; Alali et al., 2012; Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Grassa, 
2015).  
For instance, adequate monitoring mechanisms through larger board size, less CEO 
power, more gender diversity and bigger BBID with the necessary skills to coordinate and 
communicate can reduce both the agency conflicts among shareholders and managers and 
the probable conflicts between depositors, bondholders and shareholders. This can lead to 
reducing information asymmetry and agency costs. Hence, bondholders perceive board 
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structure as an important factor of bond cost and therefore affect BCRs (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2006; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Similarly resource dependence theory suggests that larger 
board size, less CEO power, more gender diversity and bigger BBID with greater level of 
expertise, knowledge, and skills may offer better access to the external environment to 
facilitate and secure an access to vital resources and consequently, enhance the BCRs (Aman 
& Nguyen, 2013). It may also legitimise bank operations and send signal to the external 
environment (Pfeffer, 1972). On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that the benefits of 
larger board size may offset problems of coordination, communication and slower decision 
making.  
The empirical evidence related to the board size has to date yielded inconsistent results. 
For instance, some prior studies suggest that board size can have a positive effect on BCRs 
(e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Grassa, 2015). Whereas, Liang et al. 
(2013), Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015), and Pathan and Faff (2013) find that board size 
has a negative impact on bank performance. Wintoki et al. (2012) find insignificant 
relationship between board size and bank performance. These inconsistent findings may 
result in different time frames and different methodological measures of risk disclosure 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Kuang & Qin, 2013).  
The empirical evidence relating to CEO power is also mixed. For example, Bebchuk et 
al., (2009), Elsayed (2007) Grove et al. (2011), and Lian et al. (2013) find a negative 
association between CEO power and banks’ performance. However, Li et al., (2014), 
Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015), Pathan (2009), and Van Ness et al., (2010) find a positive 
relationship between CEO power and banks’ performance. While, O’Sullivan et al. (2015) 
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conclude that CEO power has no effect on banks’ performance. On the other hand, the 
conclusions of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Bradley and Chen (2011), Grassa (2015), 
Kuang and Qin (2013) and Liu and Jiraporn (2010) suggest that BCRs are negatively related 
to banks whose have CEO duality.  
Similarly, the empirical evidence largely suggests that gender diversity has a positive 
impact on BCRs (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Erhardt et al., 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; 
García-Meca et al., 2015; Grassa, 2015; Pathan & Faff, 2013; Tanaka, 2014). By contrast, 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) find a significant negative association between board diversity 
and firm performance. Finally, the empirical evidence that is related to board independence 
(the board members are not executive) is also reported inconsistent and conflict results. For 
example, on the one hand Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), 
Grassa (2015), Kuang and Qin (2013), Liang et al. (2013), Li et al. (2014), and Nguyen and 
Nielsen (2010) find that BBID have a positive impact on BCRs.  
On the other hand, Aebi et al. (2012), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Erkens et al., (2012), 
and Pathan and Faff (2013) find that BBID has a negative impact on either banks’ 
performance or BCRs. Whilst Adams and Mehran (2012), Coles et al. (2008), Grove et al. 
(2011), and O’Sullivan et al. (2015) find that BBID has no impact on either banks’ 
performance or BCRs. While noting that the debate concerning board structure remains 
inconclusive, this study tests the following hypothesis: 
H3: Board structures (board size, CEO duality, gender diversity, and BBID) have a 
significant impact on BCRs. 
H3a: Board size has a significant positive impact on BCRs. 
 179 
 
H3b: CEO duality has a significant negative impact on BCRs. 
H3c: Gender diversity has a significant positive impact on BCRs. 
H3d: Board independence has a significant positive impact on BCRs. 
4.4 The Informativeness of Ownership Structures and BCRs 
Ownership structures have a key impact on attitudes to CG and disclosure that may 
impact BCRs (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Beattie et al., 2001; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; 
Bradley & Chen, 2011; Grassa, 2015). Key shareholders are expected to have both the 
control and the motivations to monitor management’s behaviour and have less agency 
conflicts with managers and boards of directors. However, these agency conflicts may 
increase between key shareholders, minority shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
Concerning agency theory, ownership concentration (i.e. block, government, and foreign 
ownership) may on the one hand exercise excessive power over the management to gain 
benefits that could negatively affect other shareholders and consequently, may adversely 
affect BCRs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
On the other hand, the role of the government (foreigner) as a major shareholder, 
especially in unstable economies due to low political stability, regulatory quality, and 
presence of corruption, can be seen as mitigation mechanism to reduce agency problems. 
This may lead to a substantial effect on the cost of capital, and consequently could positively 
affect BCRs (Borisova et al., 2015; Kaufmann et al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Ownership concentration may also facilitate access to critically needed resources by 
providing guarantees to securing debt financing which may enhance BCRs (Pfeffer, 1972). 
Proposed government (foreigner) commitment to adopt high standards may legitimise banks’ 
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operations and reduce both agency cost and information asymmetry which consequently can 
positively affect BCRs (Armstrong et al., 2010; Beuselinck et al., 2015; Borisova et al., 
2015; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Prior evidence shows mixed findings relating to the significant and impact of block 
ownership on BCRs. Although Aebi et al. (2012), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Bradley and Chen (2011), Grassa (2015) and 
Laeven and Levine (2009) find a negative impact of block ownership on BCRs, Grove et al. 
(2011) and Li et al. (2014) provide evidence that the impact of block ownership on BCRs 
and performance is positive. Likewise, the empirical evidence is generally limited and 
inconsistently related to the impact of government ownership on either banks’ performance 
or BCRs. Beuselinck et al. (2015) and Li et al. (2014) find that government ownership has a 
positive impact on either banks’ performance or BCRs, whereas Pasiouras et al. (2006) find 
insignificant impact. On the other hand, Borisova et al. (2015) and Liang et al. (2013) find 
that government ownership has a negative impact on both banks’ performance and BCRs.  
Similarly, the empirical evidence largely suggests that foreign ownership has a positive 
impact on both banks’ performance and BCRs (Berger et al.,  2010; Choi & Hasan, 2005; 
Jiang et al., 2013; Lin & Zhang, 2009). However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
Lensink et al., (2008) and Li et al. (2014) find that foreign ownership has negative impact 
on both of them. Based upon this argument, the following hypothesis is then proposed: 
H4: ownership structures (block, governmental, and foreign ownership) have a significant 
impact on BCRs. 
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H4a: Block ownership has a significant impact on BCRs. 
H4b: Governmental ownership has a significant impact on BCRs. 
H4b: Foreign ownership has a significant impact on BCRs. 
4.5 BCRs- Risk Disclosure Nexus: The Moderating Effect of 
Governance 
Governance structures may moderate the relationship between risk disclosures and 
BCRs. Considerable recent evidence (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Beattie et al., 2001; 
Beltratti & Stulz, 2012;  Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Essen et al., 
2013; Grassa, 2015; Shen et al., 2012) suggests that governance structures are the major 
determinant of both banks’ performance and BCRs.  
Prior studies conclude that BCRs are affected by firm- level governance in terms of  
board size, CEO duality, BBID, and ownership concentration (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; 
Beltratti & Stulz, 2012;  Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Grassa, 2015; 
Shen et al., 2012). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior studies examined the 
moderating effect of governance structures on the relationship between risk disclosures and 
BCRs. We would expect that banks with better governance structures further safeguard 
stockholder rights and are more expected to take decisions that maximize stockholders 
wealth as well as other stakeholders’ interests leading to a significant effect on the cost of 
capital, and consequently positively affect BCRs via enhancing risk disclosures. This study, 
therefore, tests the following hypothesis:  
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H5: governance structures (i.e. SSB, board size, CEO duality, gender diversity, BBID, block, 
governmental, and foreign ownership) moderate the relationship between risk 
disclosures and BCRs. 
The previously hypothesised relationships are presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Suggested Empirical Model for the Structural Relations Between Risk 
Disclosure and BCRs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure defines the structural relations between risk disclosure and BCRs, either directly (solid 
lines) or via moderating effect of Islamic governance, board structure and ownership structure (dotted lines) 
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5. Research Design 
5.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources  
 
The sample is selected from listed commercial and Islamic banks in Arab MENA 
(hereafter referred to as MENA) region with full data over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 
2013. 118 banks in 12 countries were initially identified based on Bankscope database but 
due to the unavailability data, the final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock 
exchanges.  
Table 20 Sample construction 
Country 
Total 
banks 
Banks 
selected 
IBs 
obs 
CBs 
obs 
DBs 
obs 
Full 
sample 
Percentage 
Bahrain 11 9 36 8 24 68 9.71% 
Egypt 11 11 13 40 20 73 10.43% 
Jordan 12 12 13 75 3 91 13.00% 
Kuwait 13 10 36 35 5 76 10.86% 
Lebanon 6 6 0 28 16 44 6.29% 
Morocco 5 1 0 8 0 8 1.14% 
Oman 6 5 0 34 5 39 5.57% 
Qatar 8 8 24 11 28 63 9.00% 
Saudi Arabia 12 11 21 0 63 84 12.00% 
Syria 11 2 1 1 0 2 0.29% 
Tunisia 2 2 0 9 0 9 1.29% 
UAE 21 18 32 39 72 143 20.43% 
Total 118 95 176 288 236 700 100.00% 
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The study covers these eight fiscal years as they present the most recent available data 
in the MENA markets and also cover pre-, during, and post-financial crisis periods. The final 
sample consists of 700 bank-year observations. A detailed sample construction is presented 
in Table 20. Risk disclosures and corporate governance data are collected from banks’ annual 
reports. Financial data is collected from annual reports as well as Bankscope database. 
Country-level macroeconomic and governance data is collected from World Bank databases. 
This essay also uses a self-constructed risk disclosures index (RMDPI) to measure the 
level of risk disclosures. It is challenging to determine a predefined set of words that can 
properly reflect all information on every risk category in banks. RMDPI reduces the bias in 
the disclosure score if the bank concentrates on providing detailed information on a certain 
category of risk while they may fail to disclose other risk categories. Thus, RMDPI is more 
likely to capture truthfully the comparative weights of different risk categories.  
This study constructs RMDPI depending on the financial risk requirements in IFRS 7, 
IFRS 9, Basel II and key risk disclosure items that are frequently used in related studies (e.g., 
Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 2009; Greco, 2012; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim 
et al., 2013; Savvides & Savvidou, 2012). Hence, RMDPI is comprised of 6 main items 
containing 96 sub-items (Appendices 1 and 2 present the scoring criteria and composition of 
RMDPI, respectively).  
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5.2 Variables Definition 
The essay classifies the variables into six main categories as described in Table 21, 
which provides full definition of all of these variables. Firstly, the dependent variable is the 
Fitch long-term issuer default ratings (RATE) following prior literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006; Alali et al. 2012; Grassa, 2015; Jorion et al. 2009). The main reason for 
choosing Fitch is that it has the largest market share for the banking sector in Arab MENA.  
As explained by Fitch, a long-term issuer default ratings represent the rating agency’s 
current opinion on an entity's overall vulnerability to default on financial commitments 
which reflect the uncured failure of that entity (Fitch Ratings, 2015). The study assigns Fitch 
ratings a value from 1, which reflects higher default risk and lower BCRs, to 22, which 
reflects lower default risk and higher BCRs, as described in Table 21. 
Secondly, the study gathers data on risk disclosures level (RMDPI) which strive to 
measure level of risk disclosures in six key areas as set out by IFRS 7 and 9, Basel II Accord 
and prior literature (e.g., Greco, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013). This consists of: credit risk 
disclosure index (CRDI); liquidity risk disclosure index (LRDI); market risk disclosure index 
(MRDI); capital adequacy risk disclosure index (ARDI); operational risk disclosure quality 
index (ODQI); and strategic risks disclosure quality index (SRDI).  
This essay uses Sharia supervisory board (SSB) as a proxy of Islamic governance. Board 
structures variables are as follows: board size (BBSZ); CEO power (CEOP); gender diversity 
(GNDI); and board independence (BBID). Ownership structures variables are as follows: 
block ownership (BSHR); foreign ownership (FSHR) and government ownership (GSHR).  
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Table 21 Summary of variables definitions 
Variables Definitions and coding. 
Panel A: Dependent variables (Fitch long term issuer default ratings).  
RATE Is the assigned rating score for Fitch’s long term issuer default ratings coded according to: 22 if 
the bank has Fitch ratings of AAA; 21 if AA+; 20 if AA; 19 if AA-; 18 if A+; 17 if A; 16 if A-; 
15 if BBB+; 14 if BBB; 13 if BBB-; 12 if BB+; 11 if BB; 10 if BB-; 9 if B+; 8 if B; 7 if B-; 6 if 
CCC+; 5 if CCC; 4 if CCC-; 3 if CC; 2 if C; 1 if DDD, DD, D; 0 if NR , WD. 
Panel B: Risk disclosure index. 
RMDPI Is the overall risk disclosure score determined depending on the un-weighted risk disclosure index 
and scoring criteria clarified in Appendices 1 and 2.  
W-RMDPI Is the overall risk disclosure score determined depending on the weighted risk disclosure index 
and scoring criteria clarified in Appendices 1 and 2. 
Panel C: Corporate governance (CG) variables. 
BSHR Percentage of shareholders with at least 5% to the total bank ordinary shareholdings. 
GSHR Percentage of governmental ownership with at least 5% to total bank ordinary shareholdings. 
FSHR Percentage of foreign ownership with at least 5% to the total bank ordinary shareholdings. 
BBSZ Number the board of directors on the bank. 
CEOP  1, if the company CEO and chairperson positions are held by same person, 0 otherwise. 
GNDI Percentage of women directors to the total number of the bank board of directors. 
BBID board independence measured by percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of the 
bank board of directors. 
SSB  Is the total SSB characteristics score determined according to the un-weighted SSB index 
consisting of 7 provisions and scoring criteria are; SSB existence=1, if a bank has SSB board, 0 
otherwise.; SSB report =1, if a bank has disclosed SSB report, 0 otherwise; SSB  size =1, if a 
bank has disclosed number of SSB’s member, 0 otherwise; Experience=1, if if a bank 
discloses SSB experience, 0 otherwise; SSB meetings=1, if a bank has disclosed number of 
SSB meetings, 0 otherwise; Independent=1, if SSB’s members are independent from 
management, 0 otherwise; Total fees disclosed=1, if a bank discloses SSB fees/ compensation, 0 
otherwise. 
Panel D: Control variables. 
LNBS Natural log of total assets, which measure bank size. 
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Variables Definitions and coding. 
ROAA Performance, which measures by return on average assets, which are percentage of net income to 
total asset. 
LIQR Liquidity, which is net, loans to total assets. 
INCD Income diversity, which is percentage of net interest income/ average earning assets. 
OPEF Operations efficiency, which is percentage of cost to income. 
BCAD The capital adequacy ratio. 
VAQ Country- level voice and accountability score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010) which calculates 
the extent to which a country's residents more contributing in choosing their government, 
expression independence, freedom of association, and a unrestricted media in years 2006 until 
2013. A higher score means more accountability. 
RQM Country- level regulatory quality score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010) which calculates the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations in years 
2006 until 2013 that allow and promote private sector development. A higher score means better 
regulatory quality. 
ROLQ Country- level rule of low score based on Kaufmann et al. (2010) which calculates the level to 
which managers have assurance in and the rules of society abide in years 2006 until 2013, These 
include the quality of contract implementation, rights of property, the police, and the magistrates, 
as well as the probability of offence and assault. 
INFL Inflation, which is consumer prices (annual %). 
CGDP GDP per capita (current US$). 
YD Dummies for each of the fiscal years 2006 - 2013. 
Finally, the models contain a wide number of control variables which are as follows: 
bank size (LNBS); performance (ROAA); Liquidity (LIQR); Income diversity (INCD); 
operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD); voice and accountability (VAQ); regulatory 
quality (RQM); rule of law (ROLQ); year dummy (YD); inflation (INFL); and GDP per capita 
(CGDP) following broad prior literature (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; DeBoskey & Gillett, 2013; Grassa, 2015; Heflin et al., 
2011; Kuang & Qin, 2013; Pasiouras et al., 2006; Sengupta, 1998). 
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5.3 Model Specification 
This essay uses ordered logistic regression and Probabilistic Neural Networks (PNNs) 
as mutually supportive methods, to examine the informativeness of risk disclosures and the 
moderating effect of governance structure variables using MENA BCRs. Therefore, this 
essay has two components for the methodology. Firstly, this study uses ordered logistic 
regression to examine the informativeness of risk disclosures, and the moderating effect of 
governance structure variables using MENA BCRs. The regression model that employed is 
identified as follows:    
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Where: 
RATE refers to Fitch long-term issuer default ratings; RMDPI refers to risk disclosures 
index proxy for risk disclosure level; CG refers to SSB, BBSZ, CEOP, GNDI, BBID, BSHR, 
GSHR, and FSHR. CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including LNBS, ROAA, 
LIQR, INCD, OPEF, BCAD, VAQ, RQM, ROLQ, YD, INFL, and CGDP; ε refers to the 
error term; 0α  refers to the constant; iβ  refers to the vectors of coefficient estimates; b is 
bank in t time. This essay employs ordered logistic regression because the dependent variable 
is categorical. Specifically, in OLS regression, the dependent variable is continuous. It can 
have any one of an infinite number of potential values.  
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However, in ordered logistic regression, dependent variable has either only a limited 
number of possible values, ordinal or categorical values. Thus, OLS regression would be less 
proper because of the violation of the assumption of independent, identically distributed 
errors. The study reports the empirical results and additional analyses in the next sections. 
Secondly, the ordered logistic regression model for the weighted risk disclosures index proxy 
for risk disclosure level that employed is identified as follows:    
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                                                                     (6) 
where: 
RATE refers to Fitch long-term issuer default ratings; W-RMDPI refers to weighted risk 
disclosures index proxy for risk disclosure level; CG refers to SSB, BBSZ, CEOP, GNDI, 
BBID, BSHR, GSHR, and FSHR. CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including 
LNBS, ROAA, LIQR, INCD, OPEF, BCAD, VAQ, RQM, ROLQ, YD, INFL, and CGDP; ε  
refers to the error term; 0α  refers to the constant; iβ  refers to the vectors of coefficient 
estimates; b is bank in t time.  
Thirdly, this study uses PNNs to examine the informativeness of risk disclosures, and 
the moderating effect of governance structure variables highlighted above using MENA 
BCRs. PNNs implement a statistical technique, called kernel discriminant analysis (KDA), 
in which the processes are structured into a multilayer feed-forward neural network with 
several layers. Therefore, PNNs are predominantly a classifier, mapping inputs to a number 
of classifications, which might be imposed into a more general function (Abdou et al., 2008; 
2012& 2016).  
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An example is given below of a PNN structure, which assumes there are n independent 
numeric variables, X1… Xn, two dependent categories, and several training cases, including 
some cases in one category and some in the other one: 
Figure 3 PNNs architecture  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: a structure of a number of independent predictors for PNNs is shown above. Each node in the first “pattern 
layer” calculates the distance between the input case and the training case reintroduced by the node. Then, the 
value passes to the second “summation layer” node, which is a function of the distance in the smoothing factors, 
as each input has its own smoothing factor. One node per dependant category/variable is in the second layer, and 
each node sums up the output values for the nodes corresponding to the training cases in that category. The second 
layer output values can be interpreted as probability function predicted for each class. Finally, the category with 
the highest probability function value selected by the output node is chosen as the estimated category.  
The Bayesian probability density function, for the respective output from probabilistic 
neural network pattern node can be represented as follows (e.g., Abdou, 2009): 
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−
X  refers to vector; in  refers to number of training patterns for class iC ; ijX−  refers to j
th 
training vector for class iC ; m  refers to vector-dimension; σ  refers to standard deviation 
parameter for smoothing purposes; iC  refers to category class; T  refers to transposition 
function for vector; and P refers to probability. The conditional probability can be written 
as: 
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                                                                        (8) 
for each class, using the basic Bayes’ formula (e.g., Abdou, 2009; Ganchev et al., 2007). 
Probabilistic neural network training consists of two parts: optical smoothing factor and 
the conjugate gradient method. Abdou (2009) citing Bishop (1995, pp. 275-276) who 
explains that, in finding a minimum line for a search procedure, if search directions are 
always based on negative gradients, the search process may be very slow; indeed there can 
be a problem, ‘in which the search point (may oscillate) on successive steps’. Instead, the 
option ‘non-interfering on conjugate directions’ can be chosen. A conjugate gradient 
algorithm can be usually employed, drawing on the work by Hestenes and Stiefel (1952). 
The conjugate gradient algorithm provides a minimization technique, which requires 
only the evaluation of the error function and its derivatives and which, for a quadratic error 
function, is guaranteed to require a certain number of steps (Abdou, 2009). Overall, PNNs 
are particularly fast, they do not require a number of hidden layers and nodes, they have a 
parallel structure, and they classify and return probabilities for different dependent 
categories, and guarantee convergence to the optimal case (Abdou, 2009; Masters, 1995). 
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6. Empirical Results and Discussion 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses  
Table 22 summarises descriptive statistics for RATE, the un-weighted (RMDPI), 
weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI), and SSB for all bank fiscal years and separately 
for each of the eight firm years investigated from 2006 to 2013. As shown in Table 22, a 
number of remarkable outcomes are identified.  
Firstly, it reports that there is a high amount of variation in BCRs between banks. For 
instance, RATE ranges from a minimum of 1 (Default) to a maximum of 19 (AA- which 
imply a very high credit quality) with the median RATE of 14.12 (good credit quality) which 
indicates that most banks in MENA have good rating. However, there has been a continuous 
decrease in BCRs from 2008 onwards, which reflects the impact of continued crises 
beginning with GFC in 2007 and credit crunch in 2010.  
The BCRs average are 14.4, 14.29, 14.09, 13.77, 13.69, and 13.84 in 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012, respectively. But RATE began to increases in 2013, which indicates the 
recovery in MENA banks from the GFC crisis’s effects. Finally, there is evidence that the 
level of listed bank RATE before GFC is higher than those reported during and after GFC. 
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Table 22 Summary descriptive statistics for RATE, RMDPI, and SSB index for all 
700 bank-years observations 
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
RATE  
Mean   14.12   14.44   14.53   14.40   14.29   14.09   13.77   13.69   13.84 
Median   15.00   15.00   16.00   15.00   15.00   15.00   15.00   15.00   15.00 
STD     3.63     3.32     3.33     3.41     3.31     3.34     4.03     4.13     4.04 
Min     1.00     7.00     7.00     7.00     7.00     7.00     1.00     1.00     1.00 
Max   19.00   19.00   19.00   19.00   19.00   19.00   19.00   19.00   19.00 
The un-weighted risk disclosures index (RMDPI)  
Mean   56.24   35.95   49.77   54.55   57.44   61.24   61.55   62.51   63.60 
Median   60.00   36.00   53.00   58.00   61.00   63.00   63.00   64.00   65.00 
STD   15.32   13.58   15.73   15.52   15.39   10.44   10.58   10.69     9.65 
Min     1.00     6.00     6.00     1.00     7.00   25.00   24.00   19.00   19.00 
Max   84.00   77.00   80.00   80.00   80.00   80.00   78.00   84.00   84.00 
The weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI)  
Mean   79.95   44.99   69.99   78.22   82.06   88.10   88.60   90.49   91.66 
Median   86.00   42.00   76.00   84.00   87.50   89.50   92.00   93.00   93.00 
STD   24.16   20.22   24.97   24.12   24.65   15.19   15.00   15.49   14.48 
Min     2.00     7.00     7.00     2.00     7.00   28.00   27.00   19.00   19.00 
Max 135.00 106.00 128.00 128.00 130.00 126.00 118.00 135.00 135.00 
SSB index   
Mean    1.39     1.00     1.17     1.25     1.51      1.51     1.45      1.51     1.67 
Median    0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00      0.00     0.00      0.00     0.00 
STD    1.91     1.60     1.77     1.81     1.94      1.96     1.94      2.01     2.12 
Min    0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00      0.00     0.00      0.00     0.00 
Max    7.00     6.00     7.00     7.00     7.00      7.00     7.00      7.00     7.00 
Notes: The final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE. The final sample 
consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. This table reports 
descriptive statistics of Fitch long-term issuer default ratings (RATE), the levels of compliance with un-
weighted (RMDPI) and weighted risk disclosure index (W-RMDPI) and Sharia supervisory board index 
(SSB). 
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Secondly, as shown in Table 22, there is a high variation degree in risk disclosures 
between MENA banks. For example, the un-weighted RMDPI ranges from a minimum of 1 
(1.04%) to a maximum of 84 (87.50%) with a mean of 56.24 (58.58%). Risk disclosure level 
(percentage) indicates that there is  a significant level of discretion in the bank management's 
decision which is consistent with the prior literature on risk disclosures (Ntim et al., 2013). 
It is also noticeable that a stable improvement in the risk disclosures during and after the 
crisis was achieved e.g. banks disclose RMDPI mean score (percentage) of 35.95 (37.45%), 
49.77 (51.84%), 54.55 (56.82%), 57.44 (59.83), 61.24 (63.79%), 61.55 (64.11%), 62.51 
(65.11%), and 63.60 (66.25%) in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, 
respectively.  
This indicates that the GFC and credit crunch have changed the concentration of the 
banks’ risk disclosures, especially after regulatory reforms (CG codes, Basel II, III and IFRS 
7, 9), in most of the countries sampled after 07/08 GFC. Finally, a steady increase in SSB is 
also achieved, which indicates the importance of banks’ compliance with Sharia and 
communicates these with stakeholders to legitimise their operations as shown in Table 22. 
However, the SSB composition and competence disclosure is still very low, which indicates 
that Sharia disclosure is not common in MENA banks due to disclosure adverse culture 
(Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; World Bank, 2009). 
Table 23 reports descriptive statistics for various governance and control variables 
included in the models. Generally, there are wide ranges in the distribution of all the 
variables. For instance, BSHR ranges from 0% to 100% with an average value of 55.44%. 
This suggests that despite the recommendations of World Bank and OCED best practices 
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regarding the need for greater diversity in ownership structure, MENA banks still have a 
significance ownership concentration.  
 
Table 23 Summary descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables for 
all 700 observations 
Variables   Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Independent (Corporate governance (CG)/ ownership characteristics variables). 
BSHR (%)       55.44       58.95       26.97    0.00     100.00 
GSHR (%)       16.40         8.70       21.19    0.00       89.06 
FSHR (%)       21.94         7.50       27.84    0.00       98.50 
BBSZ         9.50         9.00         1.91    5.00       15.00 
CEOP         0.19         0.00         0.60    0.00         1.00 
GNDI (%)         0.02         0.00         0.06    0.00         0.27 
BBID (%)         0.89         0.91         0.17    0.11         1.00 
Panel B: Control variables  
LNBS       15.75       15.75         1.55     3.73       21.09 
ROAA (%)         1.73         1.64         2.44  -26.27       23.47 
INCD (%)       31.37       29.98       16.49  -63.35     180.83 
LIQR (%)       59.05       55.65     155.10     0.00       82.01 
OPEF (%)       42.46       39.17       26.50     3.99     284.00 
BCAD (%)       20.42       17.40       14.62     9.26     204.41 
VAQ        -0.96        -0.91         0.37   -1.86        -0.11 
RQM         0.28         0.31         0.36   -0.95         0.80 
ROLQ         0.30         0.38         0.41   -0.78         1.04 
INFL         5.30         4.50         4.24    -4.90       15.10 
CGDP 23961.70 19288.75 23546.24 1472.6 93714.10 
Notes: The final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE. The final sample 
consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. Variables are defined as 
follows: block ownership (BSHR), government ownership (GSHR), foreign ownership (FSHR), board size 
(BBSZ), independent chairperson (CEOP), gender diversity (GNDI), board independence(BBID), voice and 
accountability (VAQ), regulatory quality (RQM), rule of low (ROLQ), bank size (LNBS), performance 
(ROAA), liquidity (LIQR), income diversity (INCD), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy 
(BCAD), inflation (INFL), and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used.  
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The majority of banks’ performance in the sample makes profit with a mean profitability 
ratio of 1.73%, which is still low. Table 23 also indicates that most of the banks in the sample 
make a distinction between the chairman and the CEO positions with a mean of 81% and 
these findings are consistent with the CG best practices. Although, board of director size 
ranges from five to fifteen directors with a mean of 9.50 directors, only 2% of them are 
female directors with maximum 27%, which indicates decreased level of female presence in 
MENA board of directors. Regarding to country governance, Table 23 shows that voice and 
accountability is too low, with a mean value of -0.96 and ranges between -1.86 and -0.11. 
Regulatory quality (RQM) and rule of low (ROLQ) reflect better governance with mean 
values of 0.28 and 0.30, respectively. Finally, the values of LNBS, LIQR, INCD, OPEF, 
BCAD, INFL, and CGDP as shown in Table 23 suggest wide variability in the sample, and 
thus reduce any potential of sample selection bias.  
Correlation coefficients among the variables used in the regression models to test for 
multicollinearity are presented in Table 24. The essay reports both the Pearson product-
moment correlations and the Spearman rank-order correlations for robust results, and 
noticeably, the significant and direction of both factors are generally similar. This 
demonstrates that there is no serious non-normality problem within the data. Specifically, 
Table 24 shows that RATE is positively and significantly correlated with RMDPI, LNBS, 
ROAA, LIQR, GSHR, BBSZ, BBID, SSB, RQM, ROLQ, and CGDP, whereas RATE is 
negatively and significantly correlated with OPEF, BSHR, FSHR, CEOP, GNDI, VAQ, and 
INFL, which supports the validity of the models.  
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Table 24 Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices of the variables for all 700 observations 
Variables RATE RMDPI LNBS ROAA INCD   LIQR OPEF BCAD BSHR GSHR FSHR  BBSZ CEOP GNDI BBID SSB VAQ  RQM  ROLQ INFL CGDP 
RATE   0.29**  0.48**  0.21** -0.02  0.02 -0.30** -0.05 -0.33**  0.41** -0.55** -0.24** -0.31** -0.18**  0.21**  0.21** -0.27**  0.48**  0.67** -0.22**  0.52** 
RMDPI  0.31**   0.40** -0.05 -0.10** -.08* -0.12** -0.18**  0.00  0.25** -0.15** -0.01 -0.19** -0.10**  0.23**  0.18** -0.03  0.26**  0.24** -0.42**  0.12** 
LNBS  0.66**  0.51**   0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.23** -0.13** -0.07*  0.34** -0.21**  0.06* -0.02 -0.10**  0.15**  0.11** -0.19**  0.05  0.09* -0.20**  0.18** 
ROAA  0.31** -0.04  0.12**   0.21**  0.00 -0.44**  0.14** -0.15**  0.05 -0.16** -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06  0.17**  0.17**  0.01  0.15** 
INCD  0.06 -0.08*  0.07  0.08*  -0.02  0.11**  0.02 -0.05 -0.04  0.00 -0.09*  0.00  0.04 -0.01  0.16** -0.05  0.10* -0.02  0.06**  0.01 
LIQR  0.56**  0.27**  0.25**  0.25** -0.13**  -0.03 -0.03 -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 -0.04 -0.03  0.05 -0.01  0.01  0.05*  0.06  0.00  0.00 
OPEF -0.52** -0.15** -0.39** -0.62** -0.07 -0.35**   0.22**  0.15** -0.13**  0.17** -0.03  0.07  0.17** -0.04  0.07  0.07 -0.12** -0.19**  0.07 -0.26** 
BCAD  0.03 -0.14** -0.11**  0.20** -0.14** -0.01 -0.13**  -0.10*  0.01 -0.07 -0.17** -0.00 -0.07 -0.17**  0.09* -0.01  0.04  0.06 -0.06 -0.01 
BSHR -0.31**  0.03 -0.12** -0.29**  0.00 -0.15**  0.28** -0.09*   0.15**  0.54**  0.19**  0.03  0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.27** -0.36**  0.02 -0.40** 
GSHR  0.42**  0.26**  0.36**  0.15** -0.09*  0.33** -0.20**  0.12**  0.07  -0.24** -0.02 -0.18** -0.20**  0.12**  0.07 -0.23**  0.31**  0.26** -0.16**  0.12** 
FSHR -0.60** -0.07 -0.27** -0.28**  0.04 -0.37**  0.37** -0.16**  0.52** -0.30**   0.26**  0.09*  0.25** -0.20** -0.12  0.03 -0.39** -0.43**  0.17** -0.40** 
BBSZ  0.24**  0.03  0.06  0.09* -0.02 -0.24**  0.08* -0.18**  0.18** -0.01  0.34**   0.12**  0.11** -0.03 -0.08*  0.00 -0.21** -0.29**  0.03 -0.25** 
CEOP -0.27** -0.17** -0.05 -0.09*  0.02 -0.33**  0.10* -0.02  0.05 -0.20**  0.13**  0.12**   0.04 -0.49** -0.16** -0.34** -0.32** -0.34**  0.13** -0.02 
GNDI -0.20** -0.06 -0.11** -0.11**  0.04 -0.12**  0.25** -0.15**  0.03 -0.21**  0.22**  0.13**  0.05   0.05 -0.05  0.10* -0.16** -0.18**  0.03 -0.20** 
BBID   0.27**  0.13**  0.06  0.09* -0.03  0.39** -0.10* -0.10** -0.10**  0.17** -0.22** -0.06 -0.49**  0.05   0.10* -0.04  0.22**  0.23** -0.16**  0.04 
SSB  0.35**  0.19**  0.28**  0.05  0.09*  0.10** -0.09*  0.03 -0.10**  0.09* -0.18** -0.08* -0.19** -0.05  0.06  -0.25**  0.15**  0.18** -0.20**  0.13** 
VAQ -0.20**  0.01 -0.10** -0.14** -0.04 -0.15**  0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.23** -0.01  0.04 -0.35**  0.04 -0.04 -0.24**   0.03 -0.01  0.02  0.11** 
RQM  0.33**  0.19**  0.05  0.30**  0.04  0.38** -0.24**  0.14** -0.28**  0.31** -0.38** -0.19** -0.30** -0.14**  0.30**  0.15** -0.08*   0.77** -0.30**  0.38** 
ROLQ  0.48**  0.22**  0.11**  0.29** -0.07  0.48** -0.32**  0.15** -0.35**  0.23** -0.47** -0.30** -0.18** -0.12**  0.34**  0.13**  0.18**  0.72**  -0.27**  0.58** 
INFL -0.22** -0.39** -0.23**  0.01  0.14** -0.19**  0.07 -0.23**  0.06 -0.20**  0.19**  0.06  0.16**  0.04 -0.18** -0.20**  0.02 -0.38** -0.27**   0.03 
CGDP  0.55**  0.20**  0.32**  0.26**  0.08*  0.36** -0.36** -0.01 -0.36**  0.17** -0.48** -0.25** -0.08* -0.15**  0.21**  0.27**  0.12**  0.38**  0.58** -0.04  
Notes: The final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, and UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. The upper right half of the table shows Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients while the lower left half of the table contains Spearman’s rank-order correlations coefficients.  **, and * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, and 5% level, 
respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Fitch long term issuer default ratings (RATE); risk disclosure quality (RMDPI); Sharia supervisory board (SSB); board size (BBSZ); CEO 
duality (CEOP); gender diversity (GNDI); board independence(BBID); block ownership (BSHR); government ownership (GSHR); foreign ownership (FSHR); bank size (LNBS); 
performance (ROAA); liquidity (LIQR); income diversity (INCD); operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD); voice and accountability (VAQ); regulatory quality (RQM); rule of 
low (ROLQ); inflation (INFL) and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used. 
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6.2 Ordered Logistic Regression Analyses and Discussion 
Table 25 presents the ordered logistic regression analysis results for 10 models. This 
essay examines the informativeness of risk disclosures, governance structures in the form of 
SSB, ownership mechanisms (e.g. block ownership), board characteristics (e.g. board size), 
and the moderating effect of governance structures using MENA BCRs. The 10 models are 
statistically significant (i.e. P-value < 0.01) and explain 47.17, 50.00, 51.19, 65.11, 55.39, 
60.58, 69.13, 57.35, 53.26 and 84.21 percent of the variation in RATE, respectively. It should 
be emphasised that the focus of this section’s discussion is upon the first three models3.  
The results show that risk disclosures, governance structures, and the moderating effect 
of governance structures can explain differences in RATE as follows: Firstly, risk disclosures 
(RMDPI) coefficients in models 1 to 3 of Table 25 have positive and statistically significant 
impact on RATE, implying that MENA banks with high RMDPI are more likely to receive 
better ratings especially post-GFC. The positive relation between RMDPI and RATE is 
consistent with the proposed theoretical framework (i.e. support for agency, signalling, 
legitimacy and resource dependence theories). That is RMDPI alleviates agency conflicts 
and reduces information asymmetry. In addition, there is a greater necessity for insiders to 
improve risk disclosures so as to legitimise their choices to bondholder. 
 
                                               
3It should be emphasised that I ran additional analysis using the weighted risk disclosure index for models 1 to 3 in which the results are 
shown in Table 26.  
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Table 25 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using 
ordered logistic regression 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Bank’s long term issuer default ratings (BCRs)  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Full Full Full IBs CBs DBs Pre07/08 07/08 post07/08 2SLS 
Panel A: Un-weighted RMDPI  
RMDPI  3.91***  2.79***  2.64***  1.68*  1.73*  2.64***  1.97**  0.94  2.41**  1.91* 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.008) (0.092) (0.084) (0.008) (0.049) (0.348) (0.016) (0.057) 
Panel B: Independent: CG variables  
BSHR      -  0.36  0.15  1.86*  1.22 -2.17** -0.52  1.27 -0.36 -1.03 
  (0.722) (0.877) (0.063) (0.223) (0.030) (0.605) (0.202) (0.722) (0.303) 
GSHR      -  2.01**  1.93* -0.31  0.48  2.66***  0.39  0.92  1.22*  0.68 
  (0.044) (0.053) (0.753) (0.630) (0.008) (0.696) (0.358) (0.091) (0.497) 
FSHR      - -4.73*** -4.75*** -2.69*** -3.05*** -0.71 -1.42 -1.82* -4.34*** -3.34*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.477) (0.156) (0.068) (0.000) (0.001) 
BBSZ      -  1.39  1.77*  1.13*  3.11***  0.49  0.02  1.66*  0.58  2.34** 
  (0.164) (0.077) (0.089) (0.002) (0.626) (0.988) (0.075) (0.561) (0.020) 
CEOP      - -1.77* -1.51  1.64* -1.16 -0.79  1.88*  0.28 -1.08 -1.44 
  (0.076) (0.131) (0.092) (0.247) (0.432) (0.060) (0.781) (0.279) (0.149) 
GNDI      -  2.76***  2.68***  2.79***  5.07*** -2.26**  0.98  0.47  2.82***  3.77*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.000) (0.024) (0.328) (0.637) (0.005) (0.000) 
BBID      -  2.12**  2.54**  1.29*  3.39***  2.40** -0.81  0.80  3.79***  2.74*** 
  (0.034) (0.011) (0.096) (0.001) (0.017) (0.420) (0.422) (0.000) (0.006) 
SSB      -  5.00***  4.89***  2.33** -  3.08***  2.01**  2.05**  3.25***  1.63* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.020)  (0.002) (0.045) (0.040) (0.001) (0.094) 
Panel C: Interaction variables  
RMDPI*BSHR      -      - -0.21 -0.20  0.87 -1.34 -2.01**  0.46  0.17 -0.70 
   (0.837) (0.844) (0.387) (0.181) (0.045) (0.643) (0.862) (0.485) 
RMDPI*GSHR      -      -  1.79*  1.72* -0.61  1.61*  2.19**  0.96 1.94* 1.82* 
   (0.074) (0.086) (0.539) (0.097) (0.028) (0.338) (0.088) (0.069) 
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Table 25: The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using ordered logistic 
regression continued... 
RMDPI* FSHR      -      - -2.27** -0.26 -2.61*** -1.72* -0.59 -1.77* -1.68* -2.06** 
   (0.023) (0.794) (0.009) (0.087) (0.557) (0.076) (0.092) (0.040) 
RMDPI* BBSZ      -      -  4.10***  1.78*  2.53**  2.52**  1.78*  1.97**  2.59*** 2.19** 
   (0.000) (0.075) (0.012) (0.012) (0.074) (0.049) (0.010) (0.029) 
RMDPI*CEOP      -      - -1.38 -0.22 -1.39 -0.02 -0.01 -0.42 -1.03 -1.11 
   (0.168) (0.829) (0.165) (0.986) (0.993) (0.672) (0.302) (0.269) 
RMDPI*GNDI      -      -  1.62  0.11  1.55  2.49**  1.39  1.83*  1.08  1.74* 
   (0.105)        
RMDPI*BBID -      -  1.63*  0.49  2.50**  1.48  0.00  0.43  0.21  0.96 
   (0.089) (0.623) (0.012) (0.139) (0.997) (0.666) (0.836) (0.338) 
RMDPI*SSB -      -   1.18*  1.47* -  0.18  0.23  0.16  0.22 0.64 
   (0.086) (0.091)  (0.856) (0.821) (0.870) (0.823) (0.519) 
Panel D: Control variables.  
LNBS  17.75***  15.38***  15.06***  6.20***  8.27***  6.95***  4.40***  6.34***  12.20*** 11.11*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAA  1.02  0.96  1.40*  0.32  0.10  3.56***  2.20**  0.74  0.96 1.65* 
 (0.310) (0.336) (0.072) (0.752) (0.922) (0.000) (0.028) (0.457) (0.337) (0.099) 
INCD  0.89 -0.32 -0.54 -1.08  1.73*  0.31 -0.98 -0.94 -0.83 -0.25 
 (0.373) (0.750) (0.586) (0.279) (0.084) (0.756) (0.327) (0.345) (0.408) (0.802) 
LIQR  8.75***  7.96***  7.26***  1.72*  5.47***  0.17  0.62  2.05**  5.05*** 8.92*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.865) (0.534) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEF -1.16 -0.24 -0.13 -0.40 -0.46 -2.86*** -1.00 -0.10 -0.22 -0.29 
 (0.245) (0.809) (0.895) (0.688) (0.647) (0.004) (0.319) (0.923) (0.827) (0.769) 
BCAD  2.92***  1.88*  1.53  0.76  3.18***  1.76* -2.90***  0.44  1.94* 2.40** 
 (0.003) (0.059) (0.125) (0.447) (0.001) (0.079) (0.004) (0.663) (0.052) (0.017) 
VAQ -7.17*** -4.98*** -5.76*** -3.24*** -2.98*** -3.70*** -4.07*** -5.00*** -4.33*** -7.04*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 25: The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using ordered logistic regression 
continued... 
RQM  1.91*  0.24  1.61*  1.24  2.67***  2.85***  1.64*  0.23  3.21*** 1.99** 
 (0.056) (0.811) (0.084) (0.213) (0.008) (0.004) (0.081) (0.819) (0.001) (0.047) 
ROLQ  3.74***  3.99***  4.24***  2.16**  1.88*  3.70***  2.06**  2.54**  4.92*** 2.65*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.061) (0.000) (0.039) (0.011) (0.000) (0.008) 
INFL -1.32 -0.01 -0.53 -0.54 -2.62*** -3.29*** -2.54** -1.29 -1.94* -3.24*** 
 (0.186) (0.989) (0.595) (0.591) (0.009) (0.001) (0.011) (0.196) (0.053) (0.001) 
CGDP  4.14***  3.11***  3.89***  1.51  3.60***  0.01  2.61***  3.33***  0.75 4.19*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.995) (0.009) (0.001) (0.456) (0.000) 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
LR chi2 1489.75*** 1574.11*** 1611.44*** 450.64*** 694.51*** 600.29*** 217.04*** 399.16*** 1114.78*** 97.35*** 
Pseudo R2 0.4717 0.5000 0.5119 0.6511 0.5539 0.6058 0.6913 0.5735 0.5326 0.8421 
No of obs 677 675 675 174 265 236 73 157 445 675 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote regression is significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The final sample covers 95 banks 
listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE. The 
final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. The ordered logistic regression model that employed is identified 
as follows:    
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Where: 
RATE refers to Fitch long-term issuer default ratings; RMDPI refers to risk disclosures index proxy for risk disclosure level; CG refers to SSB, BBSZ, CEOP, GNDI, 
BBID, BSHR, GSHR, and FOWN. CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including LNBS, ROAA, LIQR, INCD, OPEF, BCAD, VAQ, RQM, ROLQ, YD, INFL, 
and CGDP; ε  refers to the error term; 0α  refers to the constant; iβ  refers to the vectors of coefficient estimates; b is bank in t time. Variables are defined as 
follows: Fitch long term issuer default ratings (RATE); risk disclosure quality (RMDPI); Sharia supervisory board (SSB); board size (BBSZ); CEO duality (CEOP); 
gender diversity (GNDI); board independence (BBID); block ownership (BSHR); government ownership (GSHR); foreign ownership (FSHR); bank size (LNBS); 
performance (ROAA); liquidity (LIQR); income diversity (INCD); operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD);  voice and accountability (VAQ); regulatory 
quality (RQM); rule of low (ROLQ); inflation (INFL) and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used.  
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These results lead to the acceptance of H1, and are quite consistent with previous 
research findings (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & 
Sengupta, 2003; DeBoskey & Gillett, 2013; Heflin et al., 2011; Kuang & Qin, 2013; 
Sengupta, 1998) which suggest that disclosure has a positive effect on RATE.  
Secondly, Sharia supervisory board (SSB) coefficients are statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level for models 2 and 3. This implies that MENA banks with better SSB 
are more likely to receive higher RATE, as shown in Table 25. These results lead to the 
acceptance of H2. The positive impact of SSB on RATE is consistent with the proposed 
theoretical framework (i.e. support for agency, signalling and legitimacy, and resource 
dependence theories). That is SSB is a signal for reducing managerial power and facilitating 
access to critical resources by providing guarantees of compliance with Sharia rules and 
principles. Clearly, this can legitimise banks’ operations in addition to reducing agency cost 
and information asymmetry, and hence, gain better BCRs.  
Thirdly, the ownership structures’ results indicate that in general there is a significant 
impact on BCRs. For instance, consistent with previous empirical research’s findings 
(Beuselinck et al., 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Grove et al., 2011; Lensink et 
al., 2008; Lensink & Naaborg, 2007; Li et al., 2014), the coefficients of GSHR in models 2 
and 3 are positive and statistically significant at different confidence levels as shown in Table 
25. These findings imply that MENA banks with high GSHR are more likely to receive higher 
RATE.  
Similarly, these results are consistent with the proposed theoretical framework (i.e. 
support for agency, signalling and legitimacy, and resource dependence theories). That is, 
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GSHR facilitates access to additional resources by providing guarantees in order to secure 
debt financing which can enhance BCRs. It can also send signals to enhance legitimacy of 
banks by committing to adopt high standards and legitimising their operations, reducing 
agency cost and information asymmetry, and hence gain better ratings. 
Table 25 shows that the coefficients of FSHR are statistically significant and negatively 
related to RATE in models 2 and 3. These results are consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Lensink et al., 2008; Lensink & Naaborg, 2007; Li et al., 
2014), but inconsistent with other studies such as Berger et al. (2010), Choi and Hasan 
(2005), Jiang et al. (2013) and Lin and Zhang (2009). Finally, the coefficients of BSHR in 
Models 2 and 3 are statistically insignificant, which indicates that there is an insignificant 
relation between block ownership and BCRs in MENA banks. 
Fourthly, the findings regarding board structures indicate that there is significant impact 
on BCRs. For example, the coefficient of BBSZ in model 3 is positive and statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence level as shown in Table 25 (this coefficient for model 2 is 
statistically insignificant but still positive). This implies that MENA banks with large BBSZ 
are more likely to receive higher RATE. Likewise, the positive relation between BBSZ and 
RATE is in line with the proposed theoretical framework (i.e. support for agency, signalling 
and legitimacy, and resource dependence theories). That is, larger boards may increase 
control over management to maximize shareholder wealth, and hence, gain better ratings.  
These results are consistent with prior research findings (e.g., Andres et al., 2012; Liang 
et al., 2013; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Pathan & Faff, 2013). 
As shown in Table 25, CEOP is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level in model 
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2. This may imply that MENA banks with low CEO power are more likely to receive higher 
ratings. This negative relation between CEOP and RATE may indicate that CEOP is a signal 
for increasing managerial power and may hinder access to critical resources by providing 
signals of board dependence. Thus, less CEO power can also secure debt financing and align 
with CG best practices by reducing agency cost and information asymmetry, thereby gaining 
better ratings. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009; Elsayed, 2007; 
Grove et al., 2011; Liang et al., 2013).  
Table 25 also shows positive relation between GNDI and RATE in models 2 and 3 
suggesting that MENA banks’ boards with high gender diversity are further expected to 
receive higher ratings. This is in line with the proposed theoretical framework (i.e. support 
for agency, signalling, legitimacy, and resource dependence theories). That is, greater board 
diversity can reduce agency costs and information asymmetry in addition to producing 
unique information that can improve decision-making. It can also provide a channel to reach 
external environment to secure critical resources, enhance legitimacy of banks, and hence, 
gain better ratings. These results are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Erhardt et al., 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Grassa, 2015; Pathan & Faff, 2013; 
Tanaka, 2014).  
Lastly, regarding BBID, the coefficients for models 2 and 3 are positive and statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level. This indicates that MENA banks’ boards with higher 
percentage of BBID are more likely to receive higher ratings. The positive impact of BBID 
is in line with the proposed theoretical framework (i.e. support for agency, signalling, 
legitimacy, and resource dependence theories). That is, BBID can be considered as signal for 
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reducing managerial power and facilitating an access to critical resources by providing 
guarantees of board independence. It can also secure debt financing, which enhances banks’ 
performance and sends signals to enhance banks’ legitimacy. In addition, the higher the 
board independence, the better the CG practices in legitimising banks’ operations and 
reducing agency cost, and hence, gain better ratings. These results are consistent with prior 
research findings (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Grassa, 
2015; Kuang & Qin, 2013).  
Finally, there is evidence of the moderating effect of the governance structure in the 
relation between risk disclosures and BCRs in model 3, as shown in Table 25. The results 
show that the effect of RMDPI on RATE is moderated by governance structures. Specifically, 
the coefficients of RMDPI*GSHR, RMDPI*FSHR, RMDPI*BBSZ, RMDPI*BBID, and 
RMDPI*SSB are significant statistically at different confidence levels.  
The direct relation between risk disclosures and BCRs is positively moderated by 
governmental ownership, board size, proportion of BBID, and SSB. By contrast, foreign 
ownership negatively moderates the relation between risk disclosures and BCRs. Also, the 
moderating effect of the governance structures in the relation between risk disclosures and 
BCRs is in line with the proposed theoretical framework (i.e. support for agency, signalling 
and legitimacy, and resources dependent theories) and leads to support H5. 
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6.3 Additional Analyses 
In this section, this study performs a set of additional analyses to gauge further the 
robustness of the results to alternative measures or sub-sample estimations. Firstly, and to 
determine whether the RATE behaviour differs over the pre- and post-2007/2008 GFC 
periods, I further explored the effect of risk disclosures and governance structures on BCRs 
by separating the sample into pre-crisis period (2006), during crisis (2007–8) and post-crisis 
period (2009–13) and re-run equation (5); the study reports the results for models 7, 8 and 9, 
respectively in Table 25. The results are generally similar to those reported in model 3 of 
table 25. Model 8 of Table 25 shows that during the crisis period board size and SSB have a 
positive effect on the BCRs. Remarkably and unlike other models, results find that risk 
disclosures do not have an impact on BCRs during crisis. Also, models 7 and 8 of Table 25 
show that governance structures rarely have impact on BCRs, otherwise, it shows that the 
results in general are robust on sub-sample.  
Secondly, the study re-run equation (5) by dividing the sample into three sub-samples 
namely, Islamic banks (IBs), conventional banks (CBs), and dual banks (DBs) in which the 
results are shown in Table 25 for models 4, 5, and 6, respectively.  
 207 
 
 
 
 
Table 26 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using 
ordered logistic regression 
Variables Dependent variable: Bank’s long term issuer default ratings (BCRs)  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Full Full Full IBs CBs DBs Pre07/08 07/08 post07/08 2SLS 
Panel A: Weighted RMDPI  
W-RMDPI  7.04***  5.81***  5.82***  2.10**  2.80***  3.46***  2.28**  2.78***  5.01***  4.33*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.005) (0.001) (0.023) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Independent: CG variables  
BSHR      -  0.16  0.10  1.98**  1.36 -1.84* -0.76  1.51 -0.39 -1.06 
  (0.873) (0.919) (0.048) (0.175) (0.065) (0.446) (0.130) (0.693) (0.289) 
GSHR      -  2.11**  1.99**  0.04  0.63  2.50**  0.42  0.54 1.29*  0.73 
  (0.035) (0.046) (0.968) (0.526) (0.013) (0.675) (0.590) (0.098) (0.466) 
FSHR      - -4.62*** -4.66*** -2.79*** -3.35*** -0.67 -2.01** -1.88* -4.19*** -3.28*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.500) (0.045) (0.060) (0.000) (0.001) 
BBSZ      -  1.27  1.61*  1.31*  2.74***  0.47  0.07  1.60  0.39  2.31** 
  (0.206) (0.098) (0.089) (0.006) (0.639) (0.948) (0.110) (0.694) (0.021) 
CEOP      - -1.93* -1.63  1.75* -1.27 -0.88  2.08**  0.33 -1.04 -1.52 
  (0.054) (0.102) (0.079) (0.205) (0.379) (0.037) (0.743) (0.298) (0.128) 
GNDI      -  3.07***  2.70***  2.94***  4.62*** -2.51**  0.71  0.87  2.95***  4.03*** 
  (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.012) (0.476) (0.382) (0.003) (0.000) 
BBID      -  2.08**  2.30**  1.57*  3.14***  2.57*** -0.67  0.58  3.63***  2.73*** 
  (0.037) (0.021) (0.074) (0.002) (0.010) (0.501) (0.563) (0.000) (0.006) 
SSB      -  3.86***  3.95***  2.61*** -  2.29**  1.53  1.93*  2.54**  0.59 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)  (0.022) (0.126) (0.053) (0.011) (0.556) 
Panel C: Interaction variables  
W-RMDPI*BSHR      -      - -0.01 -0.27  0.96 -1.01 -1.93*  0.54 -0.26 -0.47 
   (0.989) (0.789) (0.338) (0.314) (0.053) (0.590) (0.796) (0.635) 
W-RMDPI*GSHR      -      -  2.44**  1.99**  0.10  1.37  2.86***  1.04  1.33  1.95* 
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Table 26: The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using ordered logistic regression continued... 
   (0.015) (0.047) (0.924) (0.170) (0.004) (0.298) (0.185) (0.051) 
W-RMDPI*FSHR      -      - -1.95* -0.88 -1.70* -1.09 -1.34 -1.24 -0.86 -1.65* 
   (0.053) (0.380) (0.090) (0.276) (0.179) (0.215) (0.389) (0.100) 
W-RMDPI* BBSZ      -      -  2.29**  0.16  0.35  1.64*  0.30 -0.26  1.44*  1.94* 
   (0.047) (0.872) (0.727) (0.084) (0.765) (0.793) (0.081) (0.052) 
W-RMDPI*CEOP      -      - -1.45 -0.08 -1.52 -0.03 -0.11 -0.34 -1.23 -1.05 
   (0.148) (0.937) (0.129) (0.978) (0.909) (0.735) (0.218) (0.294) 
W-RMDPI*GNDI      -      - -1.45 -0.09 -1.72* -2.63***  1.74* -1.91* -1.11 -1.81* 
   (0.146) (0.931) (0.086) (0.009) (0.082) (0.056) (0.269) (0.071) 
W-RMDPI*BBID      -      -  1.66*  1.15  1.59*  1.78*  0.41  0.49  0.78  0.68 
   (0.065) (0.250) (0.092) (0.074) (0.685) (0.626) (0.437) (0.498) 
W-RMDPI*SSB      -      -  0.46  1.39 -  0.53  0.41  0.76  0.12  0.64 
   (0.646) (0.164)  (0.599) (0.684) (0.450) (0.908) (0.523) 
Panel D: Control variables.  
LNBS  15.19***  13.67***  13.50***  5.92***  8.17***  6.33***  4.52***  5.95***  10.31***  8.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAA  0.44  0.48  0.53  0.29  0.40  2.86***  2.09**  0.24  1.22  1.31 
 (0.658) (0.635) (0.598) (0.775) (0.689) (0.004) (0.036) (0.810) (0.221) (0.189) 
INCD  0.94 -0.06 -0.31 -1.15  1.77*  1.15 -0.29 -0.88 -0.85 -0.03 
 (0.348) (0.952) (0.759) (0.251) (0.077) (0.249) (0.772) (0.378) (0.398) (0.976) 
LIQR  8.20***  7.47***  7.31***  1.77*  5.82***  0.50  0.52  2.14**  4.69***  8.53*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.614) (0.601) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) 
OPEF -0.84 -0.2 -0.34 -0.52 -0.03 -3.06*** -0.79 -0.12 -0.41  0.37 
 (0.401) (0.786) (0.732) (0.603) (0.979) (0.002) (0.429) (0.907) (0.685) (0.714) 
BCAD  2.84***  2.00**  1.70*  0.71  3.49***  1.81* -2.95***  0.01  2.05**  2.54** 
 (0.005) (0.045) (0.090) (0.480) (0.000) (0.070) (0.003) (0.993) (0.040) (0.011) 
VAQ -6.48*** -4.61*** -4.88*** -3.29*** -2.83*** -3.17*** -3.84*** -4.60*** -3.96*** -6.78*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RQM  1.89*  0.17  1.81*  1.02  2.84***  2.90***  2.45**  0.77  3.46***  2.17** 
 (0.059) (0.861) (0.075) (0.309) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014) (0.443) (0.001) (0.030) 
ROLQ  2.87***  3.18***  3.35***  2.03**  1.05  3.65***  1.87*  2.01**  4.83***  1.95* 
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 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.042) (0.294) (0.000) (0.061) (0.045) (0.000) (0.051) 
INFL -1.19 -0.02 -0.32 -0.72 -2.19** -3.19*** -2.48** -0.83 -2.41** -3.28*** 
 (0.234) (0.980) (0.748) (0.472) (0.029) (0.001) (0.013) (0.408) (0.016) (0.001) 
CGDP  4.62***  3.70***  3.98***  1.51  3.47***  0.31  2.44**  3.47***  0.70  4.66*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.001) (0.759) (0.015) (0.001) (0.481) (0.000) 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
LR chi2 1527.77*** 1601.83*** 1620.91*** 438.39*** 694.35*** 597.21*** 214.25*** 402.09*** 1129.77***  100.06*** 
Pseudo R2  0.4838 0.5088 0.5149 0.6335 0.5538 0.6027 0.6824 0.5777 0.5398  0.8457 
No of obs 677 675 675 174 265 236 73 157 445  675 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote regression is significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The final sample covers 95 banks 
listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE. The 
final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. The ordered logistic regression model that employed is identified 
as follows:    
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Where: 
RATE refers to Fitch long-term issuer default ratings; W-RMDPI refers to weighted risk disclosures index proxy for risk disclosure level; CG refers to SSB, BBSZ, 
CEOP, GNDI, BBID, BSHR, GSHR, and FSHR. CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including LNBS, ROAA, LIQR, INCD, OPEF, BCAD, VAQ, RQM, 
ROLQ, YD, INFL, and CGDP; ε  refers to the error term; 0α  refers to the constant; iβ  refers to the vectors of coefficient estimates; b is bank in t time. Variables 
are defined as follows: Fitch long term issuer default ratings (RATE); risk disclosure quality (W-RMDPI); Sharia supervisory board (SSB); board size (BBSZ); CEO 
duality (CEOP); gender diversity (GNDI); board independence (BBID); block ownership (BSHR); government ownership (GSHR); foreign ownership (FSHR); 
bank size (LNBS); performance (ROAA); liquidity (LIQR); income diversity (INCD); operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD);  voice and accountability 
(VAQ); regulatory quality (RQM); rule of low (ROLQ); inflation (INFL) and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used.  
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The results are generally similar to those reported in model 3 of Table 25. However, 
there is a positive relation between BSHR, CEOP, and RATE in IBs, unlike DBs. This 
suggests that there are, to some extent, similarities between Islamic, conventional, and dual 
banks and the results are robust on sub-sample estimations.  
Thirdly, in addition to using un-weighted RMDPI measure, this study also uses weighted 
RMDPI measure to examine whether the findings are sensitive to the RMDPI proxy. 
Therefore, we replicate the analyses using the weighted RMDPI measure and the results for 
various models are reported in Table 26. In general, the results suggest that risk disclosures 
and governance structures, as well as the moderating effect of the governance structures, are 
all statistically significant in explaining differences in RATE, and to great extent are similar 
to those of the un-weighted RMDPI measure’s results reported in Table 25.   
Fourthly, this essay further examines the effect of possible endogeneity that may be 
affected by eliminating unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias problems. To 
this end, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) statistical technique is used (e.g., Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013). In the first phase, 
and based on extensive prior studies (e.g., Aman & Nguyen, 2013; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; 
Grassa, 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim 
et al., 2015a, 2015b; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; O’Sullivan et al., 2015; Wintoki et al., 
2012), we conjecture that the eight governance variables including SSB are determined via 
all the twelve control variables as endogenous covariates to generate predicted values of the 
CG variables.  
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We then employed their predicted values in the second stage as instruments and re-
estimated equation (5) as follows: 
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... (9) 
Equation (9) is re-estimated to equation (5) using the predicted values from the first 
phase estimation as instruments for the eight governance variables including SSB. The results 
of the 2SLS (Model 10), which are reported in Tables 25 and 26 after controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, are fundamentally similar 
to those presented for model 3 of both Table 25 and Table 26.  
Overall, the results of model 10 in Table 25 implies that the evidence is fairly robust to 
possible endogeneity that may arise from omitted variables after directly controlling for 
endogeneity with 2SLS. The slight increase in the magnitude of the coefficients of the CG 
indicators in model 10 of Table 25 compared with those in model 3 of Tables 25 are generally 
in line with prior studies that instrumented parts of CG and risk disclosure variables more 
strongly than their un-instrumented parts in predicting RATE (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim 
et al., 2013). 
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6.4 PNNs Results 
This study presents the PNNs results for the overall sample in Tables 27 and 28, while 
the PNNs results for the training and for the holdout sub-samples are presented in Tables 29 
and 30. The study examines the informativeness of risk disclosures, governance structures 
in the form of SSB, ownership structures (e.g. block ownership), board structures (e.g. board 
size) and the moderating effect of governance structures using MENA BCRs. Firstly, the 
essay applies the same set of models which were used in ordered logistic regression with 
probabilistic neural network to the overall sample. Remarkably, Table 27 reports 0.00% bad 
prediction rate for all models apart from model number six with a value of 3.13 bad 
prediction rate. This bad prediction rate can reflect the importance, holistic and the accuracy 
of the selected variables in predicting BCRs.  
In general, the results suggest that risk disclosures and governance structures, as well as 
the moderating effect of the governance structures, are important in predicting differences in 
RATE. In particular, the results based on PNN models reported in Table 27 and Table 28 
demonstrate that on average RMDPI, GSHR, FSHR, BBSZ, BBID, SSB, RMDPI*GSHR, 
RMDPI* BBSZ, RMDPI*GNDI, and RMDPI*BBID  are the key factors in predicting RATE. 
Nevertheless, the PNN models reported in Tables 27 and 28 also identify the key financial 
ratios namely LNBS, ROAA, LIQR, and OPEF as critical factors in predicting BCRs (i.e. 
RATE).  
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Table 27 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using 
PNNs 
Variables 
 
Overall Sample 
Dependent variable: Bank’s long term issuer default ratings (BCR) 
(1)   
Full 
(2)  
Full 
(3)  
Full 
(4)  
IBs 
(5)  
CBs 
(6)  
DBs 
(7)  
Pre07/08 
(8)  
During 07/08 
(9)  
post07/08 
Diagnostic criteria 
Training sample          
No of obs 677 675 675 172 265 236 72 157 445 
Bad Prediction 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MIP 2.22% 0.00% 2.29% 0.67% 0.23% 0.08% 1.17% 0.38% 1.92% 
STD 6.10% 5.53% 5.62% 3.88% 0.85% 0.58% 2.74% 2.78% 5.33% 
Variables impact analysis 
RMDPI 4.52% 9.91% 12.96% 17.72% 15.93% 3.41% 1.05% 9.95% 6.20% 
BSHR  0.65% 2.12% 0.04% 0.01% 2.42% 0.01% 0.02% 0.70% 
GSHR  10.94% 13.57% 8.26% 17.27% 4.77% 2.85% 22.31% 6.67% 
FSHR  0.75% 1.91% 3.58% 0.09% 3.56% 0.00% 5.99% 6.45% 
BBSZ  6.16% 3.65% 0.05% 0.01% 2.70% 3.45% 0.04% 0.50% 
CEOP  0.03% 0.08% 0.02% 0.02% 0.73% 0.29% 0.01% 0.12% 
GNDI  0.12% 0.47% 0.89% 0.01% 3.62% 1.57% 0.12% 0.54% 
BBID  0.05% 9.91% 4.83% 21.24% 5.82% 9.43% 0.26% 12.83% 
SSB  7.19% 1.30% 13.96%  4.16% 20.00% 16.41% 2.12% 
RMDPI*BSHR   0.03% 0.01% 0.08% 2.33% 0.01% 0.05% 0.06% 
RMDPI*GSHR   0.41% 0.11% 1.09% 4.10% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 
RMDPI*FSHR   0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 2.07% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 
RMDPI* BBSZ   0.50% 0.18% 0.02% 2.27% 0.02% 0.62% 1.60% 
RMDPI*CEOP   0.26% 0.02% 0.02% 0.85% 0.00% 0.38% 0.37% 
RMDPI*GNDI   1.07% 0.04% 2.88% 2.30% 0.83% 1.63% 7.80% 
RMDPI*BBID   1.55% 0.06% 5.63% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.69% 
RMDPI*SSB   0.17% 1.59%  1.66% 3.91% 0.07% 2.13% 
LNBS 25.18% 23.91% 20.23% 20.40% 4.74% 5.23% 23.46% 17.57% 9.75% 
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Table 27 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using PNNs continued... 
ROAA 12.81% 9.37% 2.30% 3.97% 0.01% 3.51% 17.97% 0.03% 3.55% 
INCD 11.50% 0.02% 0.23% 0.38% 2.25% 4.82% 0.01% 0.01% 11.20% 
LIQR 7.67% 0.65% 9.04% 0.97% 13.67% 5.10% 0.60% 10.84% 4.09% 
OPEF 8.92% 15.15% 9.48% 2.92% 8.17% 6.44% 0.01% 0.10% 5.08% 
BCAD 11.54% 0.17% 4.61% 0.02% 0.03% 4.14% 11.70% 6.25% 5.92% 
VAQ 4.54% 2.52% 0.48% 0.44% 0.08% 3.07% 0.05% 1.40% 3.33% 
RQM 4.21% 0.18% 0.16% 0.05% 6.44% 3.26% 0.03% 5.59% 0.08% 
ROLQ 5.31% 6.92% 2.73% 18.86% 0.02% 2.48% 0.01% 0.19% 7.36% 
INFL 0.06% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 4.15% 0.01% 0.00% 0.27% 
CGDP 3.60% 4.90% 0.52% 0.14% 0.00% 3.42% 2.68% 0.10% 0.25% 
YD Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
∑ 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Notes: The final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. The probabilistic neural 
network pattern node can be represented as follows:  
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where,  
−
X  refers to vector; in  refers to number of training patterns for class iC ; ijX−  refers to j
th training vector for class iC ; m  refers to vector-dimension; σ  refers 
to standard deviation parameter for smoothing purposes; iC  refers to category class; T  refers to transposition function for vector; and P refers to probability. 
The table shows probabilistic neural network model for the overall sample combined with bad prediction, mean incorrect probability (MIP) and standard deviation 
of incorrect probability (STD) as indicators for model accuracy. Variables are defined as follows: Fitch long term issuer default ratings (RATE); risk disclosure 
quality (RMDPI); Sharia supervisory board (SSB); board size (BBSZ); CEO duality (CEOP); gender diversity (GNDI); board independence (BBID); block 
ownership (BSHR); government ownership (GSHR); foreign ownership (FSHR); bank size (LNBS); performance (ROAA); liquidity (LIQR); income diversity 
(INCD); operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD); voice and accountability (VAQ); regulatory quality (RQM); rule of low (ROLQ); inflation (INFL) and 
GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 28 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using 
PNNs 
Variables 
 
Overall Sample 
Dependent variable: Bank’s long term issuer default ratings (BCRs) 
(1)  
Full 
(2)  
Full 
(3)  
Full 
(4)  
IBs 
(5)  
CBs 
(6)  
DBs 
(7)  
Pre07/08 
(8)  
07/08 
(9) 
post07/08 
Diagnostic criteria 
Training sample          
No of obs 677 675 675 172 265 236 72 157 445 
Bad Prediction 0.15% 3.61% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.62% 0.00% 0.00% 3.55% 
MIP 2.92% 2.15% 0.64% 0.03% 0.37% 0.07% 3.23% 0.67% 2.03% 
STD 7.49% 5.87% 2.40% 0.13% 1.51% 0.61% 5.29% 2.66% 5.55% 
Variables impact analysis 
W-RMDPI 6.99% 4.58% 5.92% 23.22% 8.65% 3.54% 0.10% 4.43% 3.75% 
BSHR  2.17% 0.05% 0.00% 0.13% 3.00% 0.05% 0.11% 2.44% 
GSHR  3.26% 3.08% 3.93% 5.75% 2.32% 0.24% 19.45% 1.87% 
FSHR  3.43% 1.00% 8.68% 0.36% 2.95% 0.04% 4.08% 2.36% 
BBSZ  5.65% 0.74% 0.00% 0.06% 5.44% 6.20% 0.31% 3.31% 
CEOP  0.76% 0.74% 0.14% 0.00% 0.80% 0.02% 0.04% 0.53% 
GNDI  3.63% 2.91% 3.92% 0.00% 5.62% 3.21% 1.12% 2.35% 
BBID  10.13% 22.93% 20.38% 16.32% 3.65% 8.87% 9.05% 6.94% 
SSB  3.68% 6.31% 4.06%  3.57% 20.40% 15.31% 2.48% 
W-RMDPI*BSHR   0.08% 0.00% 0.02% 2.69% 0.02% 0.06% 3.62% 
W-RMDPI*GSHR   0.59% 5.63% 2.31% 1.80% 0.23% 0.04% 2.65% 
W-RMDPI*FSHR   0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.35% 0.16% 0.01% 2.53% 
W-RMDPI* BBSZ   0.32% 0.01% 0.36% 4.40% 0.07% 6.13% 4.13% 
W-RMDPI*CEOP   0.05% 0.04% 0.02% 0.92% 0.01% 0.15% 1.53% 
W-RMDPI*GNDI   0.67% 0.00% 1.79% 2.10% 1.26% 0.76% 3.06% 
W-RMDPI*BBID   0.05% 0.00% 11.12% 2.63% 0.03% 0.05% 1.43% 
W-RMDPI*SSB   0.19% 0.81%  1.77% 3.08% 0.34% 1.88% 
LNBS 22.95% 9.95% 12.59% 9.16% 21.70% 7.74% 21.20% 2.88% 6.01% 
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Table 28 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using PNNs continued... 
ROAA 17.61% 6.71% 0.36% 0.10% 0.01% 6.17% 23.48% 4.47% 7.61% 
INCD 7.82% 6.70% 0.51% 0.55% 2.74% 5.72% 0.12% 0.02% 8.38% 
LIQR 9.11% 3.33% 14.14% 0.30% 15.79% 3.56% 0.64% 6.39% 4.75% 
OPEF 11.33% 6.55% 8.34% 11.86% 8.30% 7.68% 0.03% 1.71% 4.14% 
BCAD 10.02% 8.96% 3.59% 0.00% 0.05% 2.66% 8.32% 16.65% 5.56% 
VAQ 2.96% 4.25% 0.75% 0.02% 0.05% 1.57% 0.17% 0.35% 2.68% 
RQM 1.82% 4.21% 10.46% 0.03% 4.20% 2.87% 0.09% 0.02% 2.85% 
ROLQ 3.69% 2.54% 3.51% 6.94% 0.01% 2.23% 0.28% 6.03% 2.34% 
INFL 0.04% 2.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.21% 0.11% 0.00% 2.55% 
CGDP 5.45% 1.90% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 1.74% 1.49% 0.01% 3.17% 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
∑ 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Notes: The final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. The probabilistic neural 
network pattern node can be represented as follows:  
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where,  
−
X  refers to vector; in  refers to number of training patterns for class iC ; ijX−  refers to j
th training vector for class iC ; m  refers to vector-dimension; σ  refers 
to standard deviation parameter for smoothing purposes; iC  refers to category class; T  refers to transposition function for vector; and P refers to probability. 
The table shows probabilistic neural network model for the overall sample combined with bad prediction, mean incorrect probability (MIP) and standard deviation 
of incorrect probability (STD) as indicators for model accuracy. Variables are defined as follows: Fitch long term issuer default ratings (RATE); risk disclosure 
quality (W-RMDPI); Sharia supervisory board (SSB); board size (BBSZ); CEO duality (CEOP); gender diversity (GNDI); board independence (BBID); block 
ownership (BSHR); government ownership (GSHR); foreign ownership (FSHR); bank size (LNBS); performance (ROAA); liquidity (LIQR); income diversity 
(INCD); operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD); voice and accountability (VAQ); regulatory quality (RQM); rule of low (ROLQ); inflation (INFL) and 
GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Moreover, the results for the ‘during-crisis’ models presented in Table 27 and in Table 
28, reveal the importance of RMDPI in predicting RATE unlike ordered logistic regression. 
These results reveal that credit rating agencies incorporate risk disclosures into their risk 
evaluation process especially during global financial crisis. This is evident from the relatively 
high importance value of 9.95% (and 4.43% for the weighted model) compared to an 
importance value of 1.05% (and 0.10% for the weighted model) from the pre-crisis model. 
Similarly, PNN results for the ‘post-crisis’ models presented in Tables 27 and 28 reveal that 
credit rating agencies continue to incorporate risk disclosure to assign BCRs in the post 
global financial crisis but with relatively lower importance compared to the ‘during-crisis’ 
models. 
Secondly, I had re-run PNNs by dividing the sample into two sub-samples: training sub-
sample (i.e. 80%) and holdout sub-sample4 (i.e. 20%). The results are very similar to those 
obtained from the overall sample results, as shown in Tables 29 and 30. Remarkably, Table 
29, reports relatively low bad prediction rates for the holdout sub-samples for all models. In 
line with the overall sample results, PNN models suggest different interpretation compared 
to the ordered logistic models in relation to the attention paid to RMDPI pre-, during, and 
post financial crisis scenario. For instance, credit rating agencies paid more attention to 
RMDPI during crisis compared to pre-crisis. More importantly, credit rating agencies paid 
more attention to RMDPI post crisis compared to pre-crisis. This attention slightly decreased 
compared to during crisis period.  
                                               
4It should be emphasised that the training and the holdout sub-samples are randomly chosen as part of the 
software design. 
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Table 29 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using 
PNNs 
Variables 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bank’s long term issuer default ratings (BCRs) 
(1) 
Full 
(2)  
Full 
(3)  
Full 
(4)  
IBs 
(5)  
CBs 
(6)  
DBs 
(7)  
Pre07/08 
(8)  
07/08 
(9)  
post07/08 
Diagnostic criteria 
Training sample          
No of obs 542 540 540 138 212 189 58 126 356 
Bad Prediction 0.00% 0.74% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MIP 4.89% 6.31% 1.70% 0.03% 0.28% 0.16% 0.26% 0.02% 1.31% 
STD 9.77% 12.15% 5.21% 0.24% 1.05% 0.95% 0.52% 0.06% 3.79% 
Test sample          
No of obs 135 135 135 34 53 47 14 31 89 
Bad Prediction 30.37% 18.52% 21.48% 14.71% 37.74% 17.02% 57.14% 57.14% 19.10% 
MIP 32.99% 20.41% 25.38% 16.25% 38.08% 16.76% 54.50% 61.00% 21.64% 
STD 37.08% 32.40% 38.28% 35.73% 45.20% 35.26% 40.95% 45.64% 35.07% 
Variables impact analysis 
RMDPI 9.12% 3.80% 13.81% 21.31% 21.27% 3.96% 5.23% 14.21% 12.89% 
BSHR  3.26% 0.09% 0.00% 1.04% 1.97% 0.00% 0.08% 2.46% 
GSHR  14.53% 12.19% 0.00% 11.84% 23.01% 0.83% 17.53% 14.83% 
FSHR  0.86% 7.82% 0.47% 0.04% 2.50% 0.00% 0.07% 3.95% 
BBSZ  1.15% 0.90% 0.84% 0.75% 4.05% 12.22% 6.95% 0.01% 
CEOP  0.11% 0.02% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 
GNDI  0.22% 0.28% 0.17% 0.14% 4.01% 0.00% 3.03% 0.01% 
BBID  0.23% 0.26% 7.14% 19.30% 0.16% 0.00% 0.18% 4.20% 
SSB  10.12% 8.41% 14.00%  1.65% 23.06% 10.84% 4.54% 
RMDPI*BSHR   0.01% 0.00% 0.23% 0.04% 0.00% 0.36% 0.03% 
RMDPI*GSHR   0.15% 0.00% 0.95% 0.00% 4.43% 0.09% 0.03% 
RMDPI*FSHR   0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.04% 0.30% 0.01% 
RMDPI*BBSZ   0.12% 0.41% 0.07% 0.38% 0.00% 0.11% 0.05% 
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Table 29 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using PNNs continued... 
RMDPI*CEOP   0.01% 0.71% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.02% 
RMDPI*GNDI   0.01% 0.01% 5.57% 0.07% 0.00% 0.53% 0.05% 
RMDPI*BBID   0.02% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 1.39% 
RMDPI*SSB   0.21% 0.93%  0.01% 2.15% 0.02% 0.14% 
LNBS 24.79% 29.70% 30.40% 29.98% 9.32% 0.00% 27.81% 24.64% 16.68% 
ROAA 21.56% 11.05% 2.32% 5.02% 0.00% 0.91% 0.00% 5.65% 0.01% 
INCD 10.05% 5.40% 0.56% 0.00% 0.86% 4.05% 7.67% 0.21% 19.00% 
LIQR 5.59% 10.74% 5.27% 0.75% 19.71% 0.01% 0.02% 2.81% 4.68% 
OPEF 3.81% 0.37% 9.88% 4.48% 3.75% 24.29% 0.00% 1.05% 0.04% 
BCAD 11.28% 3.23% 0.07% 1.65% 3.48% 3.95% 11.60% 0.49% 0.20% 
VAQ 6.83% 0.81% 3.12% 3.17% 0.16% 6.59% 0.73% 0.27% 0.41% 
RQM 0.97% 1.47% 3.65% 0.00% 0.02% 0.11% 0.00% 3.48% 0.01% 
ROLQ 3.98% 0.74% 0.15% 7.78% 0.50% 9.25% 4.20% 0.04% 11.42% 
INFL 0.29% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 
CGDP 1.37% 1.56% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 6.76% 2.54% 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
∑ 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Notes: The final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, and UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. . The probabilistic neural network pattern node can be 
represented as follows:  
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where,  
−
X  refers to vector; in  refers to number of training patterns for class iC ; ijX−  refers to j
th training vector for class iC ; m  refers to vector-dimension; σ  refers to standard 
deviation parameter for smoothing purposes; iC  refers to category class; T  refers to transposition function for vector; and P refers to probability. The table shows probabilistic 
neural network model for the overall sample combined with bad prediction, mean incorrect probability (MIP) and standard deviation of incorrect probability (STD) as indicators for 
model accuracy. Variables are defined as follows: Fitch long term issuer default ratings (RATE); risk disclosure quality (RMDPI); Sharia supervisory board (SSB); board size (BBSZ); 
CEO duality (CEOP); gender diversity (GNDI); board independence (BBID); block ownership (BSHR); government ownership (GSHR); foreign ownership (FSHR); bank size (LNBS); 
performance (ROAA); liquidity (LIQR); income diversity (INCD); operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD);  voice and accountability (VAQ); regulatory quality (RQM); rule of 
low (ROLQ); inflation (INFL) and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 30 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using 
PNNs 
Variables 
 
 
Dependent variable: Bank’s long term issuer default ratings (BCRs) 
(1) BCRs 
Full 
(2) BCRs 
Full 
(3) BCRs 
Full 
(4) BCRs 
IBs 
(5) BCRs 
CBs 
(6) BCRs 
DBs 
(7) BCRs 
Pre07/08 
(8) BCRs 
07/08 
(9) BCRs 
post07/08 
Diagnostic criteria 
Training sample          
No of obs 542 540 540 138 212 189 58 126 356 
Bad Prediction 0.74% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.79% 0.00% 
MIP 6.21% 3.56% 1.48% 0.64% 0.37% 0.30% 0.62% 3.10% 0.34% 
STD 11.41% 7.55% 4.31% 4.29% 1.29% 1.97% 0.87% 7.43% 1.04% 
Test sample          
No of obs 135 135 133 34 53 45 14 31 89 
Bad Prediction 22.22% 21.48% 27.07% 17.65% 15.09% 17.02% 64.29% 35.48% 19.10% 
MIP 29.54% 24.90% 28.50% 20.64% 17.48% 17.73% 66.07% 33.58% 18.86% 
STD 34.75% 33.22% 36.70% 34.10% 33.17% 36.17% 43.99% 30.31% 35.49% 
Variables impact analysis 
W-RMDPI 5.49% 5.15% 5.69% 14.44% 4.74% 8.25% 4.39% 7.95% 5.30% 
BSHR  0.23% 0.04% 0.00% 1.26% 0.00% 0.01% 0.05% 1.63% 
GSHR  8.11% 3.75% 1.61% 0.15% 17.18% 0.02% 23.16% 2.64% 
FSHR  0.18% 0.65% 7.62% 6.27% 0.00% 6.67% 8.95% 3.07% 
BBSZ  0.42% 1.04% 1.37% 3.42% 12.42% 1.73% 0.97% 4.36% 
CEOP  0.11% 0.07% 1.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.56% 0.92% 
GNDI  2.83% 0.93% 5.32% 0.00% 4.66% 0.01% 0.40% 2.19% 
BBID  13.21% 11.41% 0.08% 17.93% 1.66% 3.35% 2.40% 4.70% 
SSB  4.43% 6.06% 5.15%  0.86% 3.80% 6.07% 2.03% 
W-RMDPI*BSHR   0.07% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.53% 2.53% 
W-RMDPI*GSHR   0.24% 2.82% 0.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 1.70% 
W-RMDPI*FSHR   0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 4.25% 0.10% 1.05% 
W-RMDPI*BBSZ   0.17% 0.04% 0.22% 8.66% 0.45% 1.22% 1.63% 
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Table 30 The moderating effect of governance structures on the relation between risk disclosures and banks’ ratings using PNNs continued... 
W-RMDPI*CEOP   0.06% 0.47% 1.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 2.32% 
W-RMDPI*GNDI   0.03% 0.01% 2.29% 0.01% 0.02% 7.97% 1.20% 
W-RMDPI*BBID   1.39% 0.25% 18.56% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 3.24% 
W-RMDPI*SSB   0.65% 0.04%  0.01% 0.85% 0.09% 3.12% 
LNBS 23.66% 10.45% 10.67% 22.65% 19.25% 2.64% 20.12% 2.42% 6.52% 
ROAA 10.55% 13.49% 10.26% 2.95% 1.11% 0.05% 26.45% 0.06% 6.51% 
INCD 11.20% 6.94% 8.39% 1.14% 0.24% 0.82% 12.66% 0.04% 8.71% 
LIQR 10.10% 11.05% 5.57% 1.06% 13.46% 14.22% 0.01% 3.56% 3.80% 
OPEF 9.97% 13.08% 4.13% 1.91% 1.35% 17.17% 0.00% 4.01% 6.81% 
BCAD 11.92% 2.70% 16.65% 0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 6.69% 15.27% 7.21% 
VAQ 5.86% 0.34% 2.79% 0.18% 4.14% 0.43% 0.05% 4.37% 3.31% 
RQM 0.65% 0.20% 4.80% 0.10% 0.84% 0.01% 8.41% 8.16% 2.96% 
ROLQ 4.67% 6.75% 4.20% 28.97% 2.68% 10.84% 0.01% 0.33% 3.27% 
INFL 0.06% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 2.30% 
CGDP 5.64% 0.05% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.01% 0.97% 2.18% 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
∑ 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Notes: The final sample covers 95 banks listed in 12 MENA stock exchanges as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, and UAE. The final sample consists of 700 bank-year observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. The probabilistic neural network pattern node can be 
represented as follows:  
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where,  
−
X  refers to vector; in  refers to number of training patterns for class iC ; ijX−  refers to j
th training vector for class iC ; m  refers to vector-dimension; σ  refers to standard 
deviation parameter for smoothing purposes; iC  refers to category class; T  refers to transposition function for vector; and P refers to probability.  
The table shows probabilistic neural network model for the overall sample combined with bad prediction, mean incorrect probability (MIP) and standard deviation of incorrect 
probability (STD) as indicators for model accuracy. Variables are defined as follows: Fitch long term issuer default ratings (RATE); risk disclosure quality (W-RMDPI); Sharia 
supervisory board (SSB); board size (BBSZ); CEO duality (CEOP); gender diversity (GNDI); board independence (BBID); block ownership (BSHR); government ownership (GSHR); 
foreign ownership (FSHR); bank size (LNBS); performance (ROAA); liquidity (LIQR); income diversity (INCD); operations efficiency (OPEF); capital (BCAD);  voice and 
accountability (VAQ); regulatory quality (RQM); rule of low (ROLQ); inflation (INFL) and GDP per capita (CGDP). Table 21 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Thus, the results show that risk disclosure plays a significant role in the BCRs 
assessment especially during crunches. In particular, the findings demonstrate that risk 
disclosure and governance structures serve to change the way BCRs are assigned, which 
suggests a perpetual role for banks in improving risk disclosure and governance structures. 
These results have important implications for investors, especially bondholders, standard 
setters, regulators, banks, and central governments. 
7. Conclusion  
Unlike current literature on the impact of risk disclosures and governance structures, 
which tend to focus largely on equity markets in a single financial market, this study 
examines the predictive effect (informativeness) of risk disclosures on BCRs in MENA 
region. Consequently, it ascertains whether governance structures have a moderating effect 
on the risk disclosures-BCRs nexus using the MENA BCRs for fiscal years from 2006-2013. 
The empirical analysis shows that risk disclosures, Sharia supervisory board (SSB), 
governmental ownership, board size, gender diversity, non-executive directors and the 
moderating effect of governance structures are statistically significant and positively 
incorporated in BCRs. Whereas the results show that foreign ownership and CEO power 
(duality) are statistically significant and negatively related to BCRs, implying that MENA 
banks with high-risk disclosures, Sharia supervisory board (SSB), government ownership, 
gender diversity, and non-executive directors are more likely to receive significantly high 
ratings. By contrast, the empirical analysis shows that block ownership is statistically 
insignificant in relation to BCRs.  
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Notably, these results consider the effect of several other controlling variables, including 
bank size, performance, liquidity, income diversity, operations efficiency, capital, voice and 
accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, time, inflation, and GDP per capita. The 
results are consistent with the expectations of agency, signal, legitimacy, and resource 
dependence theories.  
Therefore, the contributions of this study are threefold. Firstly, it contributes to the 
literature by providing first-time evidence on the level of risk and governance disclosures by 
banks across the MENA region. Secondly, the study contributes to the literature by providing 
first-time evidence on the link between risk disclosures and banks’ credit ratings. Finally, the 
study contributes to the literature by providing first-time evidence on the moderating effect 
of governance structures on the risk disclosure-credit rating nexus. Therefore, this study has 
an important policy, practitioner, and regulatory implications in emerging markets, 
especially for banks as well as countries in other emerging markets that are expecting or 
currently pursuing prudential CG and risk disclosures reforms.  
Evidence of increasing informativeness of risk disclosures, and governance structures 
suggests that efforts by banks and regulators to improve risk disclosure, SSB, board 
independence, and quality of board rather than quantity become critical, and have had some 
positive impact on BCRs, and improve overall banks’ performance. In addition to, risk 
disclosures requirements should be developed frequently to ensure the quality and relevance 
of the risk disclosures.  
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Also, regulators should put more regulatory reforms with regards to foreign banks in 
order to enhance their ratings compared to government-owned banks. Regarding Islamic 
banks, banks as well as regulators should emphasise on the role of SSB to legitimise their 
operations through more disclosure on SSBs characteristics. 
Finally, it would be interesting if future research could try to examine more widely the 
consequences of risk disclosures, and governance structures from equity and debt investors' 
perception and its impact on banks’ performance and value. Also, further research can 
address sample size limitation and the impact of either additional CG variables (e.g., risk 
committee, audit committee, independent non-executive board) or other types of ownership 
structures such as family, institutional, and managerial ownership on BCRs, and consider 
using more than one financial information providers’ ratings such as Moody’s and S&P.  
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Abstract 
This essay examines the impact of risk disclosures and multi-level governance on bank 
value using a dataset from 14 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries for a period 
of eight years from 2006 to 2013. The results confirm the substantial role of risk disclosures 
and multi-level governance in improving bank valuation in MENA. More specifically, the 
results indicate that market valuation is higher in banks with bigger foreign ownership, board 
size, board independence, Islamic governance, and national governance quality. The results 
also show a significant negative relationship between CEO power and bank value. Overall, 
these results are consistent with the multi-theoretical framework predictions derived from 
the agency, signalling, and institutional theories. More importantly, the bank-level 
governance impact is higher in poorly governed environments compared with strongly 
governed environments. These findings are robust to the different sub-samples, proxies for 
bank value, risk disclosures index, and for other types of endogeneity. 
Keywords: Bank-Level Governance; Country-Level Governance; Islamic Governance; 
MENA Countries; Multi-Theoretical Framework; Risk Disclosures. 
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1. Introduction 
Risk disclosures as a corporate governance practice are principally critical for banks due 
to their opaqueness, complexities, multiple agency conflicts, and severely critical 
information asymmetries (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Bischof et al., 2016; Leventis et al., 2013). 
Regulators and central bankers prefer banks to practice risk management and disclosures by 
imposing stricter accounting standards (e.g., IAS 32, 39; IFRS 7, 9; Basel accords) and 
corporate governance reforms to achieve and maintain the smooth operation of the banking 
industry and the entire economy (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; BCBS, 2015; Laeven, 2013; 
Walker, 2009). Ineffective governance practices, including risk management and disclosure, 
alternatively, may contribute to bank crashes, which can pose a substantial impact on 
investors especially in the wake of crises. This, in turn, has grown current concerns over how 
banks are governed and what the governance structures that can effectively influence bank 
value are. 
In this essay, we undertake a cross-country study to investigate three issues related to 
market valuation that are highly relevant to banks and investors in developing countries. The 
first issue is whether the risk disclosures can influence the value of banks. The second issue 
is how bank-level governance may affect the bank value. Finally, this essay explores the 
relationship between operating in highly governed countries and the market value of banks. 
In fact, in the wake of the Global Banking Crisis (GBC), risk disclosures and multi-level 
governance may become a channel for mitigating several market failures (Adams & Jiang, 
2016; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015; Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016).  
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However, the effect of increased risk disclosures and bank-level governance on bank 
value is theoretically unclear and depends on the effects of country-level governance on 
shareholders' protection (Nguyen et al., 2015; Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016). 
According to agency theory, better risk disclosures may reduce asymmetric information 
(Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Elshandidy, 2016). Specifically, the prudential risk management and 
disclosure practices in riskier firms like banks are critical and may lead to better valuation 
(Nguyen et al., 2015). Agency theory also seeks to attenuate agency costs by the design of 
governance system to constrain managerial opportunistic behaviour and its adverse effects 
on bank valuation (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; García-Castro et al., 2013; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013). However, Tunyi and Ntim (2016), and Wiseman et al.  
(2012) argue that the institutional setting, such as the national governance quality and/ or 
country risk, is necessary to improve the perception of the particular agency conflicts that 
may affect the bank value in the stock market in different settings.  
Signalling theory argues that prudential risk disclosures and multi-level governance are 
presented to convey effective signals that may lead to better bank valuation assessment 
(Miller et al., 2013). Institutional theory also argues that the institutionally embedded 
pressures that influence the bank’s reaction to be involved in prudential risk disclosures and 
governance activities to gain institutional legitimacy may have possible outcomes in terms 
of bank valuations (Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). 
The earlier argument has debated that, although agency theory may be applicable for 
examining organizational behaviours and consequences in many contexts, there are settings 
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under which a combination of signalling and institutional theories arguments would either 
enhance or substitute agency theory explanations.  
A growing research focuses on the market valuation of the risk disclosures and other 
multi-level governance ties in banks; however, the results so far are inconsistent. For 
instance, a number of studies imply that risk disclosures will be negatively associated with 
firm value since such disclosed risk information is likely to incorporate it into investors’ 
decisions on shares prices (Kothari et al., 2009; Kravet & Muslu, 2013). However, other 
research shows that risk disclosures and firm value nexus is contingent on the risk disclosures 
types, tone, and time orientation (Bao & Datta, 2014; Elshandidy, 2016; Kothari et al., 2009). 
By contrast, other studies show that risk disclosures are considered boilerplate (Aryani, 2016; 
Mollah & Zaman, 2015).  
On the other hand, other studies demonstrate that risk disclosures will be positively 
associated with firm value since such disclosed risk information is likely to signal bank 
management to investors, which may affect shares prices positively. In particular, such 
disclosed risk information reduces information asymmetry and increases bank value 
(Campbell et al., 2014; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Miihkinen, 2013; Moumen et al., 2015). It 
remains ambiguous; though, whether risk disclosures and governance mechanisms affect 
investors’ perceptions of banks’ value. 
This conveys us to an additional important theoretical gap in the banking research - the 
propensity to focus on a single country, principally the USA. Extant research has increasingly 
documented that the institutional context has substantial implications for disclosure and 
governance findings (Aguilera et al., 2008; Elshandidy, 2016; Filatotchev et al., 2016). Thus, 
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this essay examines the potential variances in influences of the risk disclosures, bank-level 
governance, and more importantly national governance on investor perceptions of banks’ 
value.  
It should also be stated that most previous research investigating risk disclosures and 
multi-level governance informativeness focuses on developed environments such as the USA 
or UK markets (Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy, 2016; Filatotchev et al., 2013; Nguyen 
et al., 2015). However, extant research in developing countries is extremely rare (Moumen 
et al., 2015), which may impact the effectiveness of governance structures results 
(Filatotchev et al., 2013; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015). I conjecture that 
because of these variances reliance on bank CG and risk disclosures may lead to variances 
in bank value. Understanding the effect of country- and bank-level governance hence can 
extend knowledge of the economic role of risk disclosures. 
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Table 31 National governance quality indicators 
Panel A: National governance quality indicators cross- regions 
Governance 
Indicators 
Year 
East Asia& Pacific Europe & Central 
Asia 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
MENA North America South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 
VAQ 
2006 52 66 61 25 87 29 34 
2008 53 66 61 23 87 33 33 
2010 52 66 61 23 86 35 32 
2012 54 66 61 25 88 32 32 
PSQ 
2006 62 61 53 37 71 26 36 
2008 61 64 51 38 74 19 34 
2010 63 61 53 35 73 20 35 
2012 63 62 55 28 80 21 34 
GEQ 
2006 53 66 56 46 90 40 27 
2008 50 66 57 49 89 37 28 
2010 48 66 57 50 89 37 27 
2012 49 67 58 45 89 35 27 
RQM 
2006 50 68 57 43 93 33 29 
2008 46 70 57 48 93 28 29 
2010 44 70 56 48 92 27 30 
2012 46 69 56 44 91 26 30 
ROLQ 
2006 59 62 52 46 88 38 30 
2008 56 64 51 49 89 36 30 
2010 54 65 52 48 92 35 30 
2012 56 66 51 44 91 33 29 
COCQ 
2006 50 63 58 46 91 34 32 
2008 49 62 58 48 92 32 33 
2010 50 62 58 47 90 31 32 
2012 53 63 57 45 91 33 30 
Panel B: National governance quality indicators cross-MENA countries 
Governance 
Indicators 
Year MENA Bahrain Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Oman Palestine Qatar KSA Syria Tunisia UAE 
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Table 31 National governance quality indicators continued... 
VAQ 
2006 25 23 16 9 29 31 34 28 17 32 29 5 6 13 21 
2008 23 27 15 14 27 34 35 26 18 27 23 4 6 11 26 
2010 23 20 14 18 27 31 35 29 19 28 24 4 5 10 23 
2012 25 12 18 16 25 28 34 29 19 23 24 3 4 42 18 
PSQ 
2006 37 32 21 0 23 57 5 31 72 8 76 29 37 54 77 
2008 38 40 26 1 32 55 8 26 74 4 91 28 28 49 81 
2010 35 28 19 2 34 61 6 33 67 4 88 37 22 44 73 
2012 28 9 7 5 26 52 7 32 62 4 91 33 0 22 75 
GEQ 
2006 46 66 37 0 61 63 44 51 64 12 70 47 18 72 80 
2008 49 69 47 9 63 62 39 48 66 6 80 52 34 66 81 
2010 50 68 43 9 59 61 45 51 67 41 77 57 33 63 78 
2012 45 70 21 13 50 52 43 53 61 26 81 58 8 54 83 
RQM 
2006 43 71 37 7 62 61 48 49 68 13 62 52 7 55 70 
2008 48 74 47 13 61 56 53 49 69 13 73 57 18 55 66 
2010 48 75 47 16 57 56 54 51 67 60 71 56 21 53 62 
2012 44 71 28 10 56 50 50 50 67 56 74 56 4 45 75 
ROLQ 
2006 46 63 50 1 62 67 32 48 62 39 70 56 22 58 61 
2008 49 66 54 1 62 67 30 47 69 22 82 59 38 58 63 
2010 48 64 51 2 61 66 30 50 67 84 80 62 36 60 63 
2012 44 62 34 3 63 63 25 49 67 40 83 61 3 51 71 
COCQ 
2006 46 64 29 1 66 72 18 40 62 10 83 49 16 57 79 
2008 48 66 41 1 65 71 22 43 67 8 92 59 13 53 80 
2010 47 64 34 4 61 69 20 53 66 46 91 60 13 55 80 
2012 45 69 32 8 61 54 18 42 60 31 84 58 8 54 88 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) cross-MENA countries in fiscal years 2006, 2009, and 2013. The six 
dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) are defined as follows: Voice and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), 
government quality (GEQ), regulatory quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control of corruption quality (COCQ).  
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank Group, 2016. 
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To this end, this study presents empirical evidence on the impact of risk disclosures and 
multi-level governance on bank value using banks’ dataset from 14 MENA countries for a 
period of eight years from 2006 to 2013. These countries share a number of socio-economic, 
regulations, and structures with respect to CG and disclosure. For example, all of these 
countries have adopted CG codes that are driven from OCED code (e.g., Egypt, Jordon, and 
Saudi Arabia). Accounting standards also in most of these countries are established based on 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Moreover, the country-level governance 
of MENA region is weak generally.  
For instance, the mean of MENA political stability in Panel A of Table 31 is between 
28 per cent and 38 per cent, which is considered the lowest compared to the rest of world. 
More importantly, the country-level governance differs considerably between MENA 
countries. For example, the mean of MENA control of corruption in Panel B of Table 31 is 
between 1 per cent and 92 per cent, which adds more insights to examine such context. 
The results confirm the substantial role of risk disclosures and multi-level governance 
in improving bank valuation in MENA. More specifically, the results indicate that bank value 
is high in banks with high Islamic governance, foreign ownership, board size, board 
independence, and national governance quality (NGQM). The results also report a significant 
negative relation between CEO power and bank value. Also, consistent with previous studies, 
the results similarly show evidence of informative risk disclosures and multi-level 
governance in countries considered as a strongly governed environment. More importantly, 
the bank-level governance impact is higher in poorly governed environments compared to 
strongly governed environments.  
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Hence, this study contributes to the banking and governance literature as follows. First, 
it demonstrates that investors use the risk disclosures and multi-level governance to assess 
bank value. A few number of studies have been done to explore the informativeness of banks’ 
risk disclosures and multi-level governance, and most extant studies on banks’ risk 
disclosures and multi-level governance focus on banks in developed countries (Campbell et 
al., 2014; Elshandidy, 2016; Kothari et al., 2009; Nguyen et al., 2015). This study hence 
adds to the increasing research in this area. 
Second, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, it offers first-time evidence on 
the influence of Islamic governance on bank value. Specifically, the study provides evidence 
that Islamic governance has a positive impact on bank value. Third, the study offers evidence 
and extends prior research on the influence of multi-level governance on bank value using a 
multi-theoretical framework. In particular, the results show that institutional confluences 
affect not only the governance structures effectiveness but also the organizational outcomes, 
such as bank value. Hence, the results emphasize the relevance of IFRS, Basel, and CG 
reforms that push for more consistency in risk disclosures and CG practices. Consequently, 
the results have a number of implications for regulators, banks, and investors, especially in 
emerging markets.  
The essay structures as follows. Section 2 describes the multi- theoretical framework. 
Section 3 describes the related literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 
provides the research design. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and reports the 
additional tests. Finally, section 6 concludes, discusses implications and recommendations 
for future research. 
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2. Multi- Theoretical Framework 
This study employs multi-theoretical perspective to examine the relationship among risk 
disclosures, multi-level governance, and a bank's value. This essay focuses distinctively on 
bank valuations by investors in emerging markets as such valuations show the investors’ 
perceptions about the banks’ overall risks strategy, and specifically prudential risk 
management and disclosure practices (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; Elshandidy & Neri, 
2015; Ntim et al., 2012b; Wiseman et al., 2012). Banks may adopt risk disclosures and 
governance structures that meet investor perceptions to influence bank stock market 
performance (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012). Additionally, this study debates that such a 
relationship is contingent upon contextual factors and the specific national setting being 
considered (i.e., national governance quality) that may affect the bank value in the stock 
market (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). By adopting a 
multi-theoretical lens, we can investigate further nuanced, risk disclosures and multi-level 
governance mechanisms that influence the bank’s response to pressures, motivations, and 
decisions to engage in such activities that have possible benefits regarding bank valuations 
(Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; Filatotchev et al., 2016). Alternatively, I argue that 
incorporating agency, signal, and institutional perspectives may remove the limitations to the 
application of each theory separately, thus offering explicit perception to the pressures, 
motivations, and decisions contexts surrounding bank valuations. 
Agency theory (AT) seeks to explain the principal(s) - agent relationship from an 
economic utilitarianism view (Ross, 1973). Specifically, AT suggests that a conflict of 
interest in the bilateral principal-agent relationship is due to self-interested individuals 
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(opportunistic behaviour) (Aguilera, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, AT emphases 
on determining the optimal implicit or explicit nexus of contracts for aligning the interests 
of contracting parties (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). More importantly, the conflict of interest between the contracting parties 
creates information asymmetry and agency cost which may affect firm valuations 
(Armstrong et al., 2011; 2010).  
Armstrong et al. (2010, 2011) underline the influences of information asymmetry 
between the agents of the firm and the principal(s) on the market valuations for the firm’s 
shares. We can argue that risk disclosures may reduce asymmetric information; 
consequently, it can similarly improve the market valuations of bank’s shares. Specifically, 
the prudential risk management and disclosure practices in riskier firms like banks are a 
critical concern in determining how to evaluate banks’ share prices. A recent empirical 
instance of this is Elshandidy (2016) who suggest that risk-related disclosure as a channel of 
reducing information asymmetry are tied to stock price performance. Another example is 
Armstrong et al. (2010) who reveal that financial reporting transparency significantly 
mitigates asymmetric information among agents, shareholders, and creditors. 
Additionally, AT seeks to attenuate agency costs through the design of governance 
system to align the interests of principal(s) and their agents (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; 
García-Castro et al., 2013; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;  Ntim et al., 2013). Accordingly, most 
of the theoretical foundation of the extant research on corporate governance built upon AT, 
and is involved in linking different corporate governance (CG) mechanisms with firm value 
(Aguilera, 2005; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Zona et al., 2015). AT argues that principal(s) 
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may use multi-level CG, including board of directors monitoring (Fama & Jensen, 1983;  
Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015c), Islamic governance (Safieddine, 2009), and ownership structure 
(Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983) to align the interests of 
principal(s) and agents to constrain managerial opportunistic behaviour and its adverse 
effects on bank valuation.  
In other words, by managing the principal(s)-agents’ conflicts through enhanced risk 
disclosures and better governance system, banks will work more efficiently, which will be 
reflected on banks better valuation. Moreover, Tunyi and Ntim (2016), and Wiseman et al. 
(2012) argue that the institutional setting, such as the national governance quality and/ or 
country risk, is necessary for improving the understanding of the particular agency conflicts 
that may affect the bank value in the stock market in different settings. However, AT was 
criticised because of its simplistic expectations about different risk preferences; it ignores 
stewardship interests; and does not indicate the social context importance (Cuevas‐
Rodríguez et al., 2012; Wiseman et al., 2012). 
Signalling theory (ST) seeks to reduce asymmetric information between two parties by 
conveying significant information about intentions and abilities of firms (Ntim et al., 2013; 
Spence, 2002). For instance, management signals the underlying unobservable excellence of 
their companies to prospective investors by the recognizable financial statements 
transparency which may influence decision-making in the stock market (Connelly et al., 
2011; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). However, some of the extant research argues that 
institutional environment may influence signals to be more (or less) observable (Bergh et al., 
2014; Connelly et al., 2011).  
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The central ST assumption in the context of bank valuation is that asymmetric 
information affects external investors, which depend on a number of signals in establishing 
judgments about bank valuation (Bergh et al., 2014; Spence, 2002). Per se, bank valuation 
can be considered as a result of a signalling process, where signals such as risk disclosures 
are used by prospective investors to make valuation judgments related to banks (Musteen et 
al., 2010). However, signals must be recognizable and be perceived as relevant proxies of 
firms’ true position to have a significant impact. Specifically, since information on risk 
disclosures and multi-level governance are presented to the stock markets, it can be debated 
that they convey effective signals that send significant information related to the bank 
valuation assessment.  
Such signals affect a bank’s sustainability and managerial accountability (Miller et al., 
2013). Hence, ST focuses on distinguishing a bank with higher capabilities from their 
counterparts, unlike the institutional theory that concentrates on achieving imperative 
legitimacy (Miller et al., 2013). Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 
574). 
Institutional theory (IST) offers a significant theoretical mechanism that explains firm-
environment relationships from the institutional perspective. Bank and market activity are 
described from the imperative of legitimacy-seeking behaviour that, consecutively, is 
affected by socially constructed appropriate conduct’s norms and rules (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983;  Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Scott, 1987). In other words, I argue that the development 
 239 
 
of risk disclosures and governance structures are different in the MENA context as a result 
of the unique convergences of formal and informal institutions which may affect investors’ 
perceptions of the bank’s legitimacy in the capital markets (Filatotchev et al., 2016). 
Institutional theorists outline three institutional pressures that lead to greater 
isomorphism tendency. Firstly, coercive pressures result from broad-based social 
expectations relating to rules, laws in addition to firm interdependencies and power systems 
that increase legitimacy and lead to coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Iannotta et al., 2015). Secondly, normative pressures arise from mutual values, 
professionalization, societal and moral responsibilities within institutional environments, 
which create normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Judge et al., 2010). 
Thirdly, mimetic pressures stem from uncertainty, rituals, procedures, and symbols that 
increase legitimacy and standardization, which result in mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). 
Risk disclosures and multi-level governance extant research shows that investors’ 
perceptions of disclosures and numerous bank-level and country-level governance structures 
are incorporated in the institutional perspective on capital markets within which investors 
make critical evaluations toward practice adoption (Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 
2013;  Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). Specifically, by embracing an institutional perspective, 
I can examine more nuanced, institutionally embedded pressures that influence the bank’s 
reaction to be involved in risk disclosures and governance activities to gain institutional 
legitimacy that may have possible outcomes in terms of bank valuations. 
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Prior literature (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013b) argue that risk disclosures and governance structures convey three critical signals to 
investors regarding legitimacy: directors and management competence through coercive 
isomorphism, directors’ professionalization and ethics through normative isomorphism, and 
finally, cognitive through mimetic isomorphism. Therefore, in a particularly uncertain 
institutional environment connected to bank operations, risk disclosures and governance 
structures are mechanisms not only enforced through the capital market efficiency but also 
of societal norms legitimising the adoption of appropriate accounting and CG practices that 
could affect bank valuations (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012). 
The earlier argument has debated that, although agency theory may be applicable for 
examining organizational behaviours and consequences in many contexts, there are settings 
under which a combination of signalling and institutional theories arguments would either 
enhance or substitute agency theory explanations. Hence, the rationale behind risk 
disclosures and governance structures are either guided by efficiency concerns, or 
legitimization and signal underlying quality to others. Therefore, by adopting a combined 
agency–signal–institutional perspective, I can investigate more nuanced, agency cost, 
information asymmetry, and institutionally embedded structures that affect the bank’s 
reaction to internal and external pressures to engage in risk disclosures and governance 
activities that have a possible impact on investors’ valuations. 
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3. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
This section briefly describes the three relevant strands of the extant research to this 
essay and then I form the research hypotheses. The first strand associates to the investors' 
response to risk disclosures. The second relates to the bank-level governance – bank value 
relationship. The third focuses on the nature of the country-level governance – bank value 
relationship. 
3.1 The Nature of the Risk Disclosures – Bank Value 
Relationship 
There is an extensive theoretical literature suggesting that risk disclosures as a CG 
practice, can improve investors’ perceptions of the banks’ overall risks and, hence, the bank 
value (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008; Elshandidy, 2016; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Filatotchev et 
al., 2016; Moumen et al., 2015). Agency theory argues that risk disclosures may reduce 
asymmetric information and agency problems between contracting parties; consequently, it 
can similarly improve the market valuations of bank’s stock price (e.g., Armstrong et al., 
2010; Elshandidy, 2016; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In other words, by improving risk disclosures, investors’ uncertainty might 
be reduced regarding risk management in riskier firms like banks, which will be reflected on 
banks better evaluation.  
Signalling theory also predicts that banks use risk disclosures as signals to prospective 
investors to make better valuation judgements related to those banks (e.g., Bergh et al., 2014; 
Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 2002). Specifically, investors may perceive enhanced risk 
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disclosure as a signal to distinguish a bank with higher risk management quality from their 
counterparts and, consequently, affect the bank’s value (Bergh et al., 2014; Certo, 2003; 
Ntim et al., 2013). Institutional theory argues that institutionally embedded pressures (i.e., 
coercive, normative, and/ or mimetic pressures) that influence the bank’s reaction to involve 
in risk disclosures activities to gain institutional legitimacy may have possible outcomes in 
terms of bank valuations (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b). Hence, the rationale behind risk disclosures informativeness is either 
guided by efficiency concerns (agency theory), or legitimization and signal underlying 
quality (i.e., signalling and legitimacy theories) to others. 
However, some of extant research argues that institutional environment may influence 
signals to be more (or less) observable due to the institutional setting quality (Bergh et al., 
2014; Connelly et al., 2011; Nguyen et al., 2015; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016; Wiseman et al., 
2012). In addition, other agency theorists argue that increased risk disclosures might be 
motivated by management opportunistic behaviour rather than efficiency hypothesis 
(Armstrong et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2010; Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; Filatotchev 
& Wright, 2011; Zona et al., 2015). 
Extant research on the relation between risk disclosures and market value reports 
inconsistent results. A number of studies suggest that risk disclosures will be negatively 
related to firm value since such disclosed risk information is likely to be incorporated into 
investors’ decisions on shares prices (Kothari et al., 2009; Kravet & Muslu, 2013). 
Specifically, enhanced risk disclosures may offer unknown information and contingencies, 
thereby decreasing investors’ expectations of future performance and heightening risk 
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perceptions (Bao & Datta, 2014; Elshandidy, 2016; Kravet & Muslu, 2013). For instance, 
Elshandidy and Neri (2015) examine the informativeness of risk disclosures using a sample 
of 1,890 observations (1,450 from UK, and 440 from Italy) for the period of 2005 through 
2010. The results show that risk disclosures are related positively to investors’ risk 
perceptions (i.e., market liquidity); however, such relation depends on firm’s governance 
quality. Kothari et al. (2009) explore market reaction to risk disclosures in terms of good and 
bad news using a sample of 7,044 observations between 1962 and 2004. The findings 
demonstrate that risk disclosures are informative; however, investors’ risks perceptions (i.e., 
market reaction) are greater (lower) to bad (good) news disclosures. 
Moreover, Kothari et al. (2009) imply that insiders, generally, delays the bad news 
announcement to investors. Using a large sample of companies drawn from Q3/1994 through 
Q2/2007 MD&A disclosures of 8,219 unique USA companies, Feldman et al. (2010) find 
that management’s tone change are associated with window market reactions. These results 
show the incremental information content of management’s tone beyond earnings surprises 
and accruals nearly the SEC filings, suggesting that management’s tone changes increase 
investors’ risk perceptions. However, such relation depends on the firm’s information setting 
strength. 
However, other research shows that risk disclosures and firm value nexus is contingent 
on the risk disclosures types, tone, and time orientation. For example, Bao and Datta (2014) 
explore the impact of risk disclosures in 10-K forms on the investors risk perceptions using  
a sample of 7,679 observations (1,924 USA firms) over a period of five years from 2006 to 
2010. The results show that whereas the market does not incorporate two-thirds of risk 
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disclosures suggested, such risk information tends to be boiler-plate, and investors react to 
the other one-thirds of risk disclosures inconsistently.  
Elshandidy (2016) also examines whether investors incorporated risk disclosures in the 
stock price using a sample of 1,099 UK firm-year observations during a period from 2005 to 
2010. The results show that aggregate risk disclosures are not related to firm value (i.e., stock 
prices’ co-movements) whereas forward-looking (non-forward-looking) risk disclosures 
lead to increase (decrease) in firm value. Moreover, these results are contingent on firms’ 
riskiness and governance strength. Specifically, the findings show that less risky and strongly 
governed firms tend to disclose more useful risk disclosures than their counterparts. In 
addition, Kothari et al. (2009) explore whether the relationship between risk disclosures and 
capital market measures is contingent on risk disclosures tone, by using a sample of 889 
firms drawn from four sectors (i.e., financial services, technology, pharmaceutical, and 
telecommunications) over a period of six years from 1996 to 2001(5,350 Observations). The 
results show that favourable risk disclosures are related negatively with firm risk (i.e., stock 
return volatility, cost of capital, and analyst forecast diffusion) whereas unfavourable risk 
disclosures lead to increased firm risk. 
By contrast, other studies show that risk disclosures are considered boilerplate. For 
instance, using a sample of 172 banks drawn from 2005 to 2011 covering 25 countries, 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) find that risk disclosures are considered boiler-plate and are not 
related to bank value. Aryani (2016) also investigated the value relevance of risk disclosures 
using a sample of 413 Indonesian bank-year observations. The results suggest that risk 
disclosures are not significantly related to firm value.  
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On the other hand, a number of studies demonstrate that risk disclosures are positively 
related to firm value since such disclosed risk information is likely to signal bank 
management performance to investors, which may affect share prices positively. In 
particular, such disclosed risk information reduces information asymmetry and increases 
bank value. For instance, Campbell et al. (2014) examine the informativeness of risk 
disclosures of the annual report using a sample of 9,076 observations for the period of 2005 
through 2008 from all Compustat firms. The results show that risk disclosures are related 
positively to systematic and idiosyncratic risks and are related positively also with 
information symmetry and firm value.  
In fact, Campbell et al. (2014) argue that risk disclosures are not boilerplate, and are 
informative to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investors. Using a sample of 
222 firms drawn from Q2/1997 through Q1/1998 in USA context, Linsmeier et al. (2002) 
also find that market risk disclosures are related positively with information symmetry and 
firm value. In addition, Miihkinen (2013) and Rajgopal (1999) argue that risk disclosures 
mitigate information asymmetry, suggesting that risk disclosures increase firm value. 
Moumen et al. (2015) explore market reaction (i.e., future earnings change) to risk 
disclosures (i.e., operations, empowerment, information technology, integrity, and strategic 
risks) using a sample of  809 observations of listed non-financial firms between 2007 and 
2012 in 9 MENA countries. The findings demonstrate that risk disclosures are informative, 
suggesting that risk disclosures enhance investors’ risk perceptions; however, these results 
are depending on proprietary costs, regulation environments, and corporate governance 
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mechanisms. I conjecture that investors may, hence, demand better risk disclosure to increase 
market valuation. Thus, I hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with better risk disclosure 
practices will have a relatively better market valuation. 
3.2 The Nature of the Bank-level Governance – Bank Value 
Relationship 
Extant research (e.g., Adams & Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; 
Black et al., 2015; Busta et al., 2014; Enikolopov et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; 
Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015) has suggested a number of bank-level 
governance which can influence market valuation; however, their results are inconclusive. 
Therefore, the study discusses how Islamic governance affects market valuation; secondly, 
it investigates how board structure influences market valuation; thirdly, it examines how 
ownership concentration drives market valuation. 
3.2.1 Islamic Governance – Bank Value Relationship 
The presence of Islamic banking is grounded on Sharia and religion compliance. I 
conjecture that investors’ behaviour embedded in such a bank may different than they would 
in conventional banks. More precisely, I expect that the nature of religiosity–organizational 
performance relationships proposed will affect market valuation of such banks. For example, 
in line with agency theory, one could create an argument that an Islamic bank that embraces 
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the Sharia (religious) may mitigate information asymmetry, which is a critical concern in 
determining how to evaluate banks’ share prices.  
Signalling theory also predicts that conveying effective Sharia compliance related to 
risks reduces asymmetric information between management and investors. By conveying 
significant Sharia compliance information to investors, management signals the underlying 
unobservable excellence about intentions and abilities of banks which may influence 
decision-making in the stock market (Connelly et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013; Spence, 2002; 
Zhang & Wiersema, 2009).  
Arguably, the unique convergences of formal and informal MENA institutions may 
affect investors’ perceptions of the bank’s legitimacy in the capital markets. Specifically, at 
the bank level, Sharia principles translate, for example, into an additional governance 
structure that includes a Sharia Supervisory Board to ensure that all bank activities are 
compliance with Sharia principles and rules, which result in mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Filatotchev et al., 2016; Mollaha et al., 2015; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b). At the national level, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) creates coercive pressures that increase legitimacy 
by complying with AAOIFI standards that lead to coercive isomorphism (Abedifar et al., 
2013; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Iannotta et al., 2015).  
MENA context also gives rise to a unique institutional environment pressure resulting 
from mutual values, professionalization, societal and moral responsibilities that are grounded 
on Islamic values, which create normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Judge 
et al., 2010). The earlier hypothesised isomorphism argued that the bank’s reaction to be 
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involved in Islamic governance to gain institutional legitimacy might have possible outcomes 
in terms of bank valuations. 
Empirically, a number of studies have examined Islamic governance in the banking 
sector; however, the mainstream of them are indirect, qualitative, and sparse (Abedifar et al., 
2013; Ayedh & Echchabi, 2015; Chapra & Ahmed, 2002; Grassa, 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Hasan, 2011; Hasan & bin Hasan, 2012; Rammal, 2006). For example, Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2007) explore the ethical identity of Islamic banks that are grounded on Sharia using 
content analysis of 7 Islamic banks’ annual reports over the period from 2002–2004 in GCC 
region. The results demonstrate that Islamic banks suffer from expectations gap regarding 
Sharia disclosure. However, a few number of studies have explored the impact of Islamic 
governance in the banking sector quantitatively (Abdullah et al., 2015; AI-Bassam & Ntim, 
2016; Elghuweel et al.,  2016; Mallin et al., 2014). 
Mallin et al. (2014) investigate the influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on 
firm performance using a sample of 180 observations (90 Islamic banks) over the period of 
2010 to 2011 in 13 countries. The findings demonstrate that Islamic governance in terms of 
Sharia supervisory board size is related positively to financial performance, suggesting that 
Islamic governance enhances bank performance. Grassa (2015) examines the 
informativeness of Islamic governance from debt market view using a sample of 43 Islamic 
banks over the period of 2005 to 2011 in 13 countries. The results show that Islamic 
governance in terms of Sharia supervisory board expertise is related positively to credit 
ratings; however, it finds that Sharia supervisory board expertise is related negatively to 
credit ratings.  
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Mollah and Zaman (2015) examine the effect of Islamic governance on bank 
performance and value using a sample of 86 Islamic banks (427 firm-year observations) over 
the period of 2005–2011 in 25 countries. The results indicate that Islamic governance in 
terms of Sharia supervisory board size is associated positively to financial performance if it 
does a supervisory role; however, it finds that Sharia supervisory board size is associated 
negatively to financial performance if it plays an advisory role. Moreover, Mollah and Zaman 
(2015) conclude that Islamic governance is related positively to bank valuation in terms of 
Tobin’s Q but statistically insignificant. 
I conjecture that banks may have disclosures incentives for their Sharia monitoring 
effort to gain institutional legitimatization for their operations and consequently increase 
bank value. Hence, I hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with better Islamic governance 
will have a relatively better market valuation. 
3.2.2 Board of Directors – Bank Value Relationship 
While several theories exist on whether board of directors’ structure (e.g., board size, 
CEO power, and board independence) is beneficial to banks, competing viewpoints using 
agency, signal, and institutional perspective can help provide insight as to why banks may 
choose to change the board of directors’ structure. These viewpoints argue that board of 
directors are designed to constrain managerial opportunism. Agency theory argues that board 
of directors structure (e.g., board size, CEO power, and board independence) may reduce 
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asymmetric information and agency problems between contracting parties; consequently, it 
can similarly improve the market valuations of bank’s stock price (e.g., Armstrong et al., 
2010; Elshandidy, 2016; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Ntim et al., 2015a, 
2015c; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
In other words, by improving board of directors structure (e.g., bigger board size, less 
CEO power, and more board independence), investors may respond favourably when making 
a valuation for banks. An alternative viewpoint using agency theory debates that smaller 
board may enhance monitoring and reduce agency conflict (Jensen, 1993). In particular, a 
smaller board may enhance coordination and communication that may lead to more 
effectiveness.  
From a signalling perspective, banks may use improved board of directors structure 
(e.g., bigger board size, less CEO power, and more board independence) as a signal of bank 
quality to prospective investors to make better valuation judgements related to those banks 
(e.g., Bergh et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Soobaroyen & 
Ntim, 2013a, 2013b; Spence, 2002). Specifically, investors may perceive improved board of 
directors structure (e.g., bigger board size, less CEO power, and more board independence) 
as a signal to distinguish a bank with higher agency problems from their counterparts and, 
consequently, affect the bank value (Bergh et al., 2014; Certo, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012a, 
2012b; Ntim et al., 2013).  
Hence, investors see improved board of directors structure not only as an indication of 
better management oversight but also as a clue of the access they offer banks with more 
avenues of connecting with outside environment. Institutional theory argues that banks 
 251 
 
improve board of directors structure (e.g., bigger board size, less CEO power, and more 
board independence) to gain institutional legitimacy that may have possible outcomes in 
terms of bank valuations (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2012b, 2012c; Ntim et 
al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). Hence, governance extant research shows that 
investors’ perceptions of board of directors structure is incorporated in the institutional 
perspective on capital markets within which investors make critical evaluations toward 
practice adoption (Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). 
There is an extensive body of extant research examining the issue of board size and bank 
value (e.g., Abdullah et al., 2016; Bertoni et al., 2014; De Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Nguyen 
et al., 2015). Remarkably, this research is astonishingly inclusive. A number of studies 
suggest that board size will be positively associated with bank value since such larger boards 
are likely to incorporate it into investors’ decisions on shares prices (Adams & Mehran, 2012; 
Aebi et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2012). Specifically, 
larger boards may offer additional strategic capabilities and monitoring that enhance bank 
performance, thereby decreasing investors’ risk perception of future performance, which 
may affect shares prices positively.  
For instance, García-Meca et al. (2015) examine the impact of board size using a sample 
of 159 banks in nine developed countries for the period of 2004 through 2010. The findings 
show that board size is associated positively to bank value (i.e., Tobin’s Q). Bell et al. (2014) 
investigate market reaction to governance mechanisms using a sample of  198 IPOs in the 
USA between 1996 and 2006. The findings demonstrate that board size is informative; 
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however, investors’ risks perceptions (i.e., market reaction) are conditional on the power of 
banks’ home country regulation and institutions. 
However, other studies show that board size is not related to bank value (Abdullah et 
al., 2016; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Connelly et al.,  2012; Elsayed, 2007; Elyasiani & Zhang, 
2015; Erkens et al., 2012; Hagendorff et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015). 
For instance, using a sample of 116 USA banks drawn from 2001 to 2010, Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015) find that board size-bank value relationship is statistically insignificant. Erkens 
et al. (2012) also investigated the impact of board size on bank value using a sample of 296 
financial firms from 30 countries. The results suggest that board size is not related 
statistically to bank value.  
By contrast, other studies show that board size is statistically significant and negatively 
related to bank value (Bertoni et al., 2014; Busta et al., 2014; Chi & Lee, 2010; Dahya et al., 
2008; Liang et al., 2013; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015; Masulis et al., 2012; Pathan & Faff, 
2013). For instance, using a sample of 23 USA banks drawn from 2000 to 2012, Mamatzakis 
and Bermpei (2015) find that board size is statistically significant and negatively related to 
bank value. Busta et al. (2014) also investigated the impact of board size on bank value using 
a sample of 358 European banks. The results suggest that board size is statistically significant 
and negatively related to bank value.  
However, other research shows that board size and bank value nexus is concave (De 
Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Grove et al.,  2011). For example, De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) investigated the impact of board size on bank value using a sample of 69 financial 
firms from 6 countries. The results suggest that board size has an inverted U-shaped 
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relationship with bank value. García-Meca et al. (2015) indicate that cross-country studies 
should incorporate the effect of different regulatory environment (e.g., investor protection) 
quality, which may determine CG mechanisms informativeness. 
Similarly, an extensive body of the research argues and shows that the presence of CEO 
power impacts negatively on bank value (Bertoni et al., 2014; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; 
Erkens et al., 2012; García-Meca et al., 2015; Grove et al., 2011; Masulis et al., 2012; Pathan 
& Faff, 2013). For example, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) report a negative effect of CEO 
duality on bank value. Using a sample of 236 USA banks, Grove et al. (2011) find that CEO 
duality is statistically significant and negatively related to bank value. These results show 
that CEO duality increases CEO power and decrease management monitoring which may 
lead to increased agency problems that may influence bank valuation.  
However, other literature argues and shows that the presence of CEO duality do not 
impact bank value (Aebi et al., 2012; Elsayed, 2007; Hagendorff et al., 2010; Liang et al., 
2013; Liu et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015). For example, Hagendorff 
et al. (2010) examine the impact of CEO duality on the bank M&A announcement returns 
across different regulatory environments. The results show an insignificant relationship 
between CEO duality and bank value. On the other hand, the results of few studies report a 
positive relation between CEO duality and bank value (Bell et al., 2014; Mamatzakis & 
Bermpei, 2015). For instance, Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015) argue that CEO duality 
enhances bank value using a sample of 23 USA banks over the 2000-2012 period. 
Similarly, a significant body of research in accounting and management examine the 
impact of board independence on investors’ perceptions of bank value (e.g., Bell et al., 2014; 
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Bertoni et al., 2014; Black et al., 2015; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Dahya et al., 2008; Elbadry 
et al., 2015; García-Meca et al., 2015; Hagendorff et al., 2010; Owusu, 2012;  Liang et al., 
2013; Minton et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ntim, 2007, 2009; & 2011). However, 
empirical results on the relationship between board independence and bank value are 
inconclusive.  
Extant research strongly indicates that board independence is positively related to bank 
value since such increase in independence of the boards are likely to be incorporated into 
investors’ decisions on share prices (Bell et al., 2014; Bertoni et al., 2014; Black et al., 2015; 
Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Dahya et al., 2008; Elbadry et al. 2015; García-Meca et al., 2015; 
Hagendorff et al., 2010; Liang et al., 2013; Minton et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015). 
Specifically, these results argue that independent boards enhance monitoring effectiveness, 
and are likely to be more sensitive to bank performance and value. For example, using a 
sample of 292 USA banks over the period of 2003 to 2008, Minton et al. (2014) find a 
positive relationship between board independence and bank value. In China context, Liang 
et al. (2013) find that board independence is a key mechanism to enhance monitor and advise 
executives, which positively impacts bank value. 
However, other research argues and shows that the board independence do not impact 
bank value (Abdullah et al., 2016; Adams & Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Connelly et 
al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015; Masulis et al., 2012; Nguyen et 
al., 2015). For instance, Aebi et al. (2012) investigate the impact of board independence on 
bank value during 2007/2008 financial crisis using 372 USA banks. The results show that 
board independence does not statistically impact on bank value. By contrast, extant research 
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debates and shows that board independence is positively related to bank value (Bruton et al., 
2010; Chi & Lee, 2010; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Erkens et al., 2012; Pathan & Faff, 2013). 
Thus, I hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with a better board of directors 
structure (i.e., board size, CEO power, and board independence) will have a relatively better 
market valuation. 
H3a. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with a bigger board size will have a 
relatively better market valuation. 
H3b. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with less CEO power will have a relatively 
better market valuation. 
H3c. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with a better board independence will have 
a relatively better market valuation. 
3.2.3 Ownership Structure – Bank Value Relationship 
Although board of directors shape and control their banks’ strategic agenda, main 
shareholders, such as government owners, often exert control over management, which 
indirectly affects the supervision effectiveness, and hence may affect bank value (Neubaum 
& Zahra, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a, 2012c; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). From 
agency theory perspective, ownership concentration (e.g., block, governmental, and foreign 
ownership) may constrain managerial opportunism and agency problems between 
contracting parties; consequently, it can similarly improve the market valuations of bank’s 
stock price (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a, 2012c; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-
Soler, 2014).  
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An opposite viewpoint using agency theory debates that ownership concentration may 
have a negative impact on bank value because main shareholders may divert bank resources 
for either their own benefits, particularly in weak governance environments for minority 
shareholders, or political and social goals (Li et al., 2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). From a 
signalling perspective, ownership concentration by foreigner or/ and governments may use 
improved performance and efficiency as signals of bank quality for prospective investors to 
make better valuation judgments related to those banks (Bertoni et al., 2014; Borisova et al., 
2012; Ntim et al., 2012a, 2012b). Specifically, investors may perceive foreigner or/ and 
government ownership as a signal to distinguish a bank with higher efficiency from their 
counterparts and, consequently, affect the bank value (Bergh et al., 2014; Certo, 2003; Ntim 
et al., 2013).  
In addition, investors see government ownership as a clue of the access they offer banks 
with more avenues of connecting with outside environment. Institutional theory argues that 
main shareholders especially foreign shareholders are constrained by many pressures to gain 
institutional legitimacy that may have possible outcomes in terms of bank valuations (e.g., 
Boyd & Solarino, 2016; Filatotchev et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013b).  
Extant research has yielded inconsistent results on the effect of block ownership on bank 
value (e.g., Bell et al., 2014; Black et al., 2015; Busta et al., 2014; Lozano et al., 2016). One 
strand of the previous studies shows that more ownership concentration is related to higher 
market valuation (Bell et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; Lozano et al., 2016). For 
instance, and using 198 IPOs in the USA, Bell et al. (2014) find a positive relationship 
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between block ownership and market valuation. García-Meca et al. (2015) also report a 
positive association between block ownership and market value using a sample of 159 banks 
in nine countries.  
The second strand of the prior studies reports that more ownership concentration is 
related to lower market valuation (Busta et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2013; Maury & Pajuste, 
2005). For example, Busta et al. (2014) examine the association between ownership 
concentration and market valuation for a sample of 358 European banks over a period of 
1993–2005. Their results show a negative association between block ownership and market 
valuation, implying that the presence of main shareholders may divert bank resources for 
their own benefits, which can negatively influence market valuation.  
The third stream of extant studies (Black et al., 2015; Chi & Lee, 2010; Grove et al., 
2011; Maury, 2006;  Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b) shows that block ownership has no effect 
on market valuation. For example, and using a sample of 104 Korean firms, Black et al. 
(2015) report no significant relationship between block ownership and market valuation. 
Furthermore, studies such as those of Liu et al. (2012), and Lozano et al. (2016) have 
confirmed a U-shaped relation between block ownership and market valuation. 
Similarly, the results of extensive empirical studies of the government ownership– bank 
value relationship are inconclusive. A number of studies (Cheng et al., 2013; Iannotta et al., 
2013; Liang et al., 2013; Lin & Zhang, 2009; Micco et al., 2007; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) 
show that less government ownership is related to higher market valuation. Their results 
show that government shareholders may either divert bank resources for political and socio-
economic goals or increase information asymmetry and bureaucracy, which leads to poor 
 258 
 
market valuation. For example, Liang et al. (2013) report a negative relationship between 
government ownership and market valuation, using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks 
over the period of 2003–2010.  
By contrast, other studies document a positive relationship between government 
ownership and market valuation (Bell et al., 2014; Beuselinck et al., 2015; Du & Boateng, 
2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b). Their results show that government shareholders may 
have economic and political advantages of special treatment, fewer financial constraints, and 
access to resources, which are likely to be incorporated in stock prices. Finally, other 
researchers (Berger et al., 2010; Hovey et al., 2003; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000) find no 
relation between government ownership and market valuation. 
Research also suggests contradictory results on the effect of foreign ownership on bank 
value (Bell et al., 2014; Black et al., 2015; Li et al., 2014; Liang et al., 2013; Lin & Zhang, 
2009; Micco et al., 2007). A number of studies show that more foreign ownership is related 
to higher market valuation (Bell et al., 2014; Berger et al., 2010; Black et al., 2015; Choi & 
Hasan, 2005; He et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2013; Lensink et al., 2008; Lin & Zhang, 2009; 
Micco et al., 2007). Their results show that foreign shareholders often exert more control 
over management, which affects market valuation. By contrast, other researchers indicate 
that foreign ownership is related negatively with market valuation (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 1999; Lensink et al., 2008; Lensink & Naaborg, 2007; Li et al. (2014); Liang et 
al., 2013). However, Cornett et al. (2010) suggest no relationship between foreign ownership 
and market valuation. Thus, I hypothesise that: 
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Hypothesis 4. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with ownership concentration 
(i.e., block ownership, government ownership, and foreign ownership) will have a relatively 
better market valuation. 
H4a. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with block ownership will have a relatively 
better market valuation. 
H4b. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with government ownership will have a 
relatively better market valuation. 
H4c. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks with foreign ownership will have a 
relatively better market valuation. 
3.3 The Nature of the Country-level Governance – Bank 
Value Relationship 
Institutional theory suggests that relationship among risk disclosures, bank-level 
governance, and market valuation is contingent on national governance quality (NGQM). In 
particular, this relationship may be affected by the country’s culture, politics, corruption, 
regulation and barriers (Nguyen et al., 2015). A considerable and growing amount of 
research on disclosure and corporate governance has emphasized how NGQM differences 
produce differences in risk disclosures, bank-level governance, and market valuation 
relationship across countries (e.g., García-Castro et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015).  
For instance, Abdioglu et al., (2013), Aggarwal et al., (2011), Cumming et al., (2014), 
La Porta et al., (1997, 2000), Leuz et al., (2010) argue that CG structure has more effects on 
firm valuation in countries with stronger legal protection. They document that companies 
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that have good CG structure may benefit more from the national capital markets if it is 
located in a country with strong governance quality.  
More specifically, Cumming et al. (2014) offer four possible benefits for NGQM, which 
may affect the bank valuations. First, firms comply with stringent regulation (e.g., CG and 
disclosure) in strongly governed countries. Second, firms in strongly governed countries are 
perceived as less risky, have better disclosure quality, and greater liquidity. Third, firms in 
strongly governed countries tend to have better investment and growth opportunities. Fourth, 
firms in strongly governed countries tend to have better access to capital and project 
financing, while firms in weakly governed countries are more subjected to political and 
sovereign risks. This suggests that banks from strongly governed countries may get higher 
market valuations than those from weakly governed countries.  
Additionally, extant research (Abdioglu et al., 2013; Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; 
Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013a; Nguyen et al., 2015; Schiehll et al., 2014; Yoshikawa et al.,  
2014) theorizes on how country-level governance is a substitute or a complement to bank-
level governance features that affect managerial discretion, and consequently, market 
valuation. This study combines agency, signal, and institutional theory, noting that multi-
level governance works as monitors or as legitimation providers, and show how banks that 
combine country-level governance with bank-level governance may get higher market 
valuations. 
The extant research mostly examines the effect of bank-level governance on market 
valuation, without considering the effect of country-level governance that may lead to 
variations in the bank-level governance effectiveness. Using a sample of 1,064 firm-year 
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observations from 14 EU countries between 1999 and 2003, Renders and Gaeremynck 
(2012) find that country-level governance is positively improving firm value. Using a sample 
of 1334 cross-listed firms from 48 countries over the period of 1996-2008, Cumming et al. 
(2014) report a significantly positive relationship between national governance quality and 
market valuation.  
Lau et al. (2015) examine the relationship between country-level governance and market 
responses to earnings announcements using a sample of 15,418 firm-year observations from 
23 developed markets between 2002 and 2006. The results show a positive association 
between country-level governance and market responses to earnings announcements 
especially in strongly governed countries compared with those in weakly governed countries. 
By contrast, Narayan et al. (2015) show a positive association between country-level 
governance and stock market returns especially in weakly governed countries. Abdi and 
Aulakh (2012), Boulton. (2010), Dahya et al. (2008), Francis et al. (2012); Ghoul (2016), 
and Nguyen et al. (2015) also argue that country-level governance affects market valuation 
positively especially in weakly governed countries. 
Hypothesis 5. Ceteris paribus, the value of those banks operate in strongly governed 
countries (i.e., national governance quality) will have a relatively better market valuation. 
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4. Data and Research Methodology 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 
In this study, I target a sample of all listed commercial, Islamic, and dual banks over the 
period of 2006-2013 in the Arab MENA region. These countries share a number of socio-
economic, regulations, and structures with respect to CG and disclosure. This study began in 
2006 since the mandatory adoption of IFRS and Basel II took effect from mid-2005, and data 
before 2006 in the vast majority of the sample is unavailable. The sample ends in 2013 
because it is the latest available year for collecting data at the time this essay was done.  
Table 32 Sample structure 
Country Banks CBs obs IBs obs DBs obs All Banks obs Percentage 
Bahrain 11 16 44 24 84 11.17% 
Egypt 11 40 13 20 73 9.71% 
Iraq 2 16 0 0 16 2.13% 
Jordan 12 75 13 3 91 12.10% 
Kuwait 10 35 36 5 76 10.11% 
Lebanon 6 28 0 16 44 5.85% 
Morocco 1 8 0 0 8 1.06% 
Oman 5 34 0 5 39 5.19% 
Palestine 1 8 0 0 8 1.06% 
Qatar 8 11 24 28 63 8.38% 
Saudi Arabia 11 0 21 63 84 11.17% 
Syria 2 8 6 0 14 1.86% 
Tunisia 2 9 0 0 9 1.20% 
UAE 18 39 32 72 143 19.02% 
Sum 100 327 189 236 752 100.00% 
 263 
 
The sample includes all listed commercial, Islamic, and dual banks that are included in 
the Bankscope database as shown in Table 32, from 2006 to 2013, covering pre-, during- and 
post-2007/2008 banking crisis period. After excluding banks that contained missing annual 
reports, a total of 100 banks from 14 MENA countries remained in the sample. Table 32 
shows the sample distribution by country of the sample banks. Although the sample only 
contains nearly 76 per cent of the listed banks in Arab MENA countries, the sample covers 
roughly 95 per cent of the market capitalization of these countries.  
The final sample is an unbalanced panel dataset composed of 752 bank-year 
observations of 100 banks ranging from 2006 to 2013 located in 14 MENA countries namely, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and United Arab of Emirates (UAE). 
I collected the data from three different sources. Firstly, I collected risk disclosures and 
governance variables from annual reports that I obtained mainly from the Perfect 
Information database and banks’ websites. Secondly, financial data was obtained from 
Bankscope database. Finally, national macro statistics and national governance quality 
(NGQM) was obtained from World Bank databases. 
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4.2 Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
These study variables were categorised into five main categories and Table 33 presents 
the full definitions of all variables utilized in this study. First, to examine H1 to H4, the 
dependent variable is bank value measured by Tobin’s Q (TOQ) following extant research 
(Abdullah et al., 2016; Ghoul et al., 2016; Lozano et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ntim et 
al., 2012b; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
Second, I gathered data on the RMDPI scores, which seek to measure the risk disclosures 
level. The extant research employs three measurements of disclosure level. Specifically, 
prior literature use ratings from third-party research companies (e.g., Botosan & Plumlee, 
2002; Bushman et al., 2004; Doidge et al., 2007), the manual content analysis (AI-Bassam 
& Ntim, 2016; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Al-Hadi et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2013), and the computerized content analysis (Bao & 
Datta, 2014; Elshandidy, 2016; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; 
Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kothari et al., 2009; Kravet & Muslu, 2013).  
Despite the high validity and less effort of the computerized content analysis (Bao & 
Datta, 2014; Kravet & Muslu, 2013),  Barakat and Hussainey (2013),  Ntim et al. (2013) 
argue that the manual content analysis may fairly capture the disclosure level of every 
category of risk disclosure compared with the computerized content analysis. Also, they 
indicate that the computerized content analysis may not capture the true disclosure 
compliance level if banks concentrate on comprehensive disclosure of some risk items or 
categories while they ignore and/or do not fairly disclose other risk items or categories. In 
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addition, third-party disclosure data in MENA countries is limited and/ or not available for 
the latest years.  
In accordance with the above-mentioned specifications, the coding procedure of scoring 
for the un-weighted index is 0 if risk item is not disclosed by a bank or 1 if risk item is 
disclosed by a bank. In additional tests, this study also employs the weighted risk disclosures 
index to confirm the results reliability. The coding procedure of scoring for the weighted 
index is 0 if risk item is not disclosed by a bank, 1 if risk item contains the past, future, good, 
bad and/or qualitative information, or 2 if risk item contains the past, future, good, bad, 
qualitative and/or quantitative information. 
This essay measured risk disclosures (RMDPs) variable using self-constructed risk 
disclosures index (RMDPI) based on several sources. Principally, this study uses the Basel 
II guidelines, IFRS 7 and other RMDPs items that are employed in closely related studies 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ford et al., 2009; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Hence, RMDPI score ranging from 0 to 96 items is classified as follows: (a) bank financial 
risk disclosures practices, consisting of (I) credit (II) liquidity (III) market and (IV) capital 
risk disclosures practices; and (b) bank non-financial risk disclosures practices, consisting of 
(I) operational and (II) strategic risk disclosures practices.  
This study does not distinguish between voluntary and mandatory disclosure because I 
cannot reasonably discriminate between them due to the cross-country studies nature and 
differences between countries in compliance with IFRS and Basel regulations. This essay 
examined the reliability of risk disclosure index by Cronbach’s alpha test. Cronbach’s alpha 
is 83.50%, which is higher than the acceptable level in the social science of 70% (Deumes, 
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2008; Elshandidy, 2016). Cronbach’s alpha indicates that the inter-consistency between sub-
risk disclosure categories is high (Deumes, 2008; Elshandidy, 2016). Hence, risk disclosure 
index is reliable. 
Third, bank-level governance data contains Islamic governance (ISG), board size 
(BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence (BBID), block shareholdings (BSHR), 
government shareholdings (GSHR), and foreign shareholdings (FSHR). 
Table 33 Summary of definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions and coding. 
Panel A: Dependent variable: market value (TOQ). 
TOQ Bank value for each bank year is calculated based on the equity market value added to the 
book value of liabilities, all divided by the total assets book value. 
Panel B: independent variable (risk management and disclosure practices index). 
RMDPI The total risk disclosures score (RMDPI) is calculated based on the un-weighted (weighted) 
risk disclosures index and full scoring criteria are clarified in Appendices 1 and 2. 
Panel C: bank- level governance variables 
ISG  The total ISG characteristics score (ISG) is calculated based on ISG index which involving of 
7 items in addition to scoring criteria are; ISG Existence=1, if a bank has ISG board, 0 
otherwise.; ISG Report=1, if a bank has disclosed ISG report, 0 otherwise; Number of ISG 
Member=1, if a bank has disclosed number of ISG’ member, 0 otherwise; ISG Meetings=1, 
if a bank has disclosed number of ISG meetings, 0 otherwise; Experience=1, if if a bank 
discloses SSB experience, 0 otherwise; Independent=1, if ISG’ members are independent 
from management, 0 otherwise; Total ISG fees disclosed=1, if a bank discloses ISG fees, 0 
otherwise. 
BSHR Percentage of block ownership with at least 5% to total bank ordinary shareholdings. 
GSHR Percentage of government ownership with at least 5% to total bank ordinary shareholdings. 
FSHR Percentage of foreign ownership with at least 5% to the total bank ordinary shareholdings. 
BBSZ Board size for each bank year is calculated based on a number of board of directors. 
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Variables Definitions and coding. 
CEOP CEO power is calculated as 1 if CEO and board chairperson the same, 0 otherwise. 
BBID Board independence for each bank year is calculated based on the non-executive directors 
divided by the total number of board of directors. 
 
Panel D: country-level governance 
NGQM Country-level governance measured by national governance quality for each bank year, which 
is calculated as a composite measure for the overall NGQM, dimensions, which are Voice and 
accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), 
regulatory quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control of corruption quality (COCQ).  
Panel E: Control variables 
LNBS Bank size for each bank year is calculated based on natural log of the book value of total 
assets. 
BPR Profitability for each bank year is calculated based on return on assets (ROAA) which is net 
income divided by total asset. 
OPEF Operations efficiency for each bank year is calculated based on cost divided by income. 
BCAD Bank’s capital adequacy for each bank year is calculated based on capital divided by risk-
weighted asset. 
INFR Annual inflation for each bank year is consumer prices change (annual %). 
CGDP GDP per capita for each bank year is average income per individual (current US$). 
 Fourth, country-level governance measured by national governance quality (NGQM) 
employed the “Worldwide Governance Indicators” developed by the World Bank. Kaufmann 
et al. (2011) identify six dimensions of NGQM: the voice and accountability (VAQ), the 
political stability (PSQ), the government effectiveness (GEQ), the regulatory quality (RQM), 
the rule of law (ROLQ), and the control of corruption (COCQ). Correlation matrix in Table 
34 shows that there are high inter-correlations among NGQM dimensions which are 
consistent with prior studies (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Chang et al., 2012).  
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Table 34 Correlation matrix of the national governance quality’ dimensions 
Variable VAQ PSQ GEQ RQM ROLQ COCQ 
VAQ 1.000      
PSQ 0.131 1.000     
GEQ 0.142 0.821 1.000    
RQM 0.164 0.688 0.887 1.000   
ROLQ 0.152 0.855 0.799 0.821 1.000  
COCQ 0.151 0.871 0.939 0.822 0.854 1.000 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality measurement (NGQM) correlation 
matrix. The six dimensions of national governance quality measurement (NGQM) are defined as follows: Voice 
and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), regulatory 
quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control of corruption quality (COCQ).  
Therefore, and following extant research (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Nguyen 
et al., 2015; Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), this study conducted the 
principal component analysis (PCA) to create a composite measure for the overall NGQM 
dimensions. Table 35 shows the PCA (eigenvectors) and diagnostics of NGQM dimensions. 
The overall KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin), which was employed to measure sampling 
adequacy (MSAD), is 0.741. This result is higher than the recommended PCA minimum of 
0.50 (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016).  
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Table 35 PCA (eigenvectors) and diagnostics of the national governance quality’ 
dimensions 
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained KMO 
VAQ 0.097 0.995 0.030 -0.021 0.001 -0.010 0 0.919 
PSQ 0.433 -0.063 0.658 -0.107 0.578 0.174 0 0.790 
GEQ 0.456 -0.054 -0.262 -0.486 0.069 -0.692 0 0.697 
RQM 0.432 -0.013 -0.671 0.278 0.374 0.382 0 0.694 
ROLQ 0.443 -0.038 0.210 0.730 -0.340 -0.332 0 0.718 
COCQ 0.460 -0.049 0.063 -0.377 -0.637 0.484 0 0.815 
Eigenvalue 4.377 0.969 0.332 0.209 0.081 0.031   
Proportion 0.730 0.161 0.055 0.035 0.014 0.005   
KMO        0.741 
Notes: This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) PCA 
(eigenvectors). The six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQM) are defined as 
follows: Voice and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), 
regulatory quality (RQM), rule of law quality (ROLQ), control of corruption quality (COCQ). Also Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) is a measure of sampling adequacy (MSAD). 
 
Finally, this study included a wide range of bank characteristics as control variables that 
have repeatedly been recognized to influence bank value. These include bank size (LNBS), 
profitability (BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), as well as 
macro-economic variables such as annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita 
(CGDP). We do not expand direct theoretic relations between these control variables and 
RMDPI for brevity, but there are wide prior studies that find they can affect bank value (e.g., 
Abdullah et al., 2016; Aryani, 2016; Bell et al., 2014; Black et al., 2015; Cahan et al., 2015; 
Cheng et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 2016; Lozano et al., 2016; Moumen et al., 2015). 
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This essay uses fixed effects regression analysis (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2015; Ntim et 
al., 2013; Wang & Hussainey, 2013) to investigate the impact of risk disclosures and multi-
level governance on bank value in MENA banks. Therefore, the following fixed effects 
regression equation was estimated: 
∑∑
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(10) 
where: 
TOQ is a proxy of bank value measured by Tobin’s Q for bank i during year t. RMDPI 
is a proxy of risk disclosures level. BLG refers bank-level governance, which contains 
Islamic governance (ISG), board size (BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence 
(BBID), block shareholdings (BSHR), government shareholdings (GSHR), and foreign 
shareholdings (FSHR). NGQM refers to country-level governance measured by a composite 
measure of national governance quality. CONTROLS refers to bank size (LNBS), profitability 
(BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFR), 
and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). δ  is the bank-year specific fixed-effects, and ε is the 
error term.  
The main model defined in equation (10) is a standard panel data regression model that 
may possibly be estimated by pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects models. Pooled 
OLS assumes continuous variance and uncorrelated observations. To choose pooled OLS or 
the random effects and fixed effects, I used Breusch and Pagan test to decide the presence of 
the heterogeneity. The empirical results find that there are unobserved variables. Thus, 
pooled OLS estimator, arguably, is inconsistent and biased. At that point, to decide whether 
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random effects or fixed effects will be employed, the Hausman specification test was used 
to choose the best model that yield more consistency and efficiency of the estimators. I chose 
fixed-effects regression model rather than random-effects regression model because the 
Hausman favoured fixed-effects over random effects. 
This study reports the empirical analyses, covering the descriptive statistics, correlation, 
and multivariate in the following sections. 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analyses 
Table 36 presents descriptive statistics for the main indices i.e., the un-weighted risk 
disclosures index (RMDPI), the weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI), national 
governance quality (NGQM), and Islamic governance (ISG) for the full dataset, as well as 
for each of the 8 bank-years examined, respectively. On average, the distribution of the 
RMDPI differs considerably, ranging from 1.04 per cent (1 out of 96 items disclosed) to 
87.50 per cent (84 out of 96) with the mean (median) of 54.78 (60.00) per cent. These results 
are consistent with Bischof et al., (2016).  
In addition, Table 36 reports that RMDPI improves over time. For instance, RMDPI 
mean is improved steadily from 35.02 per cent in 2006 to 61.90 per cent in 2013. The steady 
improvement in RMDPI suggests that the implementation of Basel II from 2006 and CG 
codes have improved RMDPs among banks. This reflects the importance given to RMDPs 
and national governance, particularly during and after the 2007/08 crunch (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, the distribution of the W-
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RMDPI shows a similar pattern to RMDPI distribution. By contrast, the distribution of the 
NGQM fluctuates substantively, as it ranges from -7.42 to 3.50 with the mean of 0.00. In 
addition, Table 36 reports that NGQM has been fluctuating over time.  
Table 36 Summary statistics for RMDPI, W-RMDPI, NGQM, and ISG for all 752-
bank years 
 All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Independent The un-weighted risk disclosures index (RMDPI)  
Mean   54.78  35.95  49.77  54.55  57.44  61.24  61.55   62.51  63.60 
STD   16.36  13.58  15.73  15.52  15.39  10.44  10.58   10.69    9.65 
Min     1.00    6.00    6.00    1.00    7.00  25.00  24.00   19.00  19.00 
Max   84.00  77.00  80.00  80.00  80.00  80.00  78.00   84.00  84.00 
Panel B: Independent The weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI)  
Mean   79.95  44.99  69.99  78.22  82.06  88.10  88.60   90.49  91.66 
STD   24.16  20.22  24.97  24.12  24.65  15.19  15.00   15.49  14.48 
Min     2.00    7.00    7.00    2.00    7.00  28.00  27.00   19.00  19.00 
Max 135.00 106.0 128.0 128.0 130.0 126.0 118.0 135.00 135.0 
Panel C: Independent national governance quality (NGQM)  
Mean 0.00 -0.03 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.06 -0.21 -0.19 -0.20 
STD 2.09 2.05 1.98 2.00 2.01 1.85 2.02 2.29 2.46 
Min -7.42 -7.42 -7.26 -6.62 -6.10 -6.00 -5.65 -6.35 -6.84 
Max 3.50 2.06 2.17 2.54 3.50 3.21 2.56 3.34 3.42 
Panel D: Independent Islamic governance (ISG) 
Mean    1.43    1.00    1.17    1.25    1.51 1.51    1.45 1.51    1.67 
STD    1.87    1.60    1.77    1.81    1.94 1.96    1.94 2.01    2.12 
Min    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00    0.00 
Max    7.00    6.00    7.00    7.00    7.00 7.00    7.00 7.00    7.00 
Notes: This table present summary of descriptive statistics of compliance levels with un-weighted 
risk disclosures index (RMDPI), weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI), national governance 
quality (NGQM), in addition to Islamic governance (ISG) in the full sample and each year 
separately from 2006 to 2013. See Table 33 for the definitions of each variable. 
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Continuous fluctuations in NGQM reflect the nature of MENA context. In particular, 
MENA countries face considerable political instability and corruption as well as the impact 
of the 2007/08 crunch in MENA region (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Hasan & Dridi, 2010). 
Finally, a steady increase in ISG is also achieved which indicates the importance that banks 
place on compliance with Sharia. Bank communicates these with stakeholders to legitimate 
their operations, as shown in Table 36. However, the ISG composition and competence 
disclosure are still very low (mean is 1.43) which indicates that Sharia disclosure is not 
common in MENA banks due to disclosure adverse culture (Koldertsova, 2011; Samaha et 
al., 2012; World Bank, 2009).  
Table 37 shows summary statistics for all variables. For instance, bank value (TOQ) is 
between -9.83 per cent and 9.52 per cent, with a mean of 1.12 (median=1.02). This result 
indicates that market value of MENA banks is, on average, higher than their book value, 
which reflects the investors' outlooks about the strong capability of banks. Similar to the 
RMDPI, all the independent and control variables distributions generally show widespread 
variations. For instance, government shareholding (GSHR) varies substantially from 0.00 per 
cent to 95.15 per cent with a mean of 15.51.  
Board size (BBSZ) also ranges from 3.00 to 16.00 with a mean of 10 board members, 
with, on average, 79 per cent of those directors independent. These findings suggest that 
MENA banks tend to follow the CG reforms that highlight the importance of independent 
directors. In addition, these results are in line with prior related studies in the banking sector 
(e.g., Erkens et al., 2012; Hasan & Dridi, 2010; Ntim et al., 2015a, 2015b; Rosman et al., 
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2014). Lastly, the values of other variables reported in Table 37 suggest widespread 
variations in the sample, and hence decreasing potentials of any sample selection bias. 
Table 37 Summary statistics of all variables for all 752 observations 
Variables    N Mean STD Minimum  25 P Median 75 P Maximum 
TOQ 752 1.12 0.59 -9.83 0.94 1.02 1.11 9.52 
RMDPI  752 54.78 16.36 1.00 46.00 60.00 66.00 84.00 
W-RMDPI 752   79.95 24.16 2.00 68.00 85.00 96.00 135.00 
BSHR 752 54.57 26.56 0.00 37.24 57.49 73.02 100.90 
GSHR 752 15.51 20.85 0.00 0.00 6.77 21.90 95.15 
FSHR 752 22.01 29.18 0.00 0.00 6.65 40.00 98.50 
BBSZ 752 10.26 4.81 3.00 8.00 10.00 11.00 16.00 
CEOP 750 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BBID 752 0.79 0.22 0.00 0.75 0.90 1.00 1.00 
ISG 752    1.43    1.87 0.00 0.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 
NGQM 744 0.00 2.09 -7.42 -1.10 0.17 1.70 3.50 
LNBS 752 15.05 7.31 0.30 11.95 14.84 16.87 22.34 
BPR 751 0.02 0.05 -0.52 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.63 
OPEF 748 43.90 45.78 -365.63 28.99 39.20 51.71 312.40 
BCAD 707 20.25 14.39 9.26 14.41 17.24 21.81 204.41 
INFR 731 5.40 4.95 -10.10 2.00 4.00 9.30 53.20 
CGDP 732 23426.34 23200.92 5.00 3900.50 19250.90 38224.90 93714.10 
Notes: The table reports the values of minimum, 25 percentile, median, mean, standard deviation (STD), 75 percentile and 
the maximum range of the following variables: Tobin’s Q (TOQ), un-weighted risk disclosures index (RMDPI), weighted 
risk disclosures index (W- RMDPI), block shareholdings (BSHR), governmental shareholdings (GSHR), foreign shareholdings 
(FSHR), board size (BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence (BBID), Islamic governance (ISG), national 
governance quality (NGQM), bank size (LNBS), profitability (BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), 
annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 33 for the definitions of each variable. 
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Table 38 Correlation matrix for variables used for all 752 observations 
Variables TOQ RMDPI BSHR GSHR FSHR BBSZ CEOP BBID ISG NGQM LNBS BPR OPEF BCAD INFR CGDP 
TOQ   0.41** -0.02   0.10**  0.08*  0.43**  -0.22**  0.58**  0.39** 0.47**   0.01 -0.48**  0.00 -0.05  0.10**  0.12** 
RMDPI  0.44**   0.01   0.27** -0.01  0.34**  -0.16**  0.25**  0.30**   0.25**  0.50** -0.07 -0.12** -0.13** -0.36**  0.16** 
BSHR -0.03  0.01    0.18**  0.30**  0.03 - 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10** -0.04   0.12** -0.09*  0.00 -0.39** 
GSHR  0.13**  0.30**  0.13**  -0.20**  0.01  -0.17**   0.11**  0.09*   0.09*   0.35**  0.14** -0.24**   0.13** -0.14**  0.13** 
FSHR -0.02 -0.05  0.28** -0.26**   0.22** - 0.06   0.05  0.01   0.03 -0.11** -0.05   0.04 -0.09*  0.08* -0.34** 
BBSZ  0.40**   0.07  0.02   0.04  0.14**    0.13**   0.02 -0.06   0.38**   0.09* -0.02   0.05 -0.19**  0.00 -0.21** 
CEOP -0.33** -0.16** -0.04 -0.18** -0.11**  0.14**  - 0.45** -0.19**   0.23** -0.04 -0.09*   0.09* -0.04  0.12**  0.02 
BBID  0.62**   0.14** -0.03   0.15** -0.02 -0.05  -0.47**   0.12**   0.45**   0.04  0.02 - 0.07 -0.03 -0.16**  0.04 
ISG  0.35**   0.33** -0.08*   0.12** -0.10** -0.05  -0.21**   0.07*    0.47**   0.35**  0.00 - 0.09*   0.07 -0.21**  0.15** 
NGQM   0.47**   0.29** -0.17**   0.19** -0.18**   0.38**   0.22**   0.42**  0.58**    0.42**  0.02 - 0.38** -0.03 -0.05  0.14** 
LNBS  0.57**   0.55** -0.12**   0.33** -0.21**   0.10**  -0.01   0.13**  0.18**   0.44**   0.00 - 0.18** -0.11** -0.21**  0.22** 
BPR  0.02 -0.03 -0.23**   0.04 -0.29**   0.03  -0.02 - 0.04 -0.12**   0.15**   0.05  - 0.23**   0.09*  0.03  0.11** 
OPEF -0.50** -0.23**  0.14** - 0.13**  0.20** - 0.02   0.08* - 0.08*  0.03 -0.41** -0.41** -0.45**    0.16**  0.04 -0.23** 
BCAD  0.01 -0.06 -0.08*   0.02 -0.16** - 0.17**   0.02 - 0.12**  0.10**   0.05 -0.06  0.13** - 0.12**  -0.08*  0.00 
INFR -0.13** -0.34**  0.05 - 0.19**  0.15**   0.04 - 0.18** - 0.19** -0.25** -0.20** -0.20**  0.01   0.07 -0.25**   0.02 
CGDP  0.12**   0.23** -0.34**   0.18** -0.24** - 0.20**   0.08*   0.18**  0.30**   0.28**   0.33**  0.22** - 0.34**   0.02 -0.03  
Notes: This table reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients in upper right (lower left) half between the following variables: Tobin’s Q (TOQ), un-weighted risk disclosures 
index (RMDPI), block shareholdings (BSHR), governmental shareholdings (GSHR), foreign shareholdings (FSHR), board size (BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence 
(BBID), Islamic governance (ISG), national governance quality (NGQM), bank size (LNBS), profitability (BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual 
inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 33 for the definitions of each variable. 
**     Significant at the 1% level. 
*       Significant at the 5% level.
 276 
 
Table 38 reports the correlation matrix of Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-
parametric for all variables to test multicollinearity for the regression analysis. Evidently, 
low correlation coefficients between the variables of Table 38 indicate that the examination 
does not provide any signs of multicollinearity problems because the correlation coefficients 
amongst all variables are smaller than the 0.80 thresholds (Nguyen et al., 2015). In addition, 
Table 38 shows statistically significant correlation between TOQ and variables. For instance, 
RMDPI, GSHR, BBSZ, BBID, ISG, NGQM, LNBS, and CGDP are significant and positively 
correlated with TOQ, while OPEF, CEOP, and INFL are significant and negatively 
correlated with TOQ. These results are consistent with the multi-theoretical expectations, 
particularly the positive association between risk disclosures and bank value. 
5.2 Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Table 39 reports the fixed-effect regression estimates of the impact of risk disclosures 
and multi-level governance on bank value. The results of Model 1 of Table 39 indicate that 
risk disclosures and multi-level governance are significant in explaining variances in bank 
value. First, I predict that the value of those banks with better risk disclosure practices will 
have a relatively better market valuation. Model 1 of Table 39 suggests evidence consistent 
with a positive risk disclosures–bank value relationship. The coefficient of the risk 
disclosures (RMDPI) in Model 1 of Table 39 is positive (t = 4.61, p < .001), thus providing 
empirical support for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, better risk disclosures as a CG practice can 
improve investors’ perceptions of the banks’ overall risk management, and thus, improve the 
bank value. This result also indicates that complying with effective risk disclosures practices 
through greater risk disclosure activities not only can increase the bank legitimacy (Al-
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Bassam et al., 2012; Mollaha & Zamanb, 2015; and Suchman, 1995), but also present 
opportunities to get higher market valuations (Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy, 2016; 
Ntim, 2016; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016).  
This evidence is largely in line with previous studies that support the role of risk 
disclosures to improve the bank value (Campbell et al., 2014; Linsmeier et al., 2002; 
Miihkinen, 2013; Moumen et al., 2015; Rajgopal, 1999). This evidence is consistent with 
the expectations of the multi-theoretical frame, which suggests that better risk disclosures 
may reduce asymmetric information and agency problems consequently, it can improve the 
market valuations of bank’s stock price (Aguilera et al., 2008; AI-Bassam & Ntim, 2016; 
Elshandidy, 2016; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Similarly, enhanced risk disclosures (due to 
coercive and societal pressures) can increase society’s acceptance and legitimate banks’ 
operations as well as send signals to distinguish a bank with higher risk management quality 
from their counterparts (Bergh et al., 2014; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Connelly et al., 2011; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Pittroff, 2014). 
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Table 39 The impact of risk disclosures and multi-level governance on bank value (TOQ) 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: bank value (TOQ) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Full sample  IBs CBs DBs  Pre GBC GBC Post GBC  G2SLS ∆TOQ 
Panel A: Un-weighted risk disclosures index (RMDPI)  
RMDPI  4.61***  2.77*** 3.12*** 4.91***  1.85* 1.47 5.58***  4.92*** 2.32** 
 (0.000)  (0.006) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.070) (0.148) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.021) 
Panel B: Bank-level governance (ownership variables) 
BSHR -1.59  -0.80 -0.83 0.54  1.78* -0.59 -3.74***  -0.81 -1.71* 
 (0.113)  (0.425) (0.409) (0.589)  (0.080) (0.557) (0.000)  (0.418) (0.089) 
GSHR -1.60  -1.68* -0.43 -1.48  -2.22** -1.94* 0.90  -2.82*** -0.10 
 (0.110)  (0.095) (0.665) (0.142)  (0.030) (0.056) (0.367)  (0.005) (0.921) 
FSHR 1.95*  -0.31 0.06 2.36**  0.98 2.81*** 4.04***  3.05*** 2.82*** 
 (0.052)  (0.753) (0.949) (0.019)  (0.333) (0.007) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.005) 
Panel C: Bank-level governance (board variables) 
BBSZ 2.08**  -0.26 0.39 2.38**  0.68 1.86* 1.27  2.61*** 1.88* 
 (0.038)  (0.798) (0.695) (0.018)  (0.496) (0.068) (0.206)  (0.009) (0.061) 
CEOP -1.99**  -1.93* -1.48 -2.25**  -0.71 -1.04 -0.17  -2.57** -0.12 
 (0.047)  (0.055) (0.140) (0.026)  (0.478) (0.304) (0.861)  (0.010) (0.903) 
BBID 6.37***  2.66*** 3.90*** 3.03***  0.86 4.62*** 2.84***  7.91*** 0.96 
 (0.000)  (0.009) (0.000) (0.003)  (0.395) (0.000) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.338) 
Panel D: Bank-level governance (Islamic governance) 
ISG 8.35***  2.71*** - 3.14***  2.93*** 2.24** 6.25***  8.97*** 4.09*** 
 (0.000)  (0.008) - (0.002)  (0.005) (0.029) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel E: Country-level governance (national governance quality) 
NGQM 3.01***  4.59*** 4.88*** 1.08  1.50 2.46** 2.18**  3.69*** 1.32 
 (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.281)  (0.139) (0.017) (0.030)  (0.000) (0.188) 
Panel F: Control variables 
LNBS 11.88***  5.59*** 7.85*** 4.37***  3.20*** 1.63 7.14***  12.52*** 1.95* 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.109) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.052) 
BPR 0.07  -0.93 2.51** 0.45  -0.21 -0.27 1.04  0.14 0.84 
 (0.946)  (0.352) (0.013) (0.656)  (0.836) (0.789) (0.298)  (0.891) (0.403) 
OPEF -3.68***  -0.47 -1.46 -4.56***  -1.77* -0.34 -2.06**  -2.43** -1.70* 
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Table 39 The impact of risk disclosures and multi-level governance on bank value (TOQ) continued... 
 (0.000)  (0.637) (0.145) (0.000)  (0.083) (0.735) (0.040)  (0.015) (0.089) 
BCAD 1.83*  1.45 0.50 1.99**  1.65 2.44** 1.35  3.33*** 0.91 
 (0.068)  (0.150) (0.617) (0.049)  (0.105) (0.018) (0.177)  (0.001) (0.363) 
INFR 6.01***  2.80*** 1.43 4.79***  2.73*** 1.44 2.27**  6.83*** 1.71* 
 (0.000)  (0.006) (0.155) (0.000)  (0.008) (0.156) (0.024)  (0.000) (0.088) 
CGDP -1.86*  -0.58 -0.53 -0.85  -2.50** 2.18** -0.58  -2.57** 0.74 
 (0.063)  (0.566) (0.595) (0.395)  (0.015) (0.033) (0.566)  (0.010) (0.461) 
 
Constant -2.28**  -0.11 -1.94* 0.70  -0.04 -2.58** -1.75*  -3.35*** -4.56*** 
 (0.023)  (0.914) (0.054) (0.486)  (0.970) (0.012) (0.080)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Fixed effect Year   Year  Year  Year   -  Year  Year   Year  Year  
STD 
clustering 
Bank  Bank Bank Bank  - Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
F (chi2) 218.70***  80.05*** 96.80*** 83.76***  26.24*** 48.36*** 165.81***  3453*** 30.38*** 
Overall R2 0.8220  0.8525 0.8331 0.7696  0.8716 0.6828 0.7949  0.8285 0.2694 
Hausman 
chi2 
132.22***  92.95*** 112.35*** 125.78***  88.75*** 98.97*** 87.75***  143.97*** 2.25 
No. of obs 684  183 265 236  74 159 451  684 595 
Notes: This table reports the t-statistics and P-value (in parentheses) from using a fixed effect regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. This table presents the following variables: Tobin’s Q (TOQ), un-weighted risk disclosures index (RMDPI), block shareholdings (BSHR), 
governmental shareholdings (GSHR), foreign shareholdings (FSHR), board size (BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence (BBID), Islamic 
governance (ISG), national governance quality (NGQM), bank size (LNBS), profitability (BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy 
(BCAD), annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 33 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Denotes significant at the 1% level. 
**     Denotes significant at the 5% level. 
*       Denotes significant at the 10% level. 
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Second, at the bank-level, this study examines whether Islamic governance, board, and 
ownership structures can have an impact on the bank value (TOQ). Board and ownership 
structures include three ownership (block shareholdings — BSHR, government 
shareholdings — GSHR, and foreign shareholdings— FSHR) and three board (bank board 
size — BBSZ, CEO power — CEOP, and board independence— BBID) variables, 
respectively, in Table 39, Model 1. The results show that Islamic governance (ISG), foreign 
shareholdings (FSHR), bank board size (BBSZ), and board independence (BBID) are 
positively related to the TOQ, but block shareholdings (BSHR), government shareholdings 
(GSHR), and CEO power (CEOP) are negatively related to the TOQ. The results also offer 
support for the multi- theoretical framework.  
For instance, the positive relationship (t = 8.35, p < .001) between Islamic governance 
(ISG) and the TOQ is in line with those of prior studies (Abdullah et al., 2015; AI-Bassam 
& Ntim, 2016; Elghuweel et al., 2016; Mallin et al., 2014). Specifically, better Islamic 
governance as a CG practice can convey important signals to investors about the banks’ 
legitimacy, and thus, improve the bank value. This result implies that Islamic governance 
mitigates information asymmetry, which is a critical concern in determining how to evaluate 
banks’ share prices (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Cascino et al., 2010). In addition, these 
results suggest that Islamic governance signals their compliance with Sharia to gain 
institutional legitimacy and society’s acceptance, which have an impact on bank valuations. 
This, therefore, leads us to accept Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the value of those banks 
with better Islamic governance will have a relatively better market valuation. 
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Also, Model 1 of Table 39 reports positive relationship (t = 1.95, p < 0.10) between 
foreign shareholdings (FSHR) and the TOQ that is in line with those of previous studies (Bell 
et al., 2014; Berger et al., 2010; Black et al., 2015; Choi & Hasan, 2005; He et al., 2013; 
Jiang et al., 2013; Lensink et al., 2008; Lin & Zhang, 2009; Micco et al., 2007). This result 
implies that foreign shareholders have both the power and the incentives to monitor insiders’ 
behaviour to safeguard minority rights and bank reputation (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; 
Cascino et al., 2010). In addition, these results suggest that foreign shareholders signal their 
compliance with government initiatives and standards that can enable them to gain better 
market valuation. This, therefore, leads us to accept H4c, which suggests that there is a 
positive relation between foreign shareholdings (FSHR) and MENA banks’ value. 
The negative relationship, but insignificant, among block shareholdings (BSHR), 
government shareholdings (GSHR), and the TOQ (t = -1.59, p = 0.113, and, t = -1.60, p = 
0.110, respectively) is in line with those of prior studies (Bergh et al., 2014; Black et al., 
2015; Chi & Lee, 2010; Grove et al., 2011; Hovey et al., 2003; Maury, 2006; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). This result implies that the main 
shareholders (i.e., block and government shareholders) either divert bank resources for their 
own benefits and/ or for political and socio-economic goals, or increase information 
asymmetry and bureaucracy, which leads to poor market valuation (Busta et al., 2014; Cheng 
et al., 2013; Iannotta et al., 2013; Maury & Pajuste, 2005). In addition, these results suggest 
that investors may face multiple agency problems with MENA governments and the main 
shareholders, as powerful shareholders. This, therefore, leads to reject H4a. 
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Model 1 of Table 39 shows a positive relationship among bank board size (BBSZ), board 
independence (BBID) and the TOQ (t = 2.08, p = 0.038, and, t = 6.37, p = 0.000, respectively) 
which provides support for extant research. It implies that bigger boards with more board 
independence are more likely to offer additional strategic capabilities and monitoring that 
enhance bank performance, thereby decreasing investors’ risk perception of future 
performance, which may affect shares prices positively (Adams & Mehran, 2012; Aebi et 
al., 2012; Bell et al., 2014; Bertoni et al., 2014; Black et al., 2015; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; 
Dahya et al., 2008; Elbadry et al. 2015; García-Meca et al., 2015; Hagendorff et al., 2010; 
Liang et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2012; Minton et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015). These results 
suggest that bank board size and board independence is associated with better executive 
monitoring due to increased experience and skills, which may offer better access to important 
resources and enhance bank legitimacy.  
Finally, the negative effect of CEO power (CEOP) on the TOQ (t = -1.99, p = 0.047) is 
consistent with the results of previous empirical research (Bertoni et al., 2014; Elyasiani & 
Zhang, 2015; Erkens et al., 2012; García-Meca et al., 2015; Grove et al., 2011; Masulis et 
al., 2012; Pathan & Faff, 2013). This result is also in line with the theoretical suggestions 
(e.g., agency theory) that banks with less powerful CEOs (e.g., the roles of a CEO and the 
board chairman are held by two different people) are generally viewed to have lower agency 
costs. CEO duality can be seen both as a sign and an instrument of less managerial power 
that mitigates agency conflicts and legitimate bank activities. This, therefore, leads us to 
accept Hypothesis 3 (H3b). These results suggest that bank-level governance in addition to 
risk disclosures also contribute to the increase in bank value. 
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 Third, at the country-level, this essay investigates whether country-level governance 
(i.e., national governance quality) has an impact on the bank value (TOQ). The result shows 
that cross-sectional differences in the TOQ can largely be explained by national governance 
quality (NGQM). Specifically, the coefficient of the national governance quality (NGQM) in 
Model 1 of Table 39 is positive (t = 3.01, p < .005), thus providing empirical support for 
Hypothesis 5. In particular, banks in strongly governed countries get higher market valuation 
compared with their counterparts. This evidence is largely in line with previous studies that 
support the role of NGQM to improve market valuation (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012; Abdioglu et 
al., 2013; Boulton et al., 2010; Cumming et al., 2014; Dahya et al., 2008; Francis et al., 
2012; Ghoul et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2015).  
This evidence is consistent with the expectations of the multi-theoretical frame, which 
suggests that improved NGQM can provide additional monitoring level to mitigate 
information asymmetries and enhance investors’ protection, and hence, improve bank value. 
Similarly, NGQM offers incentives to avoid reputation damage and increase society 
acceptance by confirming banks legitimacy. These results suggest that country-level 
governance in addition to risk disclosures and bank-level governance also contribute to the 
increase in bank value. 
Regarding the control variables, the study reports consistent findings regarding how 
those variables impact bank value under model 1 of Table 39. Specifically, I find that a 
bank’s size (LNBS), and capital adequacy (BCAD) have a positive impact on the TOQ (t = 
11.88, p = 0.000, and, t = 1.83, p = 0.068, respectively), while I find that operations efficiency 
(OPEF) is significantly and negatively associated with the TOQ (t = -3.68, p = 0.000). The 
 284 
 
results on these control variables are in line with previous studies (e.g., Elshandidy, 2016; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Lozano et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2015). 
Taken together, the results in this section strongly support the earlier prediction that the 
value of those banks with better risk disclosures, bank-level governance, and country-level 
governance experience greater improvement in market valuation. 
5.3 Additional Analyses 
The study performs a number of further analyses to determine the robustness of the 
results. Firstly, as a robustness check, I reproduced the analyses in Model 1 of Table 39 by 
replacing RMDPI with W-RMDPI, and the results are presented in Model 1 of Table 40. 
These results are similar to those reported in Model 1 of Table 39, implying that the results 
are obviously robust for use in disclosure indices measure. Secondly, as a sensitivity analysis, 
I reproduced the analyses in Model 1 of Table 39 by replacing the TOQ with ∆TOQ, and the 
results are presented in Model 39 of Table 39. Specifically, I re-run equation (10) using 
change in TOQ, and estimated the following fixed effects regression equation: 
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(11) 
where: 
Everything continues unaffected as stated in equation (10) except that the study used the 
∆TOQ. The essay reports that the results of this regression in Model 9 of Table 39 are like 
quantitatively those stated in Model 1 of Table 39, suggesting that the results are obviously 
robust to employ the TOQ measure. 
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Thirdly, following extant research (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), the study 
addresses potential endogeneities that may be affected by omitted variable bias by estimating 
two-stage least squares for panel-data estimators (G2SLS). In the first stage, I replaced the 
multi-level governance variables with instrument variables, which are influenced by all the 
control variables. In the second stage, I used the instrumented variables of the multi-level 
governance and re-run equation (12) as follows:  
 
∑∑
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(12) 
where: 
everything continues unaffected as stated in equation (10) except that I used the 
instrumented multi-level governance variables. 
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Table 40 The impact of risk disclosures and multi-level governance on bank value (TOQ) 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: bank value (TOQ) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Full sample  IBs CBs DBs  Pre GBC GBC Post GBC  G2SLS ∆TOQ 
Panel A: Weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI) 
W-RMDPI  4.36***  0.27 3.29*** 2.66***  6.36*** 0.09 3.97***  5.80*** 1.58 
 (0.000)  (0.786) (0.001) (0.009)  (0.000) (0.930) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.114) 
Panel B: Bank-level governance (ownership variables) 
BSHR -1.39  -0.15 -0.40 0.24  2.75*** -0.62 -3.66***  -0.61 -1.60 
 (0.164)  (0.883) (0.690) (0.810)  (0.008) (0.537) (0.000)  (0.542) (0.109) 
GSHR -1.73*  -1.65 -0.96 -1.05  -2.15** -1.64 0.70  -2.90*** -0.17 
 (0.084)  (0.101) (0.337) (0.294)  (0.035) (0.107) (0.485)  (0.004) (0.864) 
FSHR 1.81*  -0.39 -0.11 2.32**  0.25 2.50** 3.55***  2.83*** 2.72*** 
 (0.071)  (0.694) (0.916) (0.021)  (0.802) (0.015) (0.000)  (0.005) (0.007) 
Panel C: Bank-level governance (board variables) 
BBSZ 1.34  0.12 0.14 1.99**  1.13 1.91* -0.13  1.73* 1.46 
 (0.179)  (0.906) (0.889) (0.048)  (0.261) (0.061) (0.899)  (0.083) (0.146) 
CEOP -2.06**  -2.01** -1.37 -1.99**  -1.71* -1.16 -0.36  -2.63*** -0.18 
 (0.039)  (0.046) (0.172) (0.048)  (0.092) (0.252) (0.719)  (0.009) (0.857) 
BBID 6.57***  2.92*** 4.28*** 3.77***  0.69 5.25*** 3.29***  7.77*** 1.13 
 (0.000)  (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.495) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.257) 
Panel D: Bank-level governance (Islamic governance) 
ISG 8.33***  3.70*** - 3.84***  3.15*** 2.34** 6.56***  8.84*** 4.31*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) - (0.000)  (0.003) (0.022) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel E: Country-level governance (national governance quality) 
NGQM 3.03***  5.24*** 4.77*** 1.28  0.49 2.89*** 2.26**  3.57*** 1.41 
 (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.203)  (0.623) (0.005) (0.024)  (0.000) (0.159) 
Panel F: Control variables 
LNBS 11.17***  6.85*** 7.05*** 5.02***  2.80*** 1.65 8.14***  11.20*** 2.26** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.007) (0.104) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.024) 
BPR 0.35  -1.32 2.65*** 0.69  0.02 -0.04 1.58  0.51 0.97 
 (0.724)  (0.188) (0.009) (0.492)  (0.984) (0.971) (0.114)  (0.609) (0.332) 
OPEF -2.97***  -0.62 -0.84 -3.59***  -1.99* -0.29 -1.04  -1.89* -1.35 
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 (0.003)  (0.534) (0.400) (0.000)  (0.051) (0.776) (0.300)  (0.059) (0.177) 
BCAD 1.52  1.32 0.41 1.70*  1.07 2.13** 0.86  3.10*** 0.66 
 (0.128)  (0.190) (0.684) (0.090)  (0.288) (0.037) (0.392)  (0.002) (0.507) 
INFR 5.69***  2.64*** 1.33 4.45***  4.02*** 1.38 2.21**  6.74*** 1.45 
 (0.000)  (0.009) (0.185) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.172) (0.028)  (0.000) (0.149) 
CGDP -1.79*  -0.71 -0.75 -1.11  -3.03*** 2.37** -0.48  -2.44** 0.75 
 (0.074)  (0.476) (0.453) (0.266)  (0.004) (0.021) (0.629)  (0.014) (0.456) 
 
Constant -1.44  -0.53 -1.86* 0.77  0.46 -2.43** -0.45  -2.59** -4.09*** 
 (0.150)  (0.599) (0.064) (0.442)  (0.650) (0.018) (0.653)  (0.010) (0.000) 
Fixed effect Year   Year  Year  Year   -  Year  Year   Year  Year  
STD 
clustering 
Bank  Bank Bank Bank  - Bank Bank  Bank Bank 
F (chi2) 217.75***  75.50*** 97.37*** 75.87***  44.40*** 46.61*** 158.03***  3541*** 30.01*** 
Overall R2 0.8294  0.8482 0.8511 0.7857  0.9199 0.6744 0.8045  0.8366 0.2712 
Hausman 
chi2 
174.25***  143.56*** 112.22*** 172.77***  103.66*** 102.44*** 132.85***  6.75 185.35*** 
No. of obs 684  183 265 236  74 159 451  684 595 
Notes: This table reports the t-statistics and P-value (in parentheses) from using a fixed effect regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. This table presents the following variables: Tobin’s Q (TOQ), weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI), block shareholdings (BSHR), 
governmental shareholdings (GSHR), foreign shareholdings (FSHR), board size (BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence (BBID), 
Islamic governance (ISG), national governance quality (NGQM), bank size (LNBS), profitability (BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital 
adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See Table 33 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Denotes significant at the 1% level. 
**     Denotes significant at the 5% level. 
*       Denotes significant at the 10% level. 
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The results are reported in Model 8 of Table 39. These results are also similar to those 
reported in Model 1 of Table 39, implying that the results are obviously robust for the 
probable endogeneities issue that could be affected by omitted variable bias. 
Fourthly, a potential concern regarding the above results is that the bank value 
differences may be driven by bank type. To mitigate this concern, the essay considers the 
robustness of the results on sub-samples: Islamic banks, commercial banks, and dual banks 
by re-running equations (1) and (3) and results presented in Table 39. Apart from limited 
sensitivities (such as the significance of FSHR and GSHR), the results in Models 2, 3, and 4 
of Table 39 have similarities to those reported in Model 1 of Table 39. This suggests that the 
results are obviously robust on the sub-samples. Inconsistently, I found out that foreign 
shareholdings (FSHR) have a negative impact on TOQ in Islamic banks, unlike commercial 
and dual banks. One possible explanation could be driven from institutional theory for the 
reason that Islamic banks with major foreign shareholdings may not gain institutional 
legitimacy that affects investors’ valuation.   
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Table 41 The impact of risk disclosures and multi-level governance on bank value (TOQ) (Highly- vs. poorly- performing 
banks) 
Variables  Dependent variable: bank value (TOQ) Difference 
t-statistics Highly-performing banks  Poorly-performing banks 
 (1) RMDPI (2) W- RMDPI  (3) G2SLS (4) ∆ TOQ  (5) RMDPI (6) W- RMDPI (7) G2SLS (8) ∆ TOQ 
Panel A: Un-weighted risk disclosures index (RMDPI) / Weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI)  
RMDPI  2.80*** 3.22*** 2.69*** 2.22**  3.56*** 2.12** 4.81*** 2.14** 23.64*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.029)  (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) 
Panel B: Bank-level governance (ownership variables) 
BSHR 0.21 0.05 0.62 1.41  -1.90* -1.55 -0.03 -2.54** -0.71 
 (0.833) (0.963) (0.536) (0.160)  (0.059) (0.122) (0.978) (0.012) (0.477) 
GSHR -1.09 -1.14 -2.27** -0.52  -1.75* -1.73* -2.30** -0.06 2.79*** 
 (0.277) (0.255) (0.023) (0.601)  (0.081) (0.085) (0.022) (0.954) (0.005) 
FSHR 0.25 0.10 1.17 0.75  1.75* 1.88* 3.75*** 2.56** 2.14** 
 (0.801) (0.919) (0.240) (0.453)  (0.082) (0.062) (0.000) (0.012) (0.032) 
Panel C: Bank-level governance (board variables) 
BBSZ 1.53 1.38 0.91 2.02**  0.00 0.38 0.87 1.14 23.73*** 
 (0.127) (0.170) (0.364) (0.046)  (1.000) (0.708) (0.385) (0.255) (0.000) 
CEOP 0.85 0.89 0.94 omitted  -2.71*** -2.73*** -3.25*** -0.38 8.88*** 
 (0.398) (0.374) (0.347) -  (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.707) (0.000) 
BBID 1.60 1.82* 2.69*** 0.78  6.35*** 6.93*** 7.68*** 3.76*** 29.71*** 
 (0.110) (0.071) (0.007) (0.438)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel D: Bank-level governance (Islamic governance) 
ISG 5.38*** 4.84*** 7.34*** 0.08  0.85 1.13 0.67 0.28 19.17*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.936)  (0.397) (0.260) (0.504) (0.778) (0.000) 
Panel E: Country-level governance (national governance quality) 
NGQM 1.97* 1.89* 2.89*** 1.27  0.47 0.12 2.23** 0.32 16.06*** 
 (0.050) (0.060) (0.004) (0.208)  (0.642) (0.906) (0.026) (0.752) (0.000) 
Panel F: Control variables  
LNBS 6.37*** 6.60*** 5.31*** 2.28**  8.69*** 7.08*** 8.66*** 1.36 36.51*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) 
BPR 0.98 1.28 0.28 1.80*  0.60 0.47 0.60 0.28 1.33 
 (0.330) (0.201) (0.782) (0.075)  (0.546) (0.638) (0.547) (0.779) (0.183) 
OPEF -1.14 -1.21 -1.22 -0.94  -2.30** -2.06** -0.83 -0.24 -18.74*** 
 (0.256) (0.229) (0.222) (0.350)  (0.022) (0.040) (0.405) (0.809) (0.000) 
BCAD 2.05** 1.87* 2.05** 0.29  0.58 0.83 2.86*** 2.24** -0.30 
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 (0.042) (0.063) (0.040) (0.774)  (0.561) (0.406) (0.004) (0.027) (0.767) 
INFR 4.86*** 4.96*** 5.11*** 0.79  2.84*** 2.22** 4.14*** 0.43 -1.80* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.429)  (0.005) (0.028) (0.000) (0.667) (0.072) 
CGDP -0.73 -0.80 -1.79* -0.41  -2.56** -2.20** -1.43 -0.02 2.28** 
 (0.465) (0.427) (0.073) (0.680)  (0.011) (0.029) (0.152) (0.984) (0.023) 
 
Constant -1.68* -1.80* -1.17 -1.55  -2.24** -1.22 -3.62*** -4.40***  
 (0.093) (0.073) (0.241) (0.125)  (0.026) (0.222) (0.000) (0.000)  
fixed effect Year  Year  Year  Year   Year  Year  Year  Year   
STD 
clustering 
Bank Bank Bank Bank  Bank Bank Bank Bank  
F (chi2) 23.93*** 24.36*** 327.28*** 4.64***  48.90*** 46.87*** 584.12*** 8.96***  
Overall R2 0.4320 0.4387 0.4913 0.1456  0.5385 0.5474 0.5917 0.2202  
Hausman 
chi2 
102.25*** 101.56*** 8.22 121.77***  119.66*** 130.44*** 1.85 108.79***  
No of obs 324 324 324 174  360 360 360 200  
Notes: This table reports the t-statistics and P-value (in parentheses) from using a fixed effect regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. This table 
presents the following variables: Tobin’s Q (TOQ), weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI), block shareholdings (BSHR), governmental shareholdings (GSHR), 
foreign shareholdings (FSHR), board size (BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence (BBID), Islamic governance (ISG), national governance quality (NGQM), 
bank size (LNBS), profitability (BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (CGDP). See 
Table 33 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Denotes significant at the 1% level. 
**     Denotes significant at the 5% level. 
*       Denotes significant at the 10% level. 
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Fifthly, the study classifies banks in the sample into strongly (poorly) performing banks 
subsample if the relative mean of bank value scores of a given bank is larger than (smaller 
than) the mean for all banks. Table 41 indicates the variables that influence bank value, and 
how those variables work among banks operating in strongly performing and poorly 
performing banks. Table 41 also offers a number of remarkable results as well as reveals that 
risk disclosures and multi-level governance have a significant impact on TOQ in highly 
performing banks compared with their counterparts. Specifically, I found that Islamic 
governance and national governance quality strongly affects TOQ in highly performing 
banks, unlike their counterparts. These results demonstrate the accountability role, ethical 
values, and effectiveness of Islamic governance and NGQM to boost and monitor banks’ 
transparency level.  
By contrast, I found that bank-level governance strongly influences TOQ in poorly 
performing banks, unlike their counterparts. In particular, I found that CEOP, BBID, BSHR, 
and GSHR strongly impact TOQ in poorly performing banks compared with highly 
performing banks. These results imply that MENA investors perceive Islamic governance 
and country-level governance as the main determinant of bank value; however, bank-level 
governance performs an important role in determining the value of poorly performing banks. 
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Table 42 The impact of risk disclosures and multi-level governance on bank value (TOQ) (Strongly vs. poorly governing 
environments) 
 
Variables 
 Dependent variable: bank value (TOQ)  
Difference 
t-statistics 
Strongly governing environment  Poorly governing environment 
(1) RMDPI (2) W- RMDPI  (3) G2SLS (4) ∆TOQ  (5) RMDPI (6) W- RMDPI (7) G2SLS (8) ∆TOQ 
Panel A: Un-weighted risk disclosures index (RMDPI) / Weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI) 
RMDPI  3.16*** 3.38*** 3.21*** 2.88***  4.08*** 3.09*** 4.61*** 1.96* 16.96*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) 
Panel B: Bank-level governance (ownership variables) 
BSHR 1.11 0.92 0.99 1.51  -2.39** -1.97** -1.79* -0.73 -2.38** 
 (0.267) (0.358) (0.323) (0.134)  (0.017) (0.049) (0.074) (0.466) (0.017) 
GSHR -0.94 -0.78 -2.11** -0.22  -2.59** -2.66*** -2.19** -1.25 3.06*** 
 (0.351) (0.439) (0.035) (0.830)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.029) (0.212) (0.002) 
FSHR 0.98 0.73 0.54 1.03  2.95*** 2.83*** 4.21*** 2.09** -0.36 
 (0.330) (0.466) (0.587) (0.305)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.038) (0.717) 
Panel C: Bank-level governance (board variables) 
BBSZ 0.34 0.13 1.03 0.00  1.59 1.08 1.86* 1.67* 13.48*** 
 (0.737) (0.894) (0.301) (0.997)  (0.112) (0.280) (0.062) (0.097) (0.000) 
CEOP 1.98** 2.09** 0.68 0.87  -3.39 -3.37*** -3.56*** -0.08 6.68*** 
 (0.049) (0.038) (0.495) (0.386)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.933) (0.000) 
BBID 1.11 1.20 0.90 1.01  7.65*** 8.11*** 7.76*** 0.84 19.87*** 
 (0.270) (0.231) (0.368) (0.314)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.404) (0.000) 
Panel D: Bank-level governance (Islamic governance) 
ISG 5.49*** 5.07*** 7.13*** 0.10  1.36 1.80* 1.76* 0.22 17.58*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.917)  (0.176) (0.073) (0.079) (0.827) (0.000) 
Panel E: Country-level governance (national governance quality) 
NGQM 1.45 1.46 1.95* 1.40  -0.20 -0.64 -1.21 -0.56 22.36*** 
 (0.149) (0.145) (0.051) (0.165)  (0.843) (0.522) (0.227) (0.579) (0.000) 
Panel F: Control variables 
LNBS 5.07*** 5.24*** 4.68*** 1.58  9.93*** 9.03*** 10.78*** 2.61** 25.18*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.118)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
BPR 0.37 0.68 0.34 1.01  -0.37 -0.24 -0.34 -1.96*    0.87 
 (0.714) (0.498) (0.735) (0.316)  (0.712) (0.812) (0.736) (0.052) (0.386) 
OPEF -0.51 -0.65 -0.60 -0.26  -3.02*** -2.47** -1.30 -1.03 -15.45*** 
 (0.608) (0.518) (0.546) (0.793)  (0.003) (0.014) (0.194) (0.304) (0.000) 
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BCAD 1.83* 1.60 1.98** 0.48  0.70 0.65 2.55** 0.13 -1.10 
 (0.069) (0.111) (0.047) (0.632)  (0.487) (0.518) (0.011) (0.898) (0.273) 
INFR 4.72*** 4.71*** 5.42*** 0.65  2.37** 1.84* 2.97*** 0.99 -0.84 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.520)  (0.018) (0.067) (0.003) (0.322) (0.399) 
CGDP -0.27 -0.18 -1.21 -1.03  -2.55** -2.36** -2.64** -0.39 4.73*** 
 (0.784) (0.854) (0.228) (0.307)  (0.011) (0.019) (0.008) (0.699) (0.000) 
 
Constant -1.57 -1.55 -0.37 -0.30  -1.53 -0.73 -2.20** -3.05***  
 (0.117) (0.122) (0.712) (0.764)  (0.126) (0.466) (0.028) (0.003)  
fixed effect Year  Year  Year  Year   Year  Year  Year  Year   
STD 
clustering 
Bank Bank Bank Bank  Bank Bank Bank Bank  
F (chi2) 18.05*** 18.28*** 310.13*** 4.49***  119.38*** 116.32*** 1607.03*** 14.45***  
Overall R2 0.4962 0.4998 0.5756 0.1206  0.7335 0.7350 0.7696 0.2828  
Hausman 
chi2 
88.05*** 85.22*** 4.62 108.25***  124.54*** 201.80*** 3.05 72.09***  
No of obs 268 268 268 141  416 416 416 261  
Notes: This table reports the t-statistics and P-value (in parentheses) from using a fixed effect regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. This table 
presents the following variables: Tobin’s Q (TOQ), weighted risk disclosures index (W-RMDPI), block shareholdings (BSHR), governmental shareholdings (GSHR), 
foreign shareholdings (FSHR), board size (BBSZ), CEO power (CEOP), board independence (BBID), Islamic governance (ISG), national governance quality 
(NGQM), bank size (LNBS), profitability (BPR), operations efficiency (OPEF), capital adequacy (BCAD), annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita 
(CGDP). See Table 33 for the definitions of each variable. 
***   Denotes significant at the 1% level. 
**     Denotes significant at the 5% level. 
*       Denotes significant at the 10% level. 
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Sixthly, I further examined whether the behaviour of investors differs over the pre, 
during, and post-2007/2008 GBC periods. Findings are presented in Models 5, 6, and 7 of 
Table 39 and Models 5, 6, and 7 of Table 40, respectively. Model 5 of Table 39 and Model 
5 of Table 40 report pre- GBC period estimates.  
The results suggest evidence consistent with a positive risk disclosures–bank value 
relationship. However, the coefficient of the risk disclosures (RMDPI) in Model 5 of Table 
39 is less than pooled sample. Model 5 of Table 39 and Model 5 of Table 40 report 
inconsistent results regarding multi-level governance. For instance, Model 5 of Table 39 
reports insignificant relationship (t = 1.50, p = 0.139) between country-level governance 
(NGQM) and the TOQ. This result suggests that MENA countries have pursued important 
steps towards enhancing country-level governance onward. Similarly, Model 5 of Table 39 
and Model 5 of Table 40 show also that most of the bank-level governance variables have 
an insignificant impact on bank value. 
Model 6 of Table 39 and Model 6 of Table 40 report GBC period estimates. The results 
suggest evidence consistent with an insignificant risk disclosures–bank value relationship. 
This result implies that investors did not incorporate better risk disclosures in their valuation 
during the crisis. The results also show that investors incorporate country-level governance 
(NGQM), board independence (BBID), foreign shareholdings (FSHR), and Islamic 
governance (ISG) as the main determinants of bank value. Model 7 of Table 39 and Model 
7 of Table 40 report post-GBC period estimates. The results strongly suggest similar 
evidence with those reported in Model 7 of Table 39 and Model 7 of Table 40 of pooled 
sample estimates. 
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Finally, previous studies argue that institutional environment significantly affects 
investors’ decisions regarding the risk disclosure informativeness (Abdioglu et al., 2013; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011; Cumming et al., 2014; Leuz et al., 2010). For example, Lau et al. 
(2015) show a positive association between country-level governance and market responses 
to earnings announcements especially in strongly governed countries compared with those 
in weakly governed countries. I hypothesise, therefore, that multi-level governance and risk 
disclosures might be more informative for those banks that operate in strongly governed 
countries than for poorly governed countries. Table 42 reports the variables that influence 
bank value, and how those variables work among banks operating in strongly governed and 
poorly governed environments.  
The study classifies banks in the sample into the strongly (poorly) governed 
environments subsample if the relative mean of NGQM scores of a given bank is larger than 
(smaller than) the mean for all banks. Table 42 also offers a number of remarkable results as 
well as reveals that risk disclosures and bank-level governance have a significant impact on 
TOQ in poorly governed environments compared with their counterparts. By contrast, 
Islamic governance and national governance quality have a significant impact on TOQ in 
strongly governed environments compared with their counterparts. I also found that both 
strongly (Models 1, 2, 3, and 4) and poorly (Models 5, 6, 7, and 8) governing environments 
are likely to provide informative risk disclosures, However, banks at poorly governing 
environments tend to provide more informative risk disclosures. 
Remarkably, I found that NGQM has a negative impact on TOQ in poorly governed 
environments. These results support the argument that NGQM plays an important role in 
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determining the sign and significance of the bank value. This result also suggests that NGQM 
plays a substitute, not a complementing role to bank-level governance features that affect 
managerial discretion, and consequently, market valuation. 
In summary, additional analyses indicate that the main results of the impact of risk 
disclosures and multi-level governance on bank value are robust to different sub-samples, 
proxies for bank value, and for risk disclosures index. However, when the study uses other 
sub-samples for strongly governed and poorly governed environments and/ or strongly 
performing and poorly performing banks, I found an evidence of a substitutive relationship 
between country-level governance and bank-level governance.  
6. Summary and Conclusion 
This study presents empirical evidence on the impact of risk disclosures and multi-level 
governance on bank value using a dataset from MENA banks for a period of eight years from 
2006 to 2013. The results confirm the substantial role of risk disclosures and multi-level 
governance in improving bank valuation in MENA. More specifically, the results indicate 
that bank value is high in banks with higher foreign ownership, board size, board 
independence, Islamic governance, and national governance quality. I also find a significant 
negative relation between CEO power and bank value. Overall, these results support the 
multi-theoretical framework predictions derived from the agency, signalling, and 
institutional theories. In addition, I found evidence of informative risk disclosures and multi-
level governance in countries considered as a strongly governed environment. More 
importantly, the bank-level governance impact is higher in poorly governed environments 
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compared to strongly governed environments. These findings are robust to the different sub-
samples, proxies for bank value, and for risk disclosures index. 
This research presents three significant contributions to the disclosure quality and 
banking literature. Firstly, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study offers 
first-time evidence on the impact of Islamic governance on bank value. Secondly, the essay 
adds to the extant research of the informativeness of risk disclosures. Thirdly, the study offers 
evidence on the impact of multi-level governance on bank value using a multi-theoretical 
framework. Hence, the results emphasize the relevance of IFRS, Basel, and CG reforms that 
push for more consistency in risk disclosures and corporate governance practices. 
Consequently, the findings have a number of implications for regulators, banks, and 
investors, especially in emerging markets.  
The results suggest that better-governed banks at bank- or national-level have a high 
expectancy of higher market valuation. These results offer regulators a resilient incentive to 
pursue CG and disclosure reforms officially and mutually with national-level governance. 
Regarding banks, the results suggest that better Islamic governance and risk disclosures are 
expected to have a better market valuation. These results empower banks’ shareholders to 
enhance board structure (e.g., board size, and BBID) and pay considerate attention to risk 
disclosures. These results also indicate the importance of Islamic governance to mitigate 
information asymmetry and gain more legitimacy to achieve society’s acceptance and 
enhance bank value.  
Thus, these results show the monitoring and legitimacy benefits of multi-level 
governance, resulting in higher bank valuation. The results of the study would be beneficial 
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to develop countries in developing the current regulatory framework by concentrating on 
country-level governance as a substitute to CG structures in mitigating banks’ information 
asymmetry. Lastly, the findings offer investors the opportunity to build specific expectations 
about the disclosure quality in terms of risk disclosures. Further research might investigate 
the impact of either governance mechanisms (e.g., risk committee and remuneration 
committee) or other types of ownership structures such as family, institutional, and 
managerial ownership on bank value. It might be also extended to use non-parametric 
statistical techniques such as neural networks to investigate whether different results can be 
obtained. 
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1. Summary of the Thesis 
The financial crises that have been witnessed over the last two decades have raised the 
importance of risk disclosure in the banking sector worldwide. Despite its importance, 
studies examining the impact of firm-level governance structures on risk disclosure are 
generally rare, but particularly acute with respect to the banking sector of developing 
countries, such as those in the MENA region. Further, and to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, no previous research has examined the effect of multi-level governance 
mechanisms (e.g., board and ownership structures, Sharia supervisory board, and country-
level governance mechanisms) either on the level of bank risk disclosures, or on bank credit 
ratings and value.  
Hence, this thesis measures the level of risk disclosures in MENA banks and ascertains 
the extent to which multi-level governance mechanisms, including bank- and country-level 
governance can explain observable differences in the risk disclosures. In addition, it 
examines the informativeness of risk disclosures from equity and debt markets using a 
sample of 14 countries in the MENA region over the period of 2006 to 2013. This thesis is 
motivated by the dearth of research investigating the impact of multi-level governance on 
risk disclosure in banks and its consequences. It is also motivated by the fact that during the 
2006 – 2013 period, all MENA authorities made considerable changes to CG and 
implemented IFRS standards and Basel accords, which required banks to report more 
information about their risks. Risk disclosures also are critical for banks due to their 
opaqueness, complexities, multiple agency conflicts, and severely critical information 
asymmetries.  
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This thesis seeks to achieve fourteen objectives. First, it ascertains whether the Sharia 
Supervisory Board (SSB) can have an effect on the level of bank risk disclosures. Second, it 
seeks to examine, at the bank level, whether differences in risk disclosure level could be 
explained by board structures. Third, it attempts to determine whether the ownership 
structures (government ownership and family ownership) can have an effect on the level of 
bank risk disclosures. Fourth, it seeks to investigate, at the country level, the extent to which 
country-level governance mechanisms (i.e., control of corruption and political stability and 
absence of violence) can have an effect on the level of bank risk disclosures. Fifth, it intends 
to examine whether the national governance quality and Islamic governance quality have an 
effect on the level of risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs).  
Sixth, it attempts to explore why and how national governance quality may have a 
moderating influence on the Islamic governance quality - RMDPs nexus in the MENA 
Islamic banks. Seventh, it examines whether risk disclosures have a predictive effect 
(informativeness) on bank credit ratings (BCRs) in MENA region. Eighth, it attempts to 
ascertain whether SSB can have a predictive effect (informativeness) on BCRs in MENA 
region. Ninth, it investigates, at the bank level, whether differences in BCRs could be 
explained by board structures. Tenth, it examines whether the ownership structures can have 
an effect on the BCRs. Eleventh, it explores whether governance structures have a 
moderating effect on the risk disclosures-BCRs nexus.  
Twelfth, it seeks to examine whether risk disclosures influence banks’ market value in 
MENA region. Thirteenth, it attempts to explore whether the bank-level governance, 
including Islamic governance, board structures, and ownership structures affect market 
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valuation. Finally, it seeks to investigate whether country-level governance could explain 
differences in market valuation. 
This thesis’ multi- theoretical prospect is that effective governance structures may 
reduce the level of information asymmetry and uncertainty between shareholders and 
managers, as well as between shareholders and stakeholders by facilitating greater corporate 
transparency and accountability through increased risk disclosures, which may lead to better 
valuation. Improved risk disclosures also send important signals to the market about 
performance and risk management in banks. Such improved risk disclosure may secure 
access to resources, legitimise banks’ operations, and hence, reduce the cost of capital and 
improve valuation. The essay results are briefly synopsised below. 
2. Synopsis of Findings 
The examination of the impact of MLG on banks’ risk disclosure is motivated by the 
dearth of research investigating the impact of board, ownership, SSB and country governance 
characteristics on risk disclosure in banks. The study is also motivated by the fact that during 
the 2006 – 2013 period, all MENA authorities made considerable changes to CG and 
implemented IFRS standards and Basel accords, which required banks to report more 
information about their risks.  
The first essay investigates the relationships among board, ownership, SSB and country 
governance characteristics and risk management and disclosure practices (RMDPs). The 
multivariate analysis results suggest that the MLG is significant in explaining differences in 
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risk disclosure level. Specifically, the results suggest that Sharia Supervisory Board index 
(SSB) is positively associated with the level of risk disclosures by banks. 
 Second, and at the bank level, this study finds that ownership (governmental ownership 
and family ownership) and board (board size and non-executive directors) structures have a 
positive effect on the level of risk disclosures by banks, whilst CEO duality is negative, but 
insignificantly related to bank risk disclosures. Finally, and at the country level, the evidence 
suggests that control of corruption has a positive effect on the level of bank risk disclosure, 
whilst political stability and absence of violence have a negative, but insignificant association 
with the level of bank risk disclosures. These findings are largely in line with the predictions 
of the multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, signalling, 
legitimacy, and resource dependence theories. 
The second essay examines the relationships among Islamic governance quality, 
including other bank-level governance mechanisms, national-level governance, and RMDPs 
using a dataset from MENA Islamic banks for the financial years of 2006-2013. The results 
confirm the substantial role of Islamic governance quality and national governance quality 
in improving RMDPs in MENA Islamic banks. Specifically, the results indicate that RMDPs 
are high in banks with high Islamic governance, board size, non-executive directors, and 
national governance quality.  
In addition, the results indicate that NGQM moderates Islamic governance quality-
RMDPs nexus. These results are consistent with the predictions of the multi-theoretical 
framework that incorporates insights from agency, signalling, legitimacy, institutional, and 
resource dependence theories. These results also support the argument that NGQM plays an 
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important role in determining the sign and the significance of the Islamic governance quality-
RMDPs nexus. 
The third essay examines the predictive effect (informativeness) of risk disclosures on 
BCRs in MENA region. Consequently, it ascertains whether governance structures have a 
moderating effect on the risk disclosures-BCRs nexus using the MENA BCRs for fiscal years 
2006-2013. The empirical analysis results are five-fold. First, the result shows that risk 
disclosures are statistically significant and positively incorporated into the BCRs. Second, 
the results show that Sharia supervisory board is statistically significant and positively 
incorporated into the BCRs. Third, the results suggest that governmental ownership is 
statistically significant and positively incorporated into the BCRs, while foreign ownership 
is statistically significant and negatively incorporate in BCRs.  
Fourth, board size, gender diversity, and non-executive directors are statistically 
significant and positively incorporated into the BCRs. While, the results indicate that CEO 
power (duality) is statistically significant and negatively related to BCRs. Finally, the results 
imply that governance structures have a moderating effect on the risk disclosures-BCRs 
nexus. Notably, these results consider the effect of several other controlling variables, 
including bank size, performance, liquidity, income diversity, operations efficiency, capital, 
voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, time, inflation, and GDP per capita. 
The results are consistent with the expectations of agency, signal, legitimacy, and resource 
dependence theories.  
In the final essay, we undertake a cross-country study to investigate three issues related 
to market valuation that are highly relevant to banks and investors in developing countries. 
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The first issue is whether the risk disclosures can influence the value of banks. The second 
issue is how bank-level governance may affect the bank value. Finally, this essay explores 
the relationship between operating in highly governed countries and the market value of 
banks. The results confirm the substantial role of risk disclosures and multi-level governance 
in improving bank valuation in MENA.  
More specifically, the results indicate that market valuation is higher in banks with 
bigger foreign ownership, board size, board independence, Islamic governance, and national 
governance quality. The results also show a significant negative relationship between CEO 
power and bank value. Overall, these results support the multi-theoretical framework 
predictions derived from the agency, signalling, and institutional theories. In addition, I 
found evidence of informative risk disclosures and multi-level governance in countries 
considered as a strongly governed environment. More importantly, the bank-level 
governance impact is higher in poorly governed environments compared with strongly 
governed environments.  
In summary, regression analyses indicate that multi-level governance has positive 
impact on risk disclosures. The risk disclosures and multi-level governance have a significant 
influence on credit ratings and bank value. In addition, the results demonstrate the 
importance of institutional settings in determining the sign and significant of either multi-
level governance-risk disclosures nexus, or the relationship between risk disclosures, multi-
level governance and bank value. Finally, these results are robust to different sub-samples, 
proxies for bank value, and for risk disclosures index.  
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3. Contributions of the Thesis 
The thesis results extend, as well as make a number of new contributions to the extant 
research. First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the study provides a first-time 
cross-country evidence on the level of risk disclosures in MENA, especially following the 
2007/08 financial crisis. Second, the essays provide evidence for the first time on the impact 
of in-board layer (i.e., SSB) on the level of risk disclosures by MENA banks. Third, the study 
provides evidence on the extent to which differences in bank risk disclosures can be 
explained by bank-level governance, including board and ownership, and country-level 
governance. Fourth, the evidence offers insights into risk disclosure and governance 
practices over the pre- and post-2007/08 period.  
Fifth, and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the study offers first-time evidence 
on the effect of national governance quality on bank risk management and disclosure 
practices using a multi-theoretical framework. Sixth, the essays offer first time evidence on 
the impact of Islamic governance quality on bank risk management and disclosure practices. 
Seventh, the study provides evidence for the first time relating to the moderating effect of 
national governance quality on the relationship between Islamic governance quality and bank 
risk management and disclosure practices. Eighth, it contributes to the literature by providing 
first time evidence on the link between risk disclosures and banks’ credit ratings.  
Ninth, the study contributes to the literature by providing first time evidence on the 
moderating effect of governance structures on the risk disclosure-credit rating nexus. Tenth, 
and to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study offers first-time evidence on the 
impact of Islamic governance on bank value. Eleventh, the essays add to the extant research 
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of the informativeness of risk disclosures. Twelfth, the study offers evidence on the impact 
of multi-level governance on bank value using a multi-theoretical framework. Hence, the 
results emphasize the relevance of IFRS, Basel, and CG reforms that push for more 
consistency in risk disclosures and corporate governance practices. 
4. Implications of the Thesis and Recommendations  
Given the distinctive aspects of the MENA context, this thesis has a number of 
implications for policymakers, regulators, practitioners and investors, as well as IBs, CBs 
and DBs, especially for banks and authorities in other transition and emerging markets. First, 
the results show that the banking sector has responded to the recent regulatory pressure to 
enhance disclosure, transparency, and governance, and thus these results shed light on the 
importance of risk disclosure reforms for management, policymakers, and regulators in the 
banking sector especially after GBC. This may stimulate other developing countries that 
either tend to issue or improve CG codes to implement CG codes so as to improve RMDPs. 
Second, the RMDPs measure could also be employed as a framework for representing a 
list of risk disclosures guidelines and recommendations, to encourage developing countries 
in improving their banks’ transparency and resilience towards risk management and 
disclosures. Third, the findings show the importance of current CG reforms in MENA banks 
and their impact on enhancing risk disclosures. Examples of such changes include employing 
independent chairpersons; increasing board size; and independent members acting as 
effective bank level advisors and monitors of risk disclosure. Consequently, regulators and 
policymakers should continually pursue reforms to encourage banks to follow CG principles 
that are promoted as good practice.  
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Fourth, the results from the four essays call attention to the ownership structure 
importance and its role in RMDPs. It indicates that stockholders, especially block, 
government, family, and foreign stockholders, have strong incentives to monitor RMDPs in 
banks. Prospective investors may encourage investing in banks with a high proportion of 
foreign and government ownership because they anticipate more transparent RMDPs that 
enhance market valuation. Fifth, for IBs and DBs, the results demonstrate the importance of 
SSB, which mitigates agency costs, and works with BODs as additional governance layers 
to enhance transparency through comprehensive risk disclosures. In addition, SSB plays an 
important role in legitimizing banks operations through more disclosure about SSB 
characteristics to mitigate information asymmetry and gain more legitimacy to achieve 
society’s acceptance.  
Sixth, for policymakers, regulators and investors, country governance results show the 
importance of sound institution governance such as control of corruption in enhancing a 
banks’ transparency through risk disclosure. This thesis thus argues that national governance 
quality should be included in the corporate governance model in banks. Thus, instead of 
developing bank-level governance only, policymakers should turn their attention to national 
governance quality to reflect the interactions among bank-level governance, bank 
transparency, and market valuation. The results show that most of the MENA countries have 
low national governance quality. Thus, more effort should be made to improve national 
governance quality.  
Seventh, evidence of increasing informativeness of risk disclosures and governance 
structures suggests that efforts by banks and regulators to improve risk disclosure, SSB, 
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board independence, and quality of board rather than quantity become critical, have had some 
positive impact on BCRs, and improve overall banks’ performance. In addition, risk 
disclosures requirements should be developed frequently to ensure the quality and relevance 
of the risk disclosures. Eighth, regulators should put more regulatory reform regarding 
foreign banks in order to enhance their ratings compared to government owned banks.  
Ninth, the results suggest that better-governed banks at bank- or national-level have a 
higher expectancy for a higher market valuation. These results offer regulators a resilient 
incentive to pursue CG and disclosure reforms officially and mutually with national-level 
governance. These results also show the monitoring and legitimacy benefits of multi-level 
governance, resulting in higher bank valuation. Tenth, the results of the study would be 
beneficial to developing countries in improving the current regulatory framework by 
concentrating on country-level governance as a substitute to CG structures in mitigating 
banks’ information asymmetry. Eleventh, the results show that the multi-level governance 
improves RMDPs among MENA banks. This may imply that, unlike mandatory risk 
disclosures standards (e.g., IFRS 7, 9; and IAS 32, 39), policymakers in developing countries 
can rely on the multi-level governance to improve RMDPs in their countries. 
Twelfth, this thesis offers also theoretical implications. Joint insights from agency, 
legitimacy, signalling, institutional and resource dependence theories may consider as an 
important step improving the relevance of Islamic and national governance mechanisms in 
explaining the motivations involved in risk disclosures and its consequences. This is 
particularly important in the regulatory and socio-demographical diversity of MENA 
countries where multi-theoretical approach could help in explaining the seemingly 
 310 
 
inconsistent results of risk disclosures variation. Furthermore, to add further theoretical 
nuance to the multi-theoretical lens, this study cogitates how national governance quality and 
further effects such as ethical and religious values of the MENA region (i.e., Islamic 
governance) may influence risk disclosures. Thus, the multi-theoretical lens may remove the 
limitations to the application of each theory separately, thus offering explicit perception to 
the pressures, motivations, and decisions contexts surrounding bank disclosure and 
valuations. 
Thirteenth, this thesis offers also methodological implications. First methodological 
implication is utilising the fixed effect, 2SLS, 3SLS, and G2SLS as presented in models of 
essays 1, 2, 3, and 4. These estimation models help to strongly solve any potential 
endogeneities that may be affected by omitted variable bias. PNNs models also may suggest 
different interpretation compared with the conventional models in relation to the antecedents 
of RMDPs and its consequences. Second, the results suggest that differentiating between 
banks operating in poorly governed environments compared with strongly governed 
environments is essential to determine the impact of institutionally embedded pressures that 
influence the bank’s reaction to be involved in risk disclosures and governance activities.  
5. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This research contains some limitations. This study depends on banks annual reports 
only. Although important, they are not the only means by which banks disclose information 
about risk. Future research can examine other means by which banks discloses risk 
disclosures (e.g., press releases and bank website). The thesis also employs bank value 
(Tobin’s q) as a measure of market valuation. It also uses Fitch long-term ratings as a 
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measure for credit ratings. The use of two or more variables to measure either market 
valuation (e.g., abnormal returns, market liquidity, and profit margin), or credit ratings (e.g., 
S&P and Moody’s ratings) would be interesting if future research could try to examine it. 
Finally, further research can address sample size limitations and the impact of further CG 
mechanism (e.g., audit committee, risk committee, and independent non-executive board 
members) and and/or other types of ownership structures such as institutional, and 
managerial ownership on risk disclosures level on risk disclosures level. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Risk disclosure index (RMDPI) 
Risk type Risk disclosure index (RMDPI) Reference(s) 
 Bank financial risk disclosure   
(i) Credit 1- Exposure to credit risk and how they are 
arise. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
2- Objectives, policies, and processes for 
managing the credit risk. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
3- Method of measuring credit risk 
exposure. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
4- Adequately describes how credit risk 
management occurs including providing a 
clear linkage between the quantitative data 
and qualitative description. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
5- Changes in exposure to credit risk, 
measurement of risk, and objectives, 
policies and processes to manage the credit 
risk from the previous period. 
(IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
6- Amount of regulatory capital for credit 
risk (pillar 1 capital). 
(IAS 1.134-136; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
7- Information about credit quality of 
financial assets that are not past due or 
impaired. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
8- Renegotiated financial assets (that would 
be past due or impaired). 
(IFRS 7.37a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
9- Aging schedule for past due amounts. (IFRS 7.37a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
10- Impairment methods and inputs 
disclosed. 
(IFRS 7.37a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
11- Summary quantitative data about 
exposure to credit risk at the reporting date. 
(IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
12- Maximum credit exposure by currency. (IFRS 7.37a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
13- Maximum credit exposure by 
geography. 
(IFRS 7.37a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
14- Maximum credit exposure by economic 
activity. 
(IFRS 7.37a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
15- Disaggregated maximum credit risk 
exposure including derivatives and off-
balance sheet items (e.g., financial 
guarantees, and contingent commitments). 
(IFRS 7.37a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
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16- Renegotiated loans for troubled 
borrowers. 
(IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
17- Risk of counterparty. (IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
18- Credit risk concentrations. (IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
19- Derivatives. (IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
20- Off-balance sheet and joint venture 
structures. 
(IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
21- Credit risk transfer/mitigation/hedging 
techniques.   
(IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
22- Collateral. (IFRS 7.14-15; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
23- Disclosures to help users understand 
credit risk. 
(IFRS 7.36a; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
(ii) 
Liquidity 
24- Exposure to liquidity risk and how they 
arise. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
25- Objectives, policies and processes for 
managing the liquidity risk. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
26- Methods used to measure the liquidity 
risk. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
27- Changes in exposure to liquidity risk, 
measurement of risk, and objectives, 
policies and processes to manage the 
liquidity risk from the previous period. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
28- Contractual undiscounted cash flows. (IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
29- Maturity analysis of non-derivative 
liabilities. 
(IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
30- Maturity analysis of derivative 
liabilities. 
(IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
31- Maturity analysis of off-balance sheet 
commitments and other financial 
instruments without contractually stipulated 
maturity (e.g., financial guarantees, etc.). 
(IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
32- Maturity analysis of financial asset. (IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
33- Expected maturity analysis. (IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
34- Derivative and trading liabilities 
Treatment. 
(IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
35- Liquidity risk 
transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques. 
(IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
36- Liquidity buffers sources and volume. (IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
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37- Sensitivity analysis. (IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
38- Financing facilities. (IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
39- Counterparty concentration profile. (IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
40- Disclosures to help users understand 
liquidity risk. 
(IFRS 7.39; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
(iii) Market 41- Objectives, policies, processes, and 
Strategies of market risk management. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
42- Structure and organization of the market 
risk management function. 
(IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
43- Instruments traded types. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
44- Interest rate risk. (IFRS 7.40; Basel II. Pillar 
3) 
45- Equity risk. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
46- Currency risk. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
47- Commodities risk (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
48- Market risk transfer/mitigation/hedging 
techniques.   
(IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
49- Linkage with credit risk. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
50- Amount of regulatory capital for market 
risk (pillar 1 capital). 
(IAS 1.134-136; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
51- VAR (value-at-risk). (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3; Pérignon & Smith, 
2010) 
52- VAR limitations. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3; Pérignon & Smith, 
2010) 
53- Stress testing. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3; Pérignon & Smith, 
2010) 
54- Stress VAR. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3; Pérignon & Smith, 
2010) 
55- Back-testing. (IFRS 7.40-42; Basel II. 
Pillar 3; Pérignon & Smith, 
2010) 
56- Disclosures to help users understand 
market risk. 
(IAS 1.134-136; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
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(iv) Capital  57- Capital management. (IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
 58- Capital measurement. (IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
 59- Risk weighted assets. (IFRS 7.33b; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
 60- Tier 1. (IAS 1.134-136; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
 61- Tier 2. (IAS 1.134-136; Basel II. 
Pillar 3) 
 Bank non-financial risk disclosure   
(v) 
Operational 
62- Amount of regulatory capital for 
operational risk (pillar 1 capital). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2006, 2014b, 
2015b, 2016; IAS 1.134-
135; IFRS 7.33 (b))  
63- Regulatory capital for operational risk 
Measurement approach. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014b, 
2014c, 2016; IFRS 7.33 
(b)) 
64- Operational risk management Strategies 
and processes. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014b, 
2014c, 2015b, 2016; IFRS 
7.33; Ntim et al., 2013) 
65- The operational risk management 
function structure and organisation. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014b, 
2014c, 2015b, 2016; IFRS 
7.33; Ntim et al., 2013)  
66- Scope and nature of the operational risk 
reporting system 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014b, 
2014c, 2015b, 2016; IFRS 
7.33; Ntim et al., 2013) 
67- Operational risk 
transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014b, 
2014c, 2015b, 2016; Ntim 
et al., 2013) 
68- Operational value-at-risk. (Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Ford et al., 2009) 
69- Internal audit function/internal control 
system. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014c; 
Helbok & Wagner, 2006; 
Karim & Archer, 2013; 
Mokni et al., 2014; Ntim et 
al., 2013; Van Greuning & 
Iqbal, 2007) 
70- Key risk indicators (KRIs)/early 
warning systems (EWSs). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014c; Ford 
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et al., 2009; Mokni et al., 
2014; Young, 2015) 
71- Self-assessment techniques (SA). (Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Ford et al., 2009; 
Young, 2015) 
72- Stress tests/ Scorecard models/scenario 
analyses. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Ford et al., 2009; 
Mokni et al., 2014; Young, 
2015) 
73- Operational risk event databases 
(internal/external). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014c; Ford 
et al., 2009; Ginena, 2014; 
Mokni et al., 2014; Van 
Greuning & Iqbal, 2007; 
Young, 2015) 
74- Legal risks. (Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Ginena, 2014; 
Helbok & Wagner, 2006; 
Van Greuning & Iqbal, 
2007) 
75- Additional information on risk exposure 
and management (e.g., cumulative amounts 
of historical operational losses classified by 
event types and business). 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Van Greuning & 
Iqbal, 2007) 
76- Technology/information technology. (Helbok & Wagner, 2006; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Van 
Greuning & Iqbal, 2007) 
77- Compliance. (Ginena, 2014; Ntim et al., 
2013; Van Greuning & 
Iqbal, 2007) 
78- Marketing/customer 
satisfaction/boycott. 
(Ntim et al., 2013; Van 
Greuning & Iqbal, 2007) 
79- Competition/proprietary/copyright. (Ntim et al., 2013; Van 
Greuning & Iqbal, 2007) 
80- Personnel (human error, labour 
disputes, loss of/recruiting key employees). 
(Ginena, 2014; Helbok & 
Wagner, 2006; Ntim et al., 
2013; Van Greuning & 
Iqbal, 2007) 
81- Integrity/management and employee 
fraud. 
(Helbok & Wagner, 2006; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Van 
Greuning & Iqbal, 2007) 
82- Business ethics/corruption. (Ginena, 2014; Ntim et al., 
2013; Van Greuning & 
Iqbal, 2007) 
83- Disclosures to help users understand 
operational risk. 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; BCBS, 2014c; Ford 
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et al., 2009; Van Greuning 
& Iqbal, 2007) 
(vi) 
Strategic 
84- Sovereign/politics. (Amran et al., 2009; Ntim 
et al., 2013; Miihkinen., 
2012; Moumen et al., 
2015) 
85- Performance measurement. Amran et al., 2009, Ntim 
et al., 2013 
86- Regulation. (Amran et al., 2009; 
Miihkinen., 2012; Ntim et 
al., 2013; Moumen et al., 
2015) 
87- Taxation. (Ntim et al., 2013) 
88- Macroeconomic trends. (Ntim et al., 2013) 
89- Natural disasters/terrorism. (Ntim et al., 2013) 
90- GDP growth/market demand/aggregate 
demand. 
(Miihkinen., 2012; Ntim et 
al., 2013) 
91- Intellectual property rights. (Ntim et al., 2013) 
92- New alliances, joint ventures and 
acquisitions. 
(Amran et al., 2009; 
Miihkinen., 2012; 
Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim 
et al., 2013) 
93- Management of growth. (Ntim et al., 2013) 
94- Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name. (Miihkinen., 2012, 
Moumen et al., 2015) 
95- Strategy. (Ntim et al., 2013) 
96- Disclosures to help users understand 
strategic risk. 
(Ntim et al., 2013) 
Total  96 risk disclosure items  
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Appendix 2: Procedure of scoring for un-weighted/ weighted index 
Procedure of scoring for un-weighted index 
0:        Risk item not disclosed by bank. 
1:        Risk item disclosed by bank. 
Procedure of scoring for weighted index 
0:        Risk item not disclosed by bank. 
1:        Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad and/or qualitative 
information. 
2:        Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or 
quantitative information. 
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Appendix 3: A list of the 100 MENA sampled banks’ names 
No  Bank name Country  
1 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank AE 
2 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank AE 
3 Bank of Sharjah AE 
4 Commercial Bank International P.S.C. AE 
5 Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. AE 
6 Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC AE 
7 Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC AE 
8 Emirates NBD PJSC AE 
9 First Gulf Bank AE 
10 Invest Bank P.S.C. AE 
11 Mashreqbank PSC AE 
12 National Bank of Abu Dhabi AE 
13 National Bank of Fujairah AE 
14 National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK AE 
15 National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain AE 
16 Sharjah Islamic Bank AE 
17 Union National Bank AE 
18 United Arab Bank PJSC AE 
19 Ahli United Bank BSC BH 
20 Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. BH 
21 Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. BH 
22 Arab Banking Corporation BSC BH 
23 Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. BH 
24 BBK B.S.C. BH 
25 Gulf Finance House BSC  BH 
26 Khaleeji Commercial Bank BH 
27 National Bank of Bahrain BH 
28 Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. BH 
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No  Bank name Country  
29 Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSc BH 
30 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank EG 
31 Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE EG 
32 Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt EG 
33 Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. EG 
34 Credit Agricole Egypt EG 
35 Egyptian Gulf Bank EG 
36 Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB EG 
37 Suez Canal Bank EG 
38 The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK EG 
39 Union National Bank - Egypt SAE EG 
40 Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt EG 
41 Arab Bank Plc JO 
42 Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) JO 
43 Bank of Jordan Plc JO 
44 Cairo Amman Bank JO 
45 Capital Bank of Jordan JO 
46 Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) JO 
47 Jordan Ahli Bank Plc JO 
48 Jordan Commercial Bank JO 
49 Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank JO 
50 Jordan Islamic Bank JO 
51 Jordan Kuwait Bank JO 
52 Société générale de Banque-Jordanie JO 
53 Ahli United Bank KSC KW 
54 Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait (KSC) KW 
55 Boubyan Bank KSCP KW 
56 Burgan Bank SAK KW 
57 Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) KW 
58 Gulf Bank KSC (The) KW 
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No  Bank name Country  
59 Kuwait Finance House KW 
60 Kuwait International Bank KW 
61 National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. KW 
62 Warba Bank KW 
63 B.L.C. Bank S.A.L LB 
64 Bank Audi SAL LB 
65 Bank of Beirut S.A.L. LB 
66 Banque BEMO SAl LB 
67 BLOM Bank S.A.L. LB 
68 Byblos Bank S.A.L. LB 
69 Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur-BMCE Bank MA 
70 Bank Dhofar SAOG OM 
71 Bank Muscat SAOG OM 
72 Bank Sohar SAOG OM 
73 HSBC Bank Oman OM 
74 National Bank of Oman (SAOG) OM 
75 Ahli Bank QSC QA 
76 Al Khalij Commercial Bank QA 
77 Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC QA 
78 Doha Bank QA 
79 Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) QA 
80 Qatar International Islamic Bank QA 
81 Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ QA 
82 Qatar National Bank QA 
83 Al Rajhi Bank SA 
84 Alinma Bank SA 
85 Arab National Bank SA 
86 Bank Al-Jazira SA 
87 Banque Saudi Fransi SA 
88 National Commercial Bank (The) SA 
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No  Bank name Country  
89 Riyad Bank SA 
90 Samba Financial Group SA 
91 Saudi British Bank (The) SA 
92 Saudi Hollandi Bank SA 
93 Saudi Investment Bank (The) SA 
94 Bank of Syria and Overseas SA SY 
95 Syria International Islamic Bank SY 
96 Arab Tunisian Bank TN 
97 UBCI BNP PARIBAS TN 
98 Bank of Palestine Plc PS 
99 North Bank IQ 
100 Bank of Baghdad IQ 
Notes: The final sample covers 100 banks listed in 14 MENA stock exchanges as follows: 
United Arab of Emirates (AE), Bahrain (BA), Egypt (EG), Jordan (JO), Kuwait (KW), 
Lebanon (LB), Morocco (MA), Oman (OM), Qatar (QA), Saudi Arabia (SA), Syria (SY), 
Tunisia (TN), Palestine (PS), and Iraq (IQ). The final sample consists of 752 bank-year 
observations over eight fiscal years, from 2006 to 2013. 
 
 
 
